# FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

JVLY
1939

VOL·17 NO·4 $1·25 A COPY

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 17 JULY 1939 No. 4

# THE FRENCH DEMOCRATIC TRADITION

*By André Siegfried*

A HUNDRED and fifty years have elapsed since the principles of the French Revolution were enunciated in the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen." Today those principles still hold, are still dynamic. Conditions have changed, of course. When the Bastille fell the principles of 1789 were being urged against an absolutist past. Today the defenders of freedom are protesting in the name of those principles against the menace of a collectivist future. In the circumstances, the hundred and fiftieth anniversary of 1789 assumes quite unusual significance. What might have been a tiresome and commonplace official celebration turns out to symbolize a whole civilization whose fate is in the balance. Nothing emphasizes the changes that the modern world has undergone more clearly than this shift of positions on the ideological checkerboard.

## I

The original appeal of the French Revolution was so elementary and so simple that the most untutored mind could grasp it. It sought to defend against the arbitrary caprice of absolute power the unalterable freedom of the individual — the "natural rights" of man. Those rights the reformers of that era conceived of as being liberty, property, personal inviolability, freedom from oppression. If tyranny arose in the form of personal power, it was met with the doctrine of popular sovereignty. "The principle of sovereignty," says the Declaration, "resides essentially in the Nation. No institution and no individual can exercise an authority which does not emanate expressly from the Nation." If the tyranny came from the Church, it was met with the concept of the independence of secular society. Thus the Revolution de-

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clared that sovereignty derives from the people — from below, not from above. All citizens are equal — metaphysically equal, one might say. "Men are born and remain," says the Declaration, "equal in right. Social distinctions can be based only on social services." From these premises freedom of thought and conscience follow logically: "The free communication of thoughts is one of the most precious rights of man. Any citizen, therefore, may freely speak, write and print, subject to his responsibility for the abuse of such freedom in cases specified by law. . . . No one shall be molested for his religious beliefs provided expression of them occasion no disturbance to the public peace as established by law."

The French mind possesses a peculiar endowment which, however, is not always a blessing. It has a faculty for discerning the principle involved in a problem and for stating it in clear terms. Then it goes on to formulate the consequences, perhaps infinite in number, that follow logically from the principle.

The principle which the Revolution succeeded in stating was a magnificent and perhaps also a dangerous one. It was the principle that respect is due to every individual human being — considered as a thinking being, capable of reflection, judgment, decision. Long before the Declaration, Pascal had said: "The dignity of man lies in his thinking." It was a dictum very similar to that in the Declaration, though on a somewhat different — one might call it Christian — plane of living. The French have an instinctive feeling, a deep persuasion, that there is a truth common to all men, which the intelligence can uncover, which can be stated in words and which everybody can accept. Hence the universality claimed by the French message. Universality is its characteristic trait, and this trait distinguishes it radically from not a few of the great movements of thought that have appeared in history.

Liberal England and democratic America, long before France, found practical solutions to the problem of freedom that have successfully withstood the tests of time. But good as the British solution was, it was good only for the English. There was no pretense that it was valid for everybody and applicable everywhere. The American message was somewhat broader than the English, but it was addressed exclusively to peoples of the white race. The peculiar thing about the Declaration of '89 was that it overstepped all frontiers and appealed to "mankind" at large. It

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proclaimed — and has often been ridiculed on this account — the "rights of man," and it defined the term "man" so broadly that every human being without exception can take advantage of it. The spokesmen of the Revolution were thinking of all men, whatever their race, caste, color or origin.

The Gospel of Jesus was addressed to all human beings, Jew or Gentile, slave or free, poor or rich, and it breathed upon the peoples of the Mediterranean basin with so fresh and passionate an inspiration that in the end the Roman Empire itself was shaken to its foundations. The message that France in her turn broadcast to the world was hardly less fraught with glowing — though dangerous — promise. She appealed to a sentiment — the sentiment which the human being has of his dignity as a human being. Strictly speaking, it is a revolutionary sentiment. It encourages freedom in the individual's thinking. It even invites to revolt. From that time forward, whenever and wherever the human being is threatened in his self-respect, his freedom, his title to existence, the first impulse is to look toward France — the France where Voltaire spoke out for Calas and Zola for Dreyfus.

And here we are at the core of the moral force that upholds our so-called Western civilization. For my part, I am convinced that so long as there are men worthy of the name, the Christian Gospel in the domain of the spirit and the Principles of '89 in the domain of human relations will preserve their basic virtues as a ferment capable of leavening any and every sort of human dough. They are not mere documentary exhibits to be classified in a historical museum. They represent forces forever alive and ceaselessly active.

II

For a hundred and fifty years the Revolution has served as a basic line of demarcation in the domestic politics of France. In France it has never been a mere question of choosing between republic or monarchy. Something much deeper has always been at issue. Léon Bourgeois, one of the founders of the League of Nations, was well aware of this when, around 1890, he remarked to a number of Royalists who were thinking of coming over to the Republic: "You accept the Republic? But that is nothing, gentlemen! Do you accept the Revolution?" Acceptance or rejection of the spirit of '89 is the basic rift between Left and Right. I myself have participated in a dozen or more national elections since the opening of the century. In every one of them I have

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found a line of demarcation between two tendencies, one an inclination towards Democracy, the other an inclination towards what is known in France as Reaction.

In considering public opinion in France one should be on guard against misleading appearances. Many more people stand to the Right of that frontier line than one would suspect at first glance. The Revolution has never enjoyed unanimous acceptance among us. The number of those who pay lip-service to it is very great. To pretend acceptance is wise for any candidate at election time. But how many men are there really in France who are imbued with the pure spirit of the Revolution? Any Frenchman has only to look into his own heart to discover that, in a country as logical as France, acceptance of the Principles of '89 has much more serious implications than one might suppose.

The Revolution, as we saw, declared that sovereignty derives from the people, from below, not from above. If that is the case, it follows that the people (in other words, universal suffrage) must be enabled actually to influence national policy. A trite commonplace! Granted, but the commonplace implies two emphatic denials. It denies government by the "socially prominent," what the English call the "ruling classes." And it denies the Church any right to interfere in matters of state.

So by the mere fact of negating the platforms of its adversaries the Revolution defines its own proper domain. "There is no known case," exclaims Alain, the French philosopher, "of a society drawing-room where popular sovereignty is unqualifiedly accepted." That is true, I believe, at least as regards France, provided acceptance implies something more than mere words. How many there are who, without daring to say so, agree with Alexander Hamilton that "the people is a great beast!"

In France since the Revolution there has been an emotional, almost mystical, conception of "the People" — spelling the word with a capital "P." The notion holds sway over all popular gatherings. Members of the poorer classes in France think of themselves as constituting a single mass as opposed to the rich, the privileged, the employing class; they feel powerful in virtue of their numbers and are conscious of their collective being. I am not sure that such people really think there can ever be absolute equality among men — after all, the land of La Fontaine's Fables is a land of realists. But they insist at least that the principle of equality shall be recognized. The equality they have in mind is not just the

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"equality of opportunity" that Anglo-Saxons talk about. It is something more than that. It is a jealous, uncompromising assertion of the theoretical dignity of each individual. The vehement faith of Jean Jacques Rousseau figures in this attitude. So does the Declaration of the Rights of Man: "Men are born and remain equal before the law." In France respect for the law is a rule; but equality is a passion. All those who believe in race, in family, in rights of birth, all those who find it natural that there should be ruling classes, people actually better qualified than others to govern, do not go back to the Principle of '89. And they should not be classified with the Left.

As for Socialism, Marx appeals to class sentiments. He does not address the people at large. He is thinking of something narrower, something more special. This lack of universality sets Marxism off sharply from French Revolutionary doctrine. For the French "the People" constitutes a far broader entity than the proletariat of Socialism, and the deeper aspirations of the People come down from '89 and not from the Communist Manifesto. All the same, the movement of 1789 should in no sense be regarded as a conservative factor in French political life. The driving force of the French Revolution is fundamentally and deeply the People. That is why a considerable element in the French middle class has slowly but surely drawn apart from the Revolution.

As regards the Church — and in France the term means only the Roman Catholic Church — the conflict is more complex, since there is the added element of dogma — a very serious matter in a country where militants are all dogmatists. The Revolution was not anti-religious. Despite the fact that the Third Republic has been continuously at war with the Roman Curia, it has at the very worst been merely anti-clerical. But anti-clerical it was obliged to be. Having the principles it has, the Catholic Church can certainly not recognize the complete independence of secular society. It may recognize an independent temporal power — indeed any sort of temporal power — as a matter of empirical fact; but it insists, and has to insist, that that power is delegated from above, that it derives from God and must recognize God as its origin.

French democracy, logical by inner compulsion, cannot accept this claim of the Church, for it is at odds with the doctrine of popular sovereignty. Here we find one of the cases where the French mind has laid hold on a principle and refuses to let go. Prolonged struggles between the Church and the Republic have

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poisoned the political atmosphere for a good half century. The secular State in France is secular and the priests have nothing to do with it. The French schools are lay schools and the name of God is never uttered in their precincts. No crucifix is seen in public buildings and institutions. The Church has been separated from the State since 1905. God is not mentioned in speeches by public officials. It will be urged that other peoples have secular school systems, separation of Church and State, real independence of secular society, and that will be true enough. But in France the principle of independence has to be proclaimed and then inexorably applied down to its remotest implications. France, unfortunately, was not blessed with England's capacity for accepting inconsistencies and flagrant breaches of logic as matters of course.

Between people who are "for '89" and people who are "against '89" the lines are as sharply drawn as geographical boundaries. On one side stand the "little" people, on the other the "socially prominent." When an individual "makes money," too much money, he moves over to the Right. Those who are climbing, but have not quite "made" society proper, linger, as a matter of jealous spite, on the Left. So in every French town and village two parties spontaneously form, a party that wants to give more and more power to the people, and a party that wants to take the incompetent masses under its wing and manage their affairs wisely. "You will have a better government!" says the latter. But the others reply that they do not want to be governed by the rich, however well or badly it may be.

It would be a mistake to imagine that material interests account altogether for this antagonism. Pride, jealousy, the inferiority complex, have much more to do with it. So we get two basically different temperaments, two points of view so radically opposed that no dispassionate judgment of either is possible — everything depends on the side you take. It is a conflict of two mysticisms, two faiths, two conceptions of life. An almost physical instinct tells the "socially prominent" that public order and competent administration are necessities, and they yearn for "strong" government. The People and its militant leaders have an explosive sense of "rights," the right of each individual to think freely, criticize sharply and rule sovereignly.

Not always, alas, does the assertion of this claim on the part of the People harmonize with the best conceivable management of

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public affairs. The very spirit of the Revolution, under the deforming pressure of an implacable logic, grievously complicates the process of governing. It must never be forgotten that France by sheer force tore her freedom out of the fabric of absolutism and that she has never felt entirely safe from a return to the old régime. In her resolve to destroy absolutism she has always been ready to smite her government, somewhat as though in hitting the apple William Tell had also killed his son. In England the Right is just a matter of Tories. In France, in contrast, the Right means Reaction. Fear of the return of Reaction to power throws the whole mechanism of government askew. The Left finds it practically impossible to assume the responsibility of governing. It associates the very idea of power with the Reaction which it hates, and bends its every effort to cripple the ministry that happens to be in power. It can of course understand a Jacobin "strong hand" in a panicky crisis of "public danger." But in a routine situation no ministry can rely on the vote of the Left. The Left will refuse to vote necessary taxes. It will condemn the police for putting down a riot in line of duty. Balancing a budget and keeping order in the streets are things, as a rule, that the Left does not know how to do. It has been in the opposition too long, and the day-to-day needs of the country often stand second, in its eyes, to the defense of a doctrine. "We can give up a colony but not a principle!" The famous apothegm may or may not have been shouted in the Chamber. Certainly it expresses the mental state of many Leftist militants.

This attitude, this tendency to think of routine governing as inevitably suspect, comes down in a straight line from the Revolution. It is made up of an almost pathological fear of a Restoration, of a feeling that it is always better to be one step farther to the Left than one's next-door neighbor, of a strange mistrust of moderate policies as hypocritical masks for reactionary designs. Every day of her existence France suffers from this conceiving of equality, democracy and the People's rights in a manner which lays primary stress on the defense of principles and secondary, if any, stress on plain, everyday needs.

On the other hand, this traditional habit of sublimating problems to the plane of dogma — dogma, moreover, that interests and impassions all human beings — endows French democracy with incomparable splendor. Nothing in history down to the Russian Revolution ever made quite such a world-wide appeal to

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the hearts of men as the Declaration of 1789. One must never lose sight of this universal aspect of the French Revolution, for it is the trait that in the sphere of political thought distinguishes France from other countries that have contributed as much as she, perhaps even more than she, to the spread of democracy and freedom through the world.

The case of England is particularly interesting in this regard. Certainly in everything that pertains to governmental practice the lessons that England has given to other countries are much more valuable than anything that could be learned from revolutionary France. In an actual as contrasted with a merely theoretical respect for individual rights, in a routine practice of liberty, in orderly and disciplined government by consent of the governed — in all these respects England, beyond any doubt, is the outstanding model and example. France has always been captive to French logic. She has often failed to delimit the application of one principle or another. In France liberty has too often meant disorder, efficient government has too often spelled tyranny. May this perhaps be remotely due to a surviving Roman conception of the *imperium*, under which power was a weapon which one seized and then used for dominion? May it also be partly due to the French Catholic tradition, which teaches humility, devotion, self-sacrifice and other Christian virtues but does not educate for freedom? With her Protestant background, England found a way to conceive of power as the expression of the common weal. The concepts of liberty and authority have never been contradictory in England. There the free man understands just what sacrifices are required of him for maintaining the public peace, and he knows how to make them, while the ruler finds a limit to his power in the legal and organized resistance of the ruled. For two centuries the civilized world has recognized the English system as an admirable model and has done its best to imitate it.

With no great success, one must admit! We have suggested above that the English system is a system for the English and (as conceived by that insular people) never pretended to be anything else. England has all along worked for herself, not for the other peoples in the world. By a marvellous adaptation of her institutions to the peculiar circumstances in which her people live — to her climate, one might almost say — she has solved the problem of combining a maximum of freedom with a maximum of order under law.

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But all this she has done in a manner that defies imitation. Democracy, shall one say? Can one be sure that there is democracy in England? The nation's unity is very largely the matter of a loyalty that is felt to the sovereign's person and to the royal family. This astonishing devotion to the crown is an essentially feudal thing. There can be no doubt of it: the English attitude owes nothing to the ideals that issued from the French Revolution. If one were to force an Englishman into a corner one would find that in his opinion, at least to a certain extent, the British monarchy rules by divine right. The English system is certainly democratic in that it functions by universal suffrage and defers most sincerely to public opinion in outlining any policy of importance. But, as no one can fail to see, aristocracy prevails in England, aristocracy by right of birth. In national elections the people's ballot ratifies the privilege of aristocracy with an enthusiasm incomprehensible in equalitarian countries. The son of a duke can without the least difficulty be elected to the House of Commons the moment he becomes of age. So one used to become a colonel in the French army under the *Ancien Régime!* I do not believe that the English recognize the principle of equality. Many details in the Declaration of the Rights of Man would certainly not win general approval in England.

One might wonder, therefore, whether the English people, which has supplied the most perfect example of liberty, of parliamentary government, of rule by public opinion, has not succeeded in doing so by virtue of its very success in preserving a tradition of social superiorities and inferiorities — in a word, of aristocracy. Many representatives of Labor in the House of Commons and the House of Lords are scions of the old nobility. I remember hearing a polished orator of the Labor Party deliver a speech in which mention of "the ruling classes" was made in every other sentence. From his tone it was certainly plain that he thought of himself as designated by birth to govern. If we point out to our British friends that this line of thought is illogical, they complacently reply: "We *are* illogical." For a Frenchman it would be physically impossible to be illogical to that degree. This, probably, is why the British constitution, though it figures as a beacon light in French schools of law and political science, fails to cast its beams upon French political practice.

As a Frenchman shaped by the Revolution of '89 I feel closer to the American democracy, which sprang as ours sprang from the

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philosophy of the eighteenth century. In the United States as in France I find a deep sense of equality, not the "equality of opportunity," which is a characteristic Anglo-Saxon concept, but just plain equality, the principle whereby one man is as good as another, whatever his birth. The English are forever talking of gentlemen and gentlewomen. The American talks of this man and that man, much as the French do, with the difference, perhaps, that we ask what a man thinks, whereas the American wants to know what he has done or is doing. In any event the American thinks of people as human beings, and in view of that the American ideal could be a world ideal, something that the English ideal could never be.

All the same, the American Revolution and the French Revolution cannot be put on exactly the same plane. America, beyond a doubt, is more deeply and more sincerely equalitarian than France. But if there are no classes in the United States, there are castes, in the sense that Americans are not indifferent to the chemical composition of the blood that flows in the veins of their fellow-citizens nor to the color of their skins. America's message of freedom, of emancipation, is addressed to all men who are white; but only to whites. The yellow races, the black races, are not invited to take advantage of it. I do not say that this is not a more reasonable message than the French one, from the standpoint of sound social and political organization. But it cannot have the universal appeal that the ideal of the French Revolution has had. In the first burst of their enthusiasm, the French had not given a thought to limitations of race. But before long the Revolution came upon the colonial problem in the West Indies. The reformers sided with the blacks against the whites. In their eyes it was a matter not of foreign or colonial policy but of principles which, once let loose in the world, could never again be recalled or rescinded. The American Civil War was inspired by very lofty moral ideals; but it cannot be conceived as part of the movement of ideas deriving from the French Revolution. The results of the war and the system that prevails today in the American South stand in the way of that.

As a Frenchman I also feel a homelike atmosphere in the United States in everything touching juridical expressions of the principles of democracy. The English do not like written laws, and that is the source of ever-recurring misunderstanding on the two sides of the Channel. The American, like the Frenchman, is sentimen-

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tally attached to great political documents which in his eyes constitute the very foundations of democratic right. From this point of view, the French and American revolutions are blood sisters. England favors crowns, so far as she is able, though the English are sincerely devoted to liberal forms of government. But when the basic principles of democracy are flouted in the world today, public opinion in America reacts more noticeably than anywhere else, and the fact gives an impression abroad that this democratic feeling is a real bond of cohesion in American national sentiment. This democratic idealism of the United States is kindred to the enthusiasms expressed in the Declaration of the Rights of Man.

III

I would like to venture the confession that France somewhat abused the "Great Principles of '89" during the course of the nineteenth century. Praises of these Principles resounded with tiresome regularity in after-dinner speeches and political platforms. They soon became a sort of rhetorical bombast. Doctrines that in their day had upset the world seemed to have exhausted their original potency. This is not very surprising. Democratic and libertarian theories did not seem to be meeting serious opposition anywhere.

Today, as we have come but recently to perceive, the anxious crisis through which the world is passing has very properly restored the old principles, supposedly outmoded, to their youthful vigor, their splendor, their timeliness. But today they must be defended from a new enemy along a new battle front. This fact entirely changes the present significance of the Principles of '89 and explains their paradoxical but no less striking rejuvenation. The old enemy, down to a recent yesterday, was monarchical absolutism backed by the intolerance of a Church that claimed to be sole repository of the truth. The Third Republic has been called upon to defend itself on a number of occasions against counterattacks by Royalists or Bonapartists, and more often and more vigorously still, against the hostility of the Catholic Church.

That phase seems now to have ended. Strangely enough, today the threat comes, in a measure at least, from what by common consent is called progress. Toward the middle of the eighteenth century the Industrial Revolution bestowed on humanity a new

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instrument of production: the machine. In view of the contributions of that gift to the welfare of humanity, the Industrial Revolution has come to seem of more far-reaching significance than its contemporary, the political Revolution of '89. But one has the right to ask a very urgent, even if painful, question: Are the ideals of the two Revolutions really compatible? In our effort to attain a maximum of production according to modern methods, can we preserve the ideals of individualism and liberty intact in the forms in which the eighteenth century handed them down to us?

The French Revolution occurred at a time when production was still in the hands of artisans, and it refused to take cognizance of anything except the individual. With the misdeeds of the old guilds fresh in mind, it forbade any form of economic combination. Powerful organizations of individuals seemed very plausibly to represent a danger to the sovereignty of the People. Revolutionary law was thus an eminently individualist law.

But before many years of the nineteenth century had passed, it became apparent that the machine, as distinguished from the tool, had made a necessity of grouping, of coöperation, of collective organization. Machine production is in fact incompatible with strictly individual labor, and society — automatically and instinctively — adapted itself in order better to provide the conditions necessary to make production ever more efficient.

By our time the capacities of the human race have expanded to formidable proportions. But in the very triumph of his ingenuity the human being now finds himself threatened in his own personality. A half-century of breath-taking investigation and discovery has practically obliterated distances. The utilization of energy has been revolutionized. Societies once remotely separate have been brought into intimate contact. And we find ourselves obliged, in consequence, to revise almost all the notions that we once held, as though a new humanity had suddenly appeared on earth. One has the impression, sometimes, that all these changes have overreached the domain of history proper, that what we are witnessing is no less than the birth of a new age of humanity — something like the change from the paleolithic to the neolithic ages of the earth.

What is to be the individual's place in this era of mass production that we see developing before our eyes? To what extent will our former conceptions as to freedom and the rights of the in-

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dividual prove valid as against a system that will have, we must confess, little interest in the individual?

These are some of the questions which minds that are the product of the French Revolution put to themselves today with growing alarm.

The Liberal School was the real inspirer of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. That school thought of the production of wealth as an instrument of peace among men — the idea of Richard Cobden, for one. But the astounding achievements of the human being, along with the new weapons that have come within his reach, seem to have gone to his head. Beyond the production of wealth, so pacific in itself, one sees looming higher and higher and nearer and nearer the will to power which Nietzsche glorified. The new fact of our time — a sensational novelty well calculated to intoxicate the imagination — is the urge of the human will to dominate Nature with an invincible technique, overriding her if necessary by violence. Here man's sin of pride emerges sharply as the mainspring of that moral barbarism which, combined with the most advanced technology, forms the essence of totalitarian ambitions. Only yesterday each advance of science was registered as an asset in the ledger of civilization. Today such advances can almost be classed as liabilities. Aspiring to the dominion of Europe, the aggressor governments are actually putting material progress at the service of passions that emanate from sheer brutality.

It is in this fact that the French Revolution finds its revived significance. Until only recently the Revolution had but one enemy before it — the past. Now, however, the future, no less than the past, holds its threats for that civilization — humane and free — which the Revolution fought for and achieved. The old individualism must be upheld against the menace of Soviet tyranny. Nevertheless, by a strange disorientation, French Radicals of the line of '89 are found joining hands with the Marxists against the bugaboo of Reaction. Such Radicals imagine that they are upholding progressive democracy, which they believe is always one step farther to the Left, not perceiving that in this alliance with extremism they are undermining the very foundation of the free civilization to which they are truly and sincerely devoted. The explanation for their attitude is a deep, and for that matter very sound, feeling that the French Revolution, even conceived as a bulwark of freedom, cannot be reduced

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to mere conservatism. In its deeper essence it is individualistic, it is liberal; but always and at all times it is democratic.

The battle that must be offered to National Socialist or Fascist tyranny is not very different, though the case is clearer. There is nothing whatever in the principles of '89 to justify any democrat in accepting totalitarian doctrine.

What is again at issue in the world today is the dignity of the human being, his unalterable right to think and to speak freely. Wherever a belief is persecuted, wherever an individual is molested or tormented for claiming the right to remain free, the call of '89 resounds as clearly and as persuasively as it sounded of old. The general offensive against the individual, and therefore against the foundations of Western civilization, has had the surprising effect of bringing two former adversaries together — the Church and the Revolution. Both of them have become aware that — on different grounds to be sure, the Church in the spiritual domain, the Revolution in the field of politics — they are battling for the same ideal, for the ideal of the individual considered as an end in himself. Viewed in this light the Revolution takes on a new aspect. Far from being an essentially anti-Christian movement, as was long believed, it appears as a mere transference to the sphere of political life of a fundamental doctrine of the Gospel — respect for human individuality. This perception may well underlie the reconciliation of the Catholic Church with the Republic, a reconciliation that lay close to the hearts of two great men — Pope Leo XIII and Aristide Briand.

At the present moment, everybody, or at least everybody in the countries that have liberal traditions, has a feeling that something essential to our civilization is in danger of dying. With that feeling has come a realization that this civilization is immeasurably precious to us. A few years ago an anniversary of '89 would have been just another anniversary. Today we hail it as a portentous event.

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# THE FRONTIERS OF THE UNITED STATES

*By A. Lawrence Lowell*

WAR is positive, peace is negative. Therefore it is natural for nations that want war to take the initiative, laying their plans far ahead and choosing the favorable moment to strike; while pacific peoples, from the very fact that they are not seeking a change, incline to rest in peace until some aggressor attacks them, and then defend themselves at a disadvantage because less well prepared beforehand. In short, the aggressive and the pacific peoples occupy the position of the wise and the foolish virgins.

Where is this train of reasoning leading us? Surely not where we want to go. Perhaps there is some error in the logic or some inaccuracy in the major premise. Maybe peace should not be negative. Maybe the policy which seeks to attain peace should not be a mere waiting for some move by a perhaps unsuspected foe, but prevision and precaution before trouble becomes acute. The danger of conceding the initiative to an opponent lies in the possibility that he will take up a position from which it will be hard for him to retire without national humiliation. We then should have to yield or fight: whereas, if we had thought the matter out beforehand, and let our attitude be known, he would not have put himself in any such position — unless, indeed, he deliberately intended to force on us a war, which no nation now wishes or perhaps ever will wish.

As originally conceived by Canning in England, and by John Quincy Adams and President Monroe in this country, the Monroe Doctrine was an example of pacific initiative which forestalled and prevented possible war. It did not contemplate any control by the United States over the new states of Central and South America, nor did it interfere with any existing sovereignty. It merely gave notice that any future European attempt at dominion in that region would be regarded by us as an unfriendly act. Backed by the parallel statement from England — then wholly master of the high seas — it proved effective in preventing any such attempt from being made. Moreover, it announced our intention to resist hostile attacks in Central and South America from overseas. This claim was not, indeed, admitted by

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European nations; but it was respected. Thus France during our Civil War tried to place Maximilian on the throne of Mexico; but there existed grounds on which we could claim — without making any threats — that France must withdraw her troops, and as soon as our hands were free we pressed our claim and France complied. Later, in the Venezuela controversy, President Cleveland was in a position to insist that England should resort to arbitration instead of force.

Herein lies — shall we call it a principle, a custom, a convention? At any rate it is a fact in international relations that when a nation has staked out a claim by occupation, or by other definite process, a subsequent attempt by another country to dispossess it is a far more serious business than rivalry involved in the race to get there first. It is said that an English officer, hearing that the French were about to occupy the island of Perim, at the southern end of the Red Sea, sailed there quickly, hoisted the British flag and thereby secured the island permanently and without dispute. Fashoda, on the upper Nile, was obviously a point of great importance to England — much more so than to France; yet Marchand coming through Central Africa got there first, raised the French flag, and acquired a right by occupation. The serious friction which ensued disappeared only in the course of a general adjustment of many differences between the two countries. Nor is the attitude created by occupation unnatural. It is the same as that of the dog and the bone: once he possesses it, the dog considers any attempt to take the bone away a *casus belli*.

The same reasoning may apply not only to actual possession but to prospective enjoyment of land as well, in cases where the land in question is not at the time vacant and yet where certain nations have entered into agreements regarding a possible successor to the title. Before the World War there was much negotiating about what should become of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. Not that there was any talk of driving Portugal out of them. The discussion turned on who should be allowed to be the purchaser if Portugal saw fit to sell them. Had the matter been finally arranged, any other nation seeking to obtain those lands would have been regarded as interfering with vested rights.

To go farther: every great nation not bound by a contrary treaty with other nations has assumed that she possessed an interest in the fate of her small neighbors, at least in so far as the

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preservation of their independence and integrity was a factor in her own security. She further has assumed that this interest was one which she could and must defend. For more than three hundred years England has been ready to fight, and has fought, to keep The Netherlands or Belgium out of the grasp of any third nation; and with the development of airplanes and submarines this has become more important than ever. Nor is it by any means an isolated instance. The continued independence of Switzerland, with its three races and for a time its four languages, has been due to the unwillingness of its powerful neighbors to see any one of them take over control of the Alpine passes. The Wars of the Spanish Succession were fought on essentially the same principle. The Congress of Berlin was held in 1878 to forestall a conflict over Russia's retention of Constantinople. And the occasion — one cannot say the cause — of the World War was the Russian resistance to the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. In fact, many wars have occurred from a lack of common recognition about the relation of a great nation to lesser ones which — although in no sense under her control — may affect her prestige or even her security. Some relationships of this sort are of so contentious a nature that they can hardly be stated without provoking trouble; but in other cases no country can reasonably object to a statement of such interest being made — unless, indeed, it is planning to gain some advantage in prospective hostilities.

These considerations raise the question whether there still are places where our proper interests have not been made clear. Monroe proclaimed that on the mainland to the south no foreign government can attain a new political foothold without offense to us; and although our untactful ways have often provoked resentment among the justly proud peoples of that region there is probably no one of them that would not resent any other's selling a part of their common heritage to a foreign power, and that would not rejoice to see any such project effectively prevented. As for Canada, everyone knows that no hostile army could land there without war with us; and a cession of Canadian land to another nation is inconceivable.

Moreover, it is clear that neither England, France, nor The Netherlands could sell its share of Guiana to a European Power. The same is true of the islands in the Caribbean or on the Atlantic seaboard. Could France trade the possession of Guadeloupe to

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Italy, or England that of Jamaica, Bermuda or Newfoundland to Germany? Clearly not. Although those islands are held in full sovereignty, such a transfer would be an unfriendly act on the part of the seller and might be a hostile one on that of the purchaser. This needs no official statement: it is self-evident. Not that we desire to obtain these possessions. On the contrary — save for an occasional case of some small island that might be useful in perfecting our defense of the Caribbean and the Panama Canal — we should much prefer to have the present owners retain them on the understanding, practically now recognized, that they are not to dispose of them without our approval.

Are there not other islands in which we have a similar but not as yet so obvious an interest? What, for example, about the Portuguese islands of the Azores? In the hands of a strong maritime Power they might serve as a naval base from which a hostile fleet could reach any part of our Atlantic possessions in less time than our fleet would take to go from one end to the other of the line we must defend in that ocean. What is more, even though our coasts may not yet be within direct striking distance from the Azores by airplane, they will surely become so as navigation of the air improves. Clearly we cannot permit the Azores to pass into the hands of a powerful, and possibly hostile, state. Further south and east lie Madeira and the Canaries, the former Portuguese, the latter Spanish. No strong nation would wish to acquire and fortify these without harboring hostile intent against someone. Still farther south, near the easternmost extremity of Africa, lie the Cape Verdes. These Portuguese islands, though easily convertible into a strong naval base, would not constitute a direct danger to us; but the picture would be very different if we should ever be called upon by our friendly neighbors in South America for help against European aggression. Then they would become of great importance. A battle fleet based on the Cape Verdes could in a surprise attack reach the South American coasts before our fleet could interpose to prevent it. And the distance to the Cape Verdes from any point where a conflict would be likely to take place would be only about half the distance to the nearest station where our battleships, cruisers and submarines could refit. In naval warfare that might be decisive; and at any rate we should obviously be placed at a grave disadvantage.

In quite another part of the Atlantic, too, we see American

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strategic interests at stake but as yet undefined. The risk of a general war in Europe has provoked some fear that Germany may hope by a conquest of Denmark to acquire Iceland, and even Greenland, as air and naval bases.

All this raises the question whether the State Department and the people of this country ought not to consider, earnestly and at once, what islands in the Atlantic, if any, we should be unwilling to see pass from the hands of their present owners into those of another European nation. Having reached a decision, should not our Government state it publicly? Nor would this constitute a purely selfish policy; for European states may well make a similar claim about the islands in the eastern part of the Atlantic, since it is of universal interest that they should remain unfortified.

The subject here presented is not new. For half a century or more Americans have discussed, and worried about, the ownership of islands in the neighborhood of their coasts. The nations that possess those islands find them inexpensive sources of usefulness or of pride; and if it were understood that they could not transfer them without our consent they would need little defense, for this fact would render the conquest of them fruitless. None of them are in unfriendly hands. The intent of the suggestion made here is wholly peaceful, and as it applies equally to all nations there is no reason why any of them should take umbrage.

The same argument holds in the Pacific, for we must at all hazards insure the safety of the Panama Canal. It provides the only way by which we can throw the fleet into either ocean as needed for the defense of our eastern or western shores. A country must not merely take advantage of the benefits geography has conferred upon it; it must make up as well as it can for the drawbacks. The Canal is our antidote for possessing two coasts separated by an ocean voyage round Cape Horn longer than half the circumference of the world. In any war with a formidable Power we must keep our fleet together; on that all naval strategists will agree. And to any citizen no argument is needed to prove what a sorry plight we should be in if when our fleet was in one ocean we were attacked in the other and the Canal were blocked; nor will anyone deny that it might be rendered useless by an airplane attack in sufficient force from a nearby station. Therefore we could not suffer the Galapagos Islands to pass from Ecuador's hands into those of any other Power without our consent.

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Although not so self-evident, the same reasoning applies to islands farther away in the Pacific yet near enough to be a source of some anxiety. The Marquesas, for example, belong to France. They are of little or no use to her, and she might be tempted to sell them if she were not made aware of our objection. Our Government should seriously consider whether it would not do well to declare that, while we have no desire to obtain any more islands in the Pacific, we feel that for our own security we could not regard as a friendly act the transfer to another Power, without our consent, of any of them lying east of the longitude of Samoa. For no great foreign nation would want to acquire such islands now except as a coign of vantage in some policy relating to America, North or South.

A question of this kind arose in 1912, when it was proposed that Mexico should lease Magdalena Bay, in Southern California, to Japan for a fishing station. The suggestion of a Japanese port for any purpose near the Canal aroused so much protest in the United States that Mexico dropped the matter. Having this occurrence in mind, and being anxious about the way security of our coastal stations might be affected by the Treaty of Paris, the writer, on July 30, 1928, inquired of Mr. Kellogg, then Secretary of State, as follows:

"Is there not an aspect of the treaty for the renunciation of war that may furnish an effective argument to opponents in the United States unless it is refuted before it is advanced? All parties to the treaty agree to renounce war as an instrument of national policy, if none of them breaks the peace. May it not be claimed that this might affect seriously the Monroe Doctrine, unless the contrary is made clear? Suppose, for example, that Japan should, without violence, propose to purchase from Mexico Magdalena Bay, or some other port of Lower California; or suppose Great Britain or Germany should plan to buy a port in Venezuela or elsewhere near the Panama Canal; might it not be urged that in such a case the treaty would bind us to renounce war as a means of prevention? If so, it could be argued that by the treaty we give notice to the world that we shall not in any event resort to force against peaceable violations of the Monroe Doctrine, no matter how prejudicial to our traditions and interests."

Secretary Kellogg on August 7 replied as follows:

"With regard to the Monroe Doctrine, I do not consider there is the slightest danger so far as this treaty is concerned. The Monroe Doctrine is one of self-defense and it clearly appears by the correspondence that any country has not only the right of self-defense but the right to defend any special interests it has. Certainly the building of a naval base near the Canal or near

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continental United States would be resisted on the ground that it endangers the special interests of this country. Furthermore, it is expected that all Central and South American countries will adhere to this treaty. With all the leading countries in the world parties to it, if any one of them should break it, the others would be released so I can see no possible danger on this score. Great Britain did not make any reservations to the treaty. In the correspondence she did say that she had special interests which were matters involving her self-defense similar to the Monroe Doctrine, but she is not going to make any reservations in the treaty whatever."

In short, the Secretary of State took the ground that the United States had such an interest in any foreign possession near enough to be important to the security of the Canal that the use of force to prevent its possible transfer to some other nation would not be a resort to war but a defense of our own international rights. That point of view may not be so obvious to all rulers that there is no need for asserting it. Even our own people might profitably be so informed. For the essential point is this: If we say nothing in advance, the foreign nation may be regarded as acquiring some island or other territory rightly and thus as having lawful possession; while we, in trying to prevent her from retaining it, would put ourselves in the position of the aggressor. Whereas, if we had made public in advance our claim to such an interest, any nation taking the territory in question would deliberately commit a hostile act. This no foreign country is likely to do.

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# THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

*By Jacques Maritain*

THE distinction between the things that belong to Cæsar and the things that belong to God is fundamental for the Catholic conscience. It guarantees the liberty of the spiritual in regard to the temporal, of the Church in regard to the State. But this distinction is not a separation: divine must cooperate with human things. From this viewpoint the introduction of the Gospel into history has not simplified man's affairs. But it has quickened the movement of history and given it direction.

Further, according to the Catholic conception, the Church is truly a *City* (an organized community) of divine origin, the Kingdom of God in a state of pilgrimage, a complete society organized in accordance with its own laws and with its own hierarchy, in which authority descends from on high, to teach souls and direct them towards salvation. This City, one and universal, is spread among the nations and cities of men, whose nature and diversities it respects.

The end, finally, towards which this City leads its members is supernatural — an entry into the life of God. Its common good is eternal life. Its concern is not the terrestrial life of men, not the conflicts, disputes and problems of the temporal order, not political and social progress, not the organization of happiness here below. The Church is not uninterested in all these matters. It cannot fail to be interested. On the one hand, by reason of the connections between the natural and supernatural orders, the mission of the Church is to watch over the integrity of the principles of natural reason, natural law, and over social as well as individual morality. On the other hand, and in virtue of a kind of superabundance which is a consequence of the law of the Incarnation, the Church brings to the world a boon which flows into the terrestrial life of men; this is of primary import for their political and social progress and for their attainment of a happier existence here on earth.

This attitude of the Church, simultaneously respectful of the autonomy of temporal things and "maternal" with regard to them, is clearly indicated in St. Paul's Epistle to Philemon. St. Paul does not ask Philemon to free his slave Onesimus; he does

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not attempt to break the social order of the ancient world. But he does open that order to the vital processes of the Gospel. Working from within, these vital processes little by little will break up the social framework of slavery. Onesimus, Philemon's slave, is to Philemon "not now as a servant, but instead of a servant, a most dear brother, especially to me: but how much more to thee both in the flesh and in the Lord!" (*Philemon*, I, 16.) Slaves like masters are "heirs indeed of God and joint-heirs with Christ." (*Romans*, VIII, 17.)

St. Paul enjoined inferiors to obey their superiors; he considered it a duty to respect legitimate authority, because all legitimate authority has its first source in God, the author of nature. Even the early Christians, preferring the *corona martyrum* to the *corona militum*, would rather risk an unjust death than revolt against the tyrannical power of a persecuting emperor. On the other hand, however, the ideas and desires which the Christian revelation raised in man's soul act unceasingly in mundane societies and imperceptibly transform them. The Church herself is not called on to descend directly into secular tasks, to take part in the flux and reflux of political activity. As the depository of energies of quite another order, more hidden but more powerful, she watches over justice, love and Christian revelation. Once these are made part of the substance of history they act of themselves according to a measure of duration other than the rhythm of time.

These introductory remarks will have brought out that for a Catholic the relationship between the Church and the world is far from simple. One should not look for a static equilibrium that would be satisfactory to geometrical imaginations or the Apollonian aspirations of textbook authors. The relation here discussed is a dynamic one, as between contending and concerting forces, whose antinomies and unstable harmonies are not finally to be resolved until the end of time.

Certain anti-clericals accuse the Church of being on the side of the rich and powerful, on the side of social stagnation. Certain apologists, on the contrary, in order to magnify the Church's work of social progress, insist upon the "revolutionary ferment" that the Church brings to the world, and present the Church as having no other end or mission but that of transforming social living conditions and creating prosperity, peace and happiness here on earth. Catholics think that both these groups are deluded,

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even though each can muster certain particular facts to support its point of view. The key to the enigma is to be found at a much deeper level.

Pascal has said that signs and miracles are given in order to blind some and enlighten others, each according to the disposition of his heart. In the novel "Youth without God," which bears such terrible witness against a totalitarian régime, Ödön de Horváth, a young Hungarian writer who died tragically in Paris a year ago, points out that the State represents a natural necessity and as such is willed by God, and consequently the Church has the duty of collaborating with the State. But what State, the novelist asks, is not governed by the powerful and wealthy? And how can one collaborate with the State without being forced at the same time to collaborate with the powerful and wealthy? The Church must above everything accomplish its own mission and endure. It doesn't matter to the Church that she may appear cynical in accepting the State such as it is, with all its injustices and imperfections; she tries only to render it, as far as possible, less evil.

The only way in which the Church can lighten her difficulties is to have to do either with a weak State or with a Christian State (internally and vitally Christian, not merely decoratively Christian). In addition, the special assistance which (according to Catholic faith) the Church receives from God is evidently less restricted when the question is one of establishing a *modus vivendi* with a government rather than of defining a dogma. In such case, the Church can limit herself to avoiding irremediable errors. Finally, it is in the worldly domain that human weaknesses can most easily come out. For example, the temptation to link religion with the lot of the wealthy and powerful, or with a certain political party or State, so as to utilize their resources (and even the fruits of their injustices) in the interest of churchmen or of the social classes which support them, has sometimes given rise to more or less grave abuses and has produced a "clericalism" entirely opposed to the spirit of the Church and her true welfare. Moreover, the secular behavior of the *Christian world* (which of course is something quite different from the Church) certainly is often far from being Christian. All this is enough to create a false face which for many people masks the reality.

The reality, as deeper historical experience shows, is that by the nature of her mission the Church always has her heart with the poor and always finds in them her true resources. According

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to the great French philosopher, Henri Bergson, history reveals that during nearly two thousand years whatever has proved durably good in human society has been accomplished under the influence of Christianity. Le Play arrived at the same conclusion in regard to the moral conditions essential to civilized progress. It is the Gospel and the Church which have taught men respect for the human person and human life, respect for conscience, respect for poverty, the dignity of woman, the sanctity of marriage, the nobility of work, the value of freedom, the infinite worth of each soul, the essential equality of human beings of every race and condition before God. In affirming that political, economic, social and international life depends on morality just as individual life does, and that neither peace nor prosperity is possible among men without justice and equity, the Church attempts to strengthen the foundations of all human progress. In our times we see the Church responding to new needs by new undertakings on a large scale. Just as in another day she contributed, according to mediæval custom, to the political formation of Europe, today she is conscious of her duty to contribute, according to the custom of modern times and by virtue of the moral authority which is conceded to her everywhere, to the salvation of threatened civilization, to the social development of the world and to the formation of the coming new order.

Indulgence is begged for the length of these preliminary explanations. Having indicated the broad features of the Catholic viewpoint, I hope to be able to deal more easily with the particular problems touching Catholicism and social progress.

II

Christianity works in the social life of people according to two quite distinct modes of action, which for the sake of brevity I shall call a *movement from below* and a *movement from above.*

The movement from below consists of the germinations produced naturally in the temporal conscience under the activation of the Christian leaven. The philosopher of history observes that this leaven is developed in the world under very diverse forms and conditions. The faithful member of a Church concerned with orthodoxy — notably, the Catholic Church — thinks that this particular Church alone preserves the leaven of the Gospel unaltered. But it is this leaven — whether in forms pure or impure, orthodox or heretical — which has in fact stirred the history of

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the secular world. If it is true that Jean Jacques Rousseau is the "father of modern times" and, though seeking good things, has, because disfigured by error, led along bad ways, it is equally true that this "naturalizing" or secularization of the Gospel, and the Messianism of revolutionaries, all are inconceivable apart from the Christian element in which western civilization has its source.

Regarding the spiritual and social conflicts of our age, the ultimate tragedy of the modern world seems to me to lie in the fact that, particularly in the nineteenth century, while many Christians practically became accomplices of social injustice and set themselves against the normal movement of history, many enemies of Christianity consecrated themselves to the progress of social justice, though adopting an erroneous and materialistic idea of it and allowing themselves to be led astray by the myth of the Revolution, without seeing that whatever was just and fruitful in their action came in fact from Christian truths (but "gone mad") and from Christian sentiments (but secularized). In this way there has come about what Pius XI called the greatest scandal of the nineteenth century — the fact that the working class finds itself separated from Christianity and the Church and believes that in order to hope for a better life on earth it must necessarily turn away from Christ. Christian thought and activity must now make an immense effort to purify from error, and to preserve, the efforts of the past century towards social progress.

For Catholics, it is well established that the Christian religion is not bound up with any temporal régime; it is compatible with every form of legitimate government, and it imposes none by preference. Neither does it impose — once certain higher principles are safeguarded — a fixed political philosophy. But if the Church need not bind itself to a temporal ideal, its believers — acting not as believers and in the name of the Church, but as members of the terrestrial city, and as such obligated to fight for a temporal ideal — must at their own individual risk and peril take part in the struggle for social justice and the progress of civilization. Today the Catholic masses understand this necessity better and better; they are done with the deficiencies of the nineteenth century.

Since the movement from below which I have just described does not commit the Church, it normally produces among those who participate — even when they are equally orthodox — quite

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different individual attitudes according to individual social connections and habits of thought. Even more important to note is that the social progress which has been thus accomplished presupposed the existence of certain technical possibilities as well as a period of moral ripening. This was true of the abolition of slavery in ancient times. The process was conditioned in part by certain technical developments — for instance, by the discoveries that permitted the substitution of animal motor power for human, notably in the carrying of burdens.[1] In the modern world the introduction of the machine is destined to play an analogous liberating rôle. On the other hand, as we have already stated, it was in virtue not of any law promulgated by the Church in the socio-temporal domain but in virtue of a slow vital development that Christianity little by little expelled the concept of slavery from the ethical conscience and finally destroyed it entirely.

If he takes the same viewpoint, the philosopher of history can observe with M. Bergson — and without thereby committing the Church in any way to a democratic philosophy — that in fact the leaven of the Gospel orients human history toward that ideal of respect for the rights of the person and fraternal friendship which is the basis of the "democratic mentality" when not vitiated by erroneous metaphysics. This leaven, it can be said, will be at work down to the end of time, so as to rid human history, in the measure that technical progress permits, of every form of servitude.

Now let us turn to what I have called the movement from above. This has its source in the official doctrine of the Church, notably in the teachings and practical directions of the Papal encyclicals.[2] They at once stimulate, orient and control the movement from below. During the last half century in particular, the Catholic Church has accumulated a rich fund of doctrine, wherein are coördinated the principles regulating the sum total of men's social and temporal problems. As I explained at the beginning, the Church does not descend into the administration of temporal affairs; but she recognizes her mission to intervene in all matters that concern the moral law. Her rôle is to dispense wisdom, both theoretical and practical.

A long study would be necessary to summarize the teachings

[1] *Cf.* Commandant Richard Lefebvre des Nouëttes, "La Force Motrice Animale à travers les Âges." Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1924.

[2] These encyclicals, in English translation, can be procured through Catholic booksellers.

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referred to above, and it is not my purpose to make it here. Everyone knows the enormous accomplishment of Leo XIII. Let me merely recall the titles of some of his encyclicals: *Inscrutabili* (1878), on the evils of society; *Arcanum Divinæ Sapientiæ* (1880), on marriage; *Diuturnum* (1881), on the origin of civil power; *Immortale Dei* (1885), on the Christian constitution of States; *Libertas Præstantissimum* (1888), on human liberty; *Sapientiæ Christianæ* (1890), on the civil duties of Christians; *Rerum Novarum* (May 15, 1891), on the condition of labor.

This last encyclical had extraordinary influence. At the time it was published, many people were almost scandalized, imagining that the Pope had "gone Socialist." The Pope had not gone Socialist, but he recalled to a world honeycombed with selfishness the laws of Christian ethics in the social order; and had all Christians listened to him, many terrible evils would have been avoided. "We do not reproach you for the encyclicals," said the Communist Rappoport to a Catholic orator some ten years ago, "but for the contempt in which you hold them." For his part, Pope Pius XI wrote in a recent encyclical: "There would be today neither Socialism nor Communism if the rulers of the nations had not scorned the teachings and maternal warnings of the Church." (*Divini Redemptoris*)

In many documents Pius X and Benedict XV also treated political and social questions, completing thereby the teachings of Leo XIII. But it was Pius XI who, with vigorous doctrinal elaboration and indomitable energy, brought the synthesis of Catholic social doctrine to a degree of precision appropriate to our time, and from it drew a decisive condemnation of the worst errors which today threaten civilization.

Here the document of capital importance is the encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* (May 15, 1931) on reconstructing the social order, in which the Pope brings out the moral and social roots of present evils, and, after having criticized Individualism, Manchesterian Liberalism, Socialism and Communism, outlines the general principles of the program of social reform based on the organization of "vocational groups" and on the uplifting of the proletariat through the acquisition of property. It should be noted that the "associations" or "vocational groups" mentioned in the encyclical are quite different from the "corporations" of the totalitarian states. The latter are agencies of the State, whence the State itself is called corporative. The encyclical, on the con-

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trary, recommends merely a corporative *economy;* and the vocational group, like a labor union, is conceived as founded essentially upon freedom of association and is endowed with all the autonomy that is compatible with the exigencies of the common good. Later came the encyclical *Non Abbiamo Bisogno* (June 29, 1931), in which the idolatry of the Fascist totalitarian state is condemned; the encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge* (March 14, 1937), on German National Socialism; and the encyclical *Divini Redemptoris* (March 19, 1937), on atheistic Communism.[3] Let me quote a few typical extracts from these encyclicals:

". . . it violates right order whenever capital so employs the working or wage-earning classes as to divert business and economic activity entirely to its own arbitrary will and advantage without any regard to the human dignity of the workers, the social character of economic life, social justice and the common good."

"It is true that there is a formal difference between pauperism and proletarianism. Nevertheless, the immense number of propertyless wage-earners on the one hand, and the superabundant riches of the fortunate few on the other, is an unanswerable argument that the earthly goods so abundantly produced in this age of industrialism are far from rightly distributed and equitably shared among the various classes of men."

After having noted that the wage contract is legitimate in itself, Pius XI nonetheless writes:

"In the present state of human society, however, We deem it advisable that the wage-contract should, when possible, be modified somewhat by a contract of partnership, as is already being tried in various ways to the no small gain both of the wage-earners and of the employers. In this way wage-earners are made sharers in some sort in the ownership, or the management, or the profits."

"Labor, indeed, . . . is not a mere chattel, since the human dignity of the workingman must be recognized in it, and consequently it cannot be bought and sold like any piece of merchandise. None the less, the demand and supply of labor divides men on the labor market into two classes, as into two camps, and the bargaining between these parties transforms this labor market into an arena where the two armies are engaged in fierce combat. To this grave disorder which is leading society to ruin a remedy must evidently be applied as speedily as possible. But there cannot be question of any perfect cure, except this opposition be done away with, and well ordered members of the social body come into being anew, vocational groups namely, binding men together not according to the position they occupy in the labor market, but according to the diverse functions which they exercise in society."

"Just as the unity of human society cannot be built upon class warfare,

[3] Two other very important encyclicals of Pius XI must also be mentioned: *Quas Primas* (1925) on the Kingship of Christ, and *Casti Connubii* (1930) on Christian marriage; but they do not directly concern the object of the present study.

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so the proper ordering of economic affairs cannot be left to free competition alone. From this tainted source have proceeded in the past all the errors of the 'Individualistic' school. This school, ignorant or forgetful of the social and moral aspects of economic matters, teaches that the State should refrain in theory and practice from interfering therein, because these possess in free competition and open markets a principle of self-direction better able to control them than any created intellect. Free competition, however, though within certain limits just and productive of good results, cannot be the ruling principle of the economic world. This has been abundantly proved by the consequences that have followed from the free rein given to these dangerous individualistic ideals. It is therefore very necessary that economic affairs be once more subjected to and governed by a true and effective guiding principle. Still less can this function be exercised by the economic supremacy which within recent times has taken the place of free competition: for this is a headstrong and vehement power, which, if it is to prove beneficial to mankind, needs to be curbed strongly and ruled with prudence. It cannot, however, be curbed and governed by itself. More lofty and noble principles must therefore be sought in order to control this supremacy sternly and uncompromisingly: to wit, social justice and social charity. To that end all the institutions of public and social life must be imbued with the spirit of justice, and this justice must above all be truly operative. It must build up a juridical and social order able to pervade all economic activity. Social charity should be, as it were, the soul of this order and the duty of the state will be to protect and defend it effectively." (*Quadragesimo Anno*, 1931.)

". . . And here We find Ourselves confronted by a mass of authentic affirmations and no less authentic facts which reveal beyond the slightest possibility of doubt the resolve (already in great measure actually put into effect) to monopolize completely the young, from their tenderest years up to manhood and womanhood, for the exclusive advantage of a party and of a régime based on an ideology which clearly resolves itself into a true, a real pagan worship of the State — the 'Statolatry' which is no less in contrast with the natural rights of the family than it is in contradiction with the supernatural rights of the Church."

"A conception of the State which makes the rising generations belong to it entirely, without any exception, from the tenderest years up to adult life cannot be reconciled by a Catholic either with Catholic doctrine or with the natural rights of the family. It is not possible for a Catholic to accept the claim that the Church and the Pope must limit themselves to the external practices of religion (such as Mass and the Sacraments), and that all the rest of education belongs to the State." (*Non Abbiamo Bisogno*, 1931.)

"This, unfortunately, is what we now behold. For the first time in history we are witnessing a struggle, cold-blooded in purpose and mapped out to the least detail, between man and 'all that is called God.'"

"Communism, moreover, strips man of his liberty, robs human personality of all its dignity, and removes all the moral restraints that check the eruptions of blind impulse. There is no recognition of any right of the individual in his relations to the collectivity; no natural right is accorded to human personality. . . ."

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"What would be the condition of a human society based on such materialistic tenets? It would be a collectivity with no other hierarchy than that of the economic system. It would have only one mission: the production of material things by means of collective labor. . . ."

"But the law of nature and its Author cannot be flouted with impunity. Communism has not been able, and will not be able, to achieve its objectives even in the merely economic sphere. It is true that in Russia it has been a contributing factor in rousing men and materials from the inertia of centuries, and in obtaining by all manner of means, often without scruple, some measure of material success. Nevertheless, We know, from reliable and even very recent testimony, that not even there, in spite of slavery imposed on millions of men, has Communism reached its promised goal. After all, even the sphere of economics needs some morality, some moral sense of responsibility, which can find no place in a system so thoroughly materialistic as Communism. Terrorism is the only possible substitute. . . ."

". . . the means of saving the world of today from the lamentable ruin into which amoral Liberalism has plunged us, are neither the class-struggle nor terror, nor yet the autocratic abuse of State power, but rather the infusion of social justice and the sentiment of Christian love into the social-economic order."

"But when on the one hand We see thousands of the needy, victims of real misery for various reasons beyond their control, and on the other so many round about them who spend huge sums of money on useless things and frivolous amusement, We cannot fail to remark with sorrow not only that justice is poorly observed, but that the precept of charity also is not sufficiently appreciated, is not a vital thing in daily life."

". . . charity will never be true charity unless it takes justice into constant account."

"From this it follows that a 'charity' which deprives the workingman of the salary to which he has a strict title in justice, is not charity at all, but only its empty name and hollow semblance. The wage-earner is not to receive as alms what is his due in justice. And let no one attempt with trifling charitable donations to exempt himself from the great duties imposed by justice. Both justice and charity often dictate obligations touching on the same subject-matter, but under different aspects; and the very dignity of the workingman makes him justly and acutely sensitive to the duties of others in his regard."

"Man has a spiritual and immortal soul. He is a person, marvelously endowed by his Creator with gifts of body and mind. He is a true 'microcosm,' as the ancients said, a world in miniature, with a value far surpassing that of the vast inanimate cosmos. God alone is his last end, in this life and the next. By sanctifying grace he is raised to the dignity of a son of God, and incorporated into the Kingdom of God in the Mystical Body of Christ. In consequence he has been endowed by God with many and varied prerogatives: the right to life, to bodily integrity, to the necessary means of existence; the right to tend towards his ultimate goal in the path marked out for him by God; the right of association and the right to possess and use property." (*Divini Redemptoris*, 1937.)

"Whoever exalts race, or the people, or the State, or a particular form of State, or the depositories of power, or any other fundamental value of the

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human community — however necessary and honorable be their function in worldly things — whoever raises these notions above their standard value and divinizes them to an idolatrous level, distorts and perverts an order of the world planned and created by God: he is far from the true faith in God and from the concept of life which that faith upholds."

"None but superficial minds could stumble into concepts of a national God, of a national religion; or attempt to lock within the frontiers of a single people, within the narrow limits of a single race, God, the Creator of the universe, King and Legislator of all nations before whose immensity they are 'as a drop of a bucket' (*Isaiah* xl, 15)."

"Human laws in flagrant contradiction with the natural law are vitiated with a taint which no force, no power can mend. In the light of this principle one must judge the axiom, that 'right is common utility,' a proposition which when given a correct significance, means that what is morally indefensible, can never contribute to the good of the people. But ancient paganism acknowledged that the axiom, to be entirely true, must be reversed and be made to say: 'Nothing can be useful, if it is not at the same time morally good' (Cicero, *De Officiis*, ii. 30). Emancipated from this moral rule, the principle would in international law carry a perpetual state of war between nations; for it ignores in national life, by confusion, right and utility, the basic fact that man as a person possesses rights he holds from God, and which any collectivity must protect against denial, suppression or neglect. To overlook this truth is to forget that the real common good ultimately takes its measure from man's nature, which balances personal rights and social obligations, and from the purpose of society, established for the benefit of human nature."

"A Christianity which keeps a grip on itself, refuses every compromise with the world, takes the commands of God and the Church seriously, preserves its love of God and of men in all its freshness, such a Christianity can be, and will be, a model and a guide to a world which is sick to death and clamors for directions, unless it be condemned to a catastrophe that would baffle the imagination. Every true and lasting reform has ultimately sprung from the sanctity of men who were driven by the love of God and of men." (*Mit brennender Sorge*, 1937.)

I might add that in a document addressed to all Catholic seminaries and universities Pius XI on April 14, 1938, condemned racist doctrines.

Speaking of Pope Pius XI, the Patriarch of Lisbon wrote in November 1938: "Many have been astonished by the invincible energy of this august old man who with the Gospel in his hand, and fearless in his Faith, has condemned Communism, Totalitarianism, Statism, Racism, pagan Nationalism, all these new idols before which prostrate themselves the regimented masses who lose the sentiment of their dignity and their liberty once they lose Christ. Those who are scandalized by the Pope's supreme condemnation of the persecuting régimes that boast of having

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saved Europe from Communism, do not know, as the Gospel says, of what spirit they are."

The Catholic Church does not think theoretical teaching is enough. She strives to put it into practice. What, from this viewpoint, have the encyclicals accomplished in the social order? Actually, despite the resistance and neglect already mentioned, and about which the Popes themselves have often complained,[4] it can be said that the practical efficaciousness of the teaching in the encyclicals appears the most powerful which it is possible for an *unarmed* teaching to attain — unarmed, and for that reason all the more fascinating. However, to answer more precisely the question raised, the historian is led to distinguish what may be called different zones of accomplishment.

In a first zone belong the attempts made by certain Catholic statesmen to turn the maxims of the encyclicals into political or national plans of construction for immediate application by authoritative means. By an apparent paradox, this first zone of accomplishment, which is the most visible — the Papal encyclicals often being openly invoked as a political platform — involves the greatest risk of deception. In effect, since such accomplishments are not the result of a slow fruition of historical forces, they very frequently assume a dictatorial form, and hence partake of the fragility inherent in that form. Moreover, the universal and lofty maxims of Church doctrine are here applied to the contingencies of the social order without any previous elaboration of a more particular and concrete political philosophy; wherefore they are in danger of appearing as an abstract framework, or at times even as a decorative apparatus concealing practical realities far indeed from being Christian. It should be added that the danger of attempting an artificial construction will be all the greater if Catholicism is used, contrary to the nature of things, as a means of making up for the deficiencies of some strictly temporal political ideal and some strictly temporal principle of association and unity.[5]

A second zone of accomplishment, much more important in

[4] "What is to be thought of the action of those Catholic employers who in one place succeeded in preventing the reading of Our Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* in their churches? Or of those Catholic industrialists who even to this day have shown themselves hostile to a labor movement that We Ourselves recommended? Is it not deplorable that the right of private property, defended by the Church should so often have been used as a weapon to defraud the workingman of his just salary and his social rights?" (*Divini Redemptoris.*) The workers' movement to which Pius XI alludes here is that of the French *Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne.*

[5] Such was the case with Austria before the *Anschluss.*

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my opinion, is the influence exercised upon legislation by men inspired directly by the encyclicals or by the indirect effect of the encyclicals. In many countries a Catholic social school has developed, and there is a *Confédération Internationale des Syndicats Chrétiens*, with a central office at Utrecht. In France, the Christian labor unions exercise considerable influence. Since the time of Leo XIII, Catholic members of Parliament like La Tour du Pin and Albert de Mun have tried to secure the enactment of social laws which might have prevented many subsequent evils. And when the Léon Blum cabinet undertook urgent social reforms in 1936, its workingmen's legislation (paid vacations, collective bargaining, mediation and arbitration, regulation of salaries, fixing of work and rest periods) contained many similarities to bills proposed many years before by Catholic deputies or to measures recommended internationally by Catholics (for example, through the International Labor Office at Geneva).[6] In other countries, more complete labor legislation (at least in regard to the first three points) has long ago been passed. If the stubborn activity of the working classes and the battles waged in the name of Socialism have here played a preponderant rôle, Papal teachings, even upon non-Catholics, have indirectly had a notable influence. So it was that Pius XI could say: "Catholic social principles of sociology gradually became part of the intellectual heritage of the whole human race." And he added: "As a result of these steady and tireless efforts, there has arisen a new branch of jurisprudence unknown to earlier times, whose aim is the energetic defense of those sacred rights of the workingman which proceed from his dignity as a man and as a Christian. These laws concern the soul, the health, the strength, the housing, workshops, wages, dangerous employments, in a word, all that concerns the wage-earners, with particular regard to women and children." [7]

There is, finally, a third zone of accomplishment, related to the preceding but still to be distinguished from it. This comprises the effect which the teaching and direction of the Church has had upon the mass of Catholics the world over — and indirectly upon

[6] The latest case is that of the forty-hour week. Economic competition prevents this from being validly applied by one state alone. It should be further noted that the Catholic social school has always favored not only a living wage, but a family wage; the French legislation of June 1936 neglected this latter consideration, and to that extent revealed that it stemmed from backward individualism.

[7] *Quadragesimo Anno*. On the social action of the Church, notably in the nineteenth century, one can consult with profit the work of Professor Émile Chênon, "Le Rôle Social de l'Église." (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1928).

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non-Catholic Christians, and even upon non-Christians — by arousing in them, and illuminating from the point of view of doctrine, the movement from below which has been already discussed. It is the zone of accomplishment which is the largest and the least easy to define. Here the ways by which the influence of the Church makes itself felt are slow, and reach the most profound depths of human experience.

In effect, through the movement from below the world's conscience, stimulated by the leaven of the Gospel, advances — amidst suffering and contradictions, sometimes enlightened by sound doctrine, sometimes blindly and gropingly — toward a higher state of civilization. Not only among Christians,[8] but even among "unbelievers," and among those caught up in the more or less aberrant historical currents crisscrossing the modern world, Christian forces — sometimes pure, sometimes deviating or even corrupt — have been at work. This being true, it can be understood that to have a complete idea of the rôle of Christianity in social progress and the contrasting movements of history one must take into account both the influence exercised from above (stemming from the efforts of the teaching Church) and the action exercised from below (stemming from the efforts of secular conscience).

Ideally, if Christianity reigned in every heart and human weaknesses found no place in the human agencies of the Church — in a word, if everything went as it should in the world — the two influences from above and below ought to meet and act in constant accord. In actual fact they often are separated and lack synchronization; and there even may be opposition between them. For on the one hand it sometimes happens that secular conscience starts out on a wrong road, and on the other hand it also happens that the movement from below is ahead of the movement from above. Here is the inevitable penalty for a world in which tension and conflict are a law, and in which, moreover, religious divisions exist and evil has its place. In general, rigorous fidelity to pure truth and passionate effectiveness in the world's conflicts and conquests are rarely encountered in the same men and in the same zones of human effort.

[8] For example, to mention Frenchmen only, in the nineteenth century there were orthodox Catholics like Ozanam and Lacordaire, or Lammenais, a Catholic who was not orthodox.

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III

The world is in a general state of crisis due primarily to the loosing of two groups of opposed, revolutionary, totalitarian phenomena. One proceeds from Socialism (Communism) of a class and aims to establish the world dictatorship of the proletariat; the other proceeds from Socialism of a racial community or of state policy (Fascism and National Socialism) and aims to establish the world empire of "proletarian nations." So grave is this crisis that one may ask whether it does not foretell the twilight of Western civilization. In my opinion, it is the liquidation of several centuries of error. According to the philosophy of history which I consider true, there is reason to think that the only favorable outcome in the social order, now or later, lies in the inauguration of a new political philosophy and a remade democracy.

The Church is neither democratic nor anti-democratic. As I have tried to explain in this study, its essential mission is above temporal qualifications.

But in the historical circumstances of our times it is clearly evident that the Church considers that the totalitarian idolatry, whatever forms and colors it may take, carries a most serious threat to the exercise of her spiritual mission and to the truth of which she is the depository and which she is commissioned to teach. The freedom of the word of God, and the dignity of the human person, are at stake. From this viewpoint, the recent election of the new Pope carried implicit significance. In the spring of the year 1939 it was not difficult to see that the destiny of religion, as well as that of natural law and international good faith, coincides with the destiny of freedom.

If the democracies, cruelly racked by ancient materialist errors and by the disorders resulting from the primacy of money, have strength and time to purify and renew themselves — as the Church invites them to do by all the teachings touched upon in this study,[9] and as, for their part, democratic leaders recognize is necessary[10] — then the peril of a breakdown of civilization can still be overcome. If not, there is always hope that a new world can arise from the ruins.

[9] The pastoral letter of the American Catholic hierarchy in favor of Christian democracy (October 1938) has significant importance from this viewpoint.

[10] I have in mind especially President Roosevelt's message of January 4, 1939.

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The Catholic Church, it was pointed out above, has plenty of time and is accustomed to vicissitudes, catastrophes even. Today the Church is trying to renew, in quite different forms than were suited to mediæval Europe, her work of moral direction and spiritual inspiration. The means upon which the Church appears mostly to depend are those instituted by Pope Pius XI under the name of "Catholic Action." Catholic Action does not operate on the political plane but on the spiritual and apostolic plane. Yet in its attempts to infuse Christian energy into the life of individuals and the communities in which they group themselves Catholic Action prepares from within, in the depths of the human soul, the primary conditions of a new social and political life. The most characteristic of Catholic Action movements is the *Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne*, numbering thousands of young workers in Belgium and France, whose object is to restore the dignity of the working class through the power of Christ and in the spirit of the Gospel. Such movements are definitely oriented towards daring social progress and the coming of a new order.

In finishing this study, I would like to make two more remarks. In the first place, if it is true that political life and proper political discernment require rectitude of instinct and inclination, then it can be easily understood that the most profound need of a democracy is the development of Christian instincts, both of the intelligence and the heart, touching the social and political life of the mass of citizens. From this viewpoint, the historic rôle to which Catholic Action is called is very great. In the second place, if it is true that politics is by its very essence a special branch of ethics, as the natural wisdom of ancient Chinese civilization recognized centuries ago, it can be understood that the fundamental problem to which a Christian civilization must apply itself (what a singularly profound revolution this would be after four centuries of Machiavellism!) is how to construct a Christian system of politics, truly and vitally Christian and not merely decoratively so. And here two passages of Catholic doctrine apply. One is from Pope Pius XI: "It is the sacred duty for governments and peoples to take as their guide the doctrine of Christ in their interior and exterior political life." (*Ubi Arcano*, 1922.) The other is from Pope Benedict XV: "The Gospel precept of love among men is entirely valid for states and peoples." (*Pacem Dei*, 1920.)

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# PREPARING CIVILIAN AMERICA FOR WAR

*By Harold J. Tobin*

"America's brilliant, if pitiless, war industry had entered the service of patriotism and had not failed it. Under the compulsion of military necessity a ruthless autocracy was at work, and rightly, even in this land at the portals of which the Statue of Liberty flashes its blinding light across the seas. They understood war." — Field Marshal von Hindenburg.

THE United States is again building a war machine which it hopes to make even more efficient than the one which elicited this praise from the German commander in his autobiography. Appropriations for the Army and Navy are the largest in the country's history except in time of war. More than that, the Government is laying plans, now in peacetime, to bring the full weight of its resources in men, materials and morale to the support of its armed forces in case it becomes involved in another great war. Unlike the totalitarian states, the United States cannot institute a war economy in time of peace. Planning can go no further, therefore, than to prepare for an efficient transition from the normal pattern of political, economic and social life to one in which the military machine can attain its full effectiveness when war actually comes.

Since the War Department is most directly concerned with the problem, the advance planning which is already under way naturally centers there. Three agencies are engaged in making these preparations — the Planning Branch in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, the Army Industrial College, and the Army and Navy Munitions Board. Ever since the World War the Planning Branch has worked to devise an Industrial Mobilization Plan. The task of training the personnel necessary to operate such a Plan in all its vast detail falls upon the Army Industrial College, organized in 1924. In this institution annual classes of sixty Army, Navy and Marine officers are taught the principles and methods of economic planning. The responsibility for keeping the Industrial Mobilization Plan up to date devolves upon the Army and Navy Munitions Board, headed by the Assistant Secretaries in the War and Navy Departments.

In the event of a war the Plan will come into operation when the Army and Navy have determined their requirements in men and matériel. The Plan provides for the translation of these gen-

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eral requirements into specific demands on American industry and stipulates what economic measures the latter must take to meet them. It also outlines the governmental organization necessary to see that the economic measures are carried out.

During the first stages of an emergency the Army and Navy Munitions Board is to coördinate the work of supplying the armed forces. This will be done by an Executive Committee composed of three officers from each of the two defense departments. The work of the Board is already distributed among several divisions. In time of war these can be expanded and put under civilian control. The Commodities Division is important. Under it are Commodity Committees, each of them planning to ensure an adequate supply of a particular commodity in which wartime shortages may possibly appear. There also are divisions for Power and Fuel and for Transportation. A Facilities Division makes preparations to obtain the additional manufacturing facilities that will be needed in wartime. The Legal Division prepares forms for war contracts, as well as legislation to put the whole Plan into effect. The Liaison Division works on matters less directly involved in the procurement of munitions — such as labor, trade, public relations, price control and finance. The Policy Division has two unrelated functions: it standardizes products and materials used by both the defense departments, and it analyzes the plans of the other divisions and the means proposed for carrying them into effect. Each of the two departments is represented on every agency of the Munitions Board, those from the Army being drawn from a corresponding division in the Planning Branch.

In a minor war it is expected that the Army and Navy Munitions Board can administer the necessary mobilization measures without greatly expanding its present staff. If it needs additional personnel, the seven hundred graduates of the Army Industrial College will be available unless engaged in more important duties. In recent years there has also been extensive recruitment of reserve officers with special abilities in trade, engineering, public relations and so forth, who could be promptly mustered into service on the outbreak of hostilities. The close, if informal, collaboration now maintained by the Munitions Board with trade and industrial associations would be strengthened in time of war. The civilian services in a minor war would therefore be directed by an organization headed by civilians — the two Assistant Secretaries — but staffed mainly by military and naval officers

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coöperating with civilian trade and professional associations. Such a setup involves few departures from the ordinary peacetime organization for planning and procurement and indicates that a minor conflict is not expected to put any particular strain on our industrial resources.

For a major war, however, a supplementary organization has been planned, headed and largely staffed by civilians, and capable of exercising a certain degree of control over every aspect of civilian life. A War Resources Administration, roughly comparable to the Executive Committee of the Munitions Board, will centralize control over all the war industries; and this body will be responsible directly to the President, in whose name it will wield broad authority. It is proposed to create other administrative bodies corresponding to the divisions of the Munitions Board. These include Administrations for War Finance, War Trade, War Labor, Price Control, Public Relations, and Selective Service. Divisions of the War Resources Administration will control Facilities, Commodities, Power and Fuel, and Transportation. The heads of these Administrations and Divisions, plus the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, and the commanders of the Army and Navy, will form an Advisory Council to the War Resources Administrator.

These agencies are not to be created all at once, but only as fast as necessity warrants. The rôle of the Munitions Board will be reduced, as each agency is established, until its prime function is that of coördinating the demands of the Army and Navy and presenting them to the proper super-agency. Since the War Resources Administrator is the most important figure in this setup, he will presumably be the first to be appointed. The various administrators will be the ablest civilians, in their respective fields, that the President can find. They will have broad leeway in selecting their own subordinates, not only from among the civilians who possess the necessary technical knowledge and executive ability, but among Army and Navy officers with special training. The administrators will have equally great freedom in deciding the setup of their super-agencies; in so doing they will have the advantage of the Munitions Board's plans.

Present plans call for the institution of War Service Committees, composed of leading civilians in each industry who will speak for it in dealing with the existing Commodity Committees of the Munitions Board. These Commodity Committees, with

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expanded personnel including civilians, will be retained under the War Resources Administration. The Administrator will thus be able to maintain contact with each producer in each industry.

This war organization requires broad powers if it is to function effectively. Since any war in which the United States engages may be assumed to have the full support of the American people, coöperation rather than coercion should produce the necessary results. However, in case coöperation is given reluctantly, the Government must possess the power to coerce. Here the priority power would be of decisive importance. With this power the Government could direct the flow of materials and services where they would be most useful; it might also choose between the needs of its different agencies, between those of itself and of the civilian population, or between those of individual consumers. Only slightly less important is price control, which might be used to prevent the violent economic dislocation, waste and extravagance which always accompany a sudden and large demand for goods of which supplies are limited. Then there is the "compulsory order," which could be used to relieve industry of existing civilian contracts when its products were urgently needed by the Government. And lastly, there is the power to commandeer, a police measure enforceable against a non-coöperating concern, and the right to license, applicable to exporters and importers in order to control the country's foreign trade.

The Executive already possesses some of these powers. If it were to possess all of them, through appropriate legislation, the war organization would be legally equipped to carry out its task. If, for example, the Army and Navy find that the supply of shoes is short, they will notify the War Resources Administration through the Munitions Board. The shoe manufacturers' War Service Committee will then survey the trade. If it discloses that the facilities for making shoes are inadequate, the Committee will inform the trade that the Facilities Division is ready to approve the construction of new shoe-manufacturing plants. The War Finance Control Commission will approve the sale of securities necessary to raise the funds to erect them. The War Resources Administration will see that the manufacturer obtains the necessary priority on building materials, and on the power and fuel to operate the factory when it is built. The War Labor Administration will help the manufacturer secure the necessary workmen through its nation-wide system of employment agencies, and the

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Selective Service Administration will refrain from drafting these workmen while they are in his employ. The Price Control Administration will try to keep down the prices of the manufacturer's materials, so that he may complete his contract at the agreed price and so maintain the standard of living of his workers in balance with their wages. On the other hand, if the manufacturer attempts to expand his plant when there are already sufficient facilities available and when labor and material are needed elsewhere, his project will be disapproved and hindered.

This, in simple terms, is the Plan and how it would operate. Now, for what sort of a war has it been devised? The Plan seems to envisage the possibility of a large-scale conflict, for it is based on the needs of a Protective Mobilization force of 1,000,000 men, capable of expansion to 4,000,000 men. It does not, however, provide for their transportation or maintenance overseas; and it assumes that there will be no great expansion of the Navy, since warships cannot be quickly built. Obviously there is no potential enemy force of comparable size in this hemisphere; nevertheless, the Munitions Board must plan for all contingencies. Divisional planning measures have been prepared to deal with any difficulties likely to occur in raising the proposed American force.

A careful analysis made soon after the World War showed that there were twenty-eight "strategic" commodities essential to the production of military supplies but scarce in the United States. The Commodity Committees, after consulting government agencies like the Bureau of Mines and non-governmental bodies such as the Minerals Advisory Council, have eliminated eleven of these, either because new sources of supply have been discovered in or near the United States, because substitutes are now being produced or because reserve stocks have been built up. The Committees will continue to strike other items off the list whenever possible; rubber may be the next to go if present experiments with substitutes are successful. The Commodity Committees also work out plans for securing ample supplies of strategic raw materials. In cases where these are not subject to deterioration, a stock pile may form a temporary safeguard. There also exists a second list, composed of "critical" raw materials — those in which the problem of supply is less pressing than is the case with the so-called strategic items, but a shortage of which might cause "bottlenecks" in wartime production. These also receive the attention of the Commodities Division. War

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conditions may move items from the critical to the strategic list. The United States will inevitably have to depend on foreign sources for some of its strategic and critical raw materials. Control over the importation of these will be in the hands of the War Trade Administration. In order for the United States to obtain the supplies it requires this agency will probably have to negotiate trade agreements with other nations, either allies or neutrals.

Let us now turn from raw materials to manufactured articles. The Planning Branch has surveyed some 20,000 plants to assure itself that facilities exist for producing the 14,000 items the Army will need. The production of many of these items is at present so far ahead of demand that no action is required. In the case of the other items, either the supply is short or the product is not being made commercially. In these instances, producers are asked to accept tentative wartime production schedules, and their plants are placed in the "allocated" category. There are about 10,000 such plants. When the Army and Navy both need the product of the same plant, the allocation is made by the Munitions Board. As a means of accustoming manufacturers to producing unfamiliar items, small "educational orders" are given them.

If the plants manufacturing a certain article are inadequate or are not strategically located, the Facilities, Power and Fuel, and Transportation Divisions of the Munitions Board are called in to plan for the construction and equipment of additional plants. In most lines, however, it is anticipated that present industrial capacity will be sufficient. The Facilities Division will plan to locate the new plants in areas near the supply of raw materials, where transportation facilities are not likely to be overtaxed, and where power and fuel are available. Where all these favorable conditions are not found together, a balance must be struck among them. During the World War, the greatest industrial and transport strain developed in New England and in the area between Pittsburgh and New York. Now that industry has become more decentralized through the use of electricity, it is easier to plan for these areas. Here the Power and Fuel Division is benefiting from the research of the National Defense Power Committee. By permission of the Federal Power Commission electric power may be shifted from one part of the nation to another.

The work of the Transportation Division is based on the assumption that the railroads are still the backbone of our transportation system and that motor and water transport will be

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merely auxiliary feeders. The railroads are to be left in private hands under a plan of operation which is being elaborated by the Association of American Railways to meet government needs.

Proper contract forms for war supplies are difficult to prepare. Peacetime procedure is not adapted to war conditions, being designed to safeguard the Government at every turn regardless of resulting delay. Open competitive bidding and the rigid limitation of profits are feasible in peace; but in war they may seriously hamper the procurement of necessary supplies. The removal of the restrictions normally surrounding the making of contracts undoubtedly opens the way to profiteering. But during the World War loose contracts were not the principal cause for excess profits. As a result of the Government's foresight in time of peace, both as regards the probable needs of the defense forces and in cataloguing the country's natural recources, there should be less improvident purchasing in another war than there was in the last. Under the present system of allocations and educational orders, competitive bidding will be restricted to certain specified firms; this does not mean, however, that there will be no time and opportunity for determining whether the prices set by these are out of line. The "cost-plus" form of contract used during the World War has not been eliminated; but government checks on manufacturers' costs are now more effective. Further, the types of contracts have been reduced from 400 to eight and this should simplify auditing. The new contracts contain provisions by which manufacturers may be allowed compensation, after appropriate hearings, in cases where their labor and material costs rose after the contract was awarded. Since it is expected that there will be some form of price control, this particular form of abuse, prevalent in the World War, should be largely eliminated.

However, no acceptable principle of price control has yet been worked out. Mr. Baruch, who was chairman of the 1918 War Industries Board, favors establishing a "ceiling" over all prices. This ceiling would be the level obtaining on that date preceding the declaration of war when prices last appeared normal. Thereafter any rises would have to be approved by the price control authority. Others consider this method unworkable in practice and believe that it would induce bootleg prices. Some experts would at first have the Government control the prices of only the most important raw materials and then slowly extend its supervision of the price structure as it became administratively

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practicable and as appeared necessary to protect the general price level. The Brookings Institution is now studying this subject at the request of the Munitions Board. Some agency with adequate powers, such as the Federal Trade Commission, should extend the study and keep it up to date.

What, now, about man power, both for industry and the armed forces? Since no difficulty in securing adequate man power is expected, the principal problem will be that of utilizing it wisely. We will require a draft only in a war of major proportions; and this will have to be voted by Congress. If necessary, all men of military age would be registered; those not needed immediately would be placed in deferred categories. Volunteering in the early stages of the war would be permitted until a selective service act had been passed and come into operation. A system for coördinating and supplementing state employment agencies would be needed in order to provide labor for the nation's industrial machine. In this way the whole nation could be made into a single labor market. Preparations for meeting labor's own problems and for settling its wartime disputes are still incomplete; these await the smoothing out of difficulties in labor's own ranks and the revision of our national labor legislation.

Plans for the conduct of public relations involve no sharp departures from World War practice. The Army and Navy will control the dissemination of information concerning strategic activities. News from the civilian branches of the Government will be distributed through a central civilian agency. The press presumably will again abstain voluntarily from printing military information likely to give aid or comfort to the enemy. The radio can be completely dominated by the Government through its power to grant or refuse licenses. The motion-picture industry will probably desire to avoid controversial issues, and so will readily adhere to any rules imposed by a supervisory authority. The Munitions Board feels that this supervising body should be composed of civilians. The Army and Navy are concerned only with the proper presentation and control of their own military information, and they feel that other matters connected with the war should be left to civilian publicity agencies.

In the past the plans of the various divisions described above were embodied in annexes attached to the Industrial Mobilization Plan; however, in the 1939 version they were omitted. This does not mean that the principles underlying these plans have

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been changed. Rather it is an indication that in time of war they will be put into effect largely by civilians, with the Munitions Board serving in only an advisory capacity. Also, the Plan has heretofore been accompanied by the drafts of legislative bills designed to give the President powers to put it into effect. In these the President was authorized to register all men between 18 and 45 years of age, and either to enroll them in the armed forces or to grant them deferments. He was also given power to fix prices and profits. He could license any occupation and fix its rates of compensation. He could open and close stock exchanges, and permit or stop the sale of securities. When the Nye Committee investigated the Plan in 1934, it sharply criticized both the annexes and the bills; in their place it substituted a bill of its own which added a confiscatory war profits tax, though it granted sweeping powers to the Executive. Thereafter the Munitions Board's Plan contained the same grant of powers to the Executive as that of the Nye Bill, with slight modifications. However, it has now been decided not to include drafts of legislative bills in the Plan. Instead, the Legal Division of the Munitions Board will prepare tentative drafts of necessary legislation which can be changed as conditions may require.

There are two important gaps in the Munitions Board's current Plan. The first is a lack of any provision for war financing. The defense departments quite correctly consider that this problem belongs to the Treasury. They merely state that taxation must not be so severe as to discourage industrial production. This limitation applies particularly to taxation on excess profits. But the Treasury has not been authorized to prepare war finance legislation. The whole question, then, is still open, even though Congress in recent years has given it much attention. One of the Nye Committee's recommendations was that the war be paid for as far as possible out of revenue. It therefore wrote a "pay as you go" bill placing a tax of 100 percent on all incomes over $10,000. (The corporation tax provisions in this bill were based on those of the existing revenue law, and when this was later revised, the Nye provisions became obsolete.) In 1938 a new bill was introduced requiring the Treasury to draft a war revenue bill and keep it up to date. But this bill has never become law; as a result there is still a gap in our war planning. A succession of bills has been introduced into Congress (beginning in 1935 with the McSwain bill) to tax all the profits out of war. Such

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proposals might discourage possible "warmongers." But as war revenue bills they can scarcely be taken seriously, since the rates they set are so high that they probably could not be enforced.

The second gap in our planning is the failure to make preparations for the period of neutrality intervening between the outbreak of some general war abroad and our possible entry into it. The Plan of the Munitions Board does not provide for the application of preparatory measures previous to our declaration of war. But civilian preparations for war should be undertaken during this crucial interval; and if economic dislocations became severe, as they well might, steps would have to be taken to mitigate them. Price control will be particularly important at such a time; frantic bidding for supplies by foreign belligerents may force prices up to a point where attempts to prevent inflation in this country would be futile after we had become a belligerent.

Existing legislation can be invoked to a certain extent to tide us over this period. The Executive possesses emergency powers which might be used both to prevent price kiting and to inaugurate a defense program. Under the National Defense Act the President may preëmpt any factory's output and authorize its reorganization if necessary for national defense. The Federal Power Act gives him authority to redirect the flow of power for the same purpose. The Merchant Marine and Federal Transportation Acts give him similar emergency powers over transportation. To prevent violent fluctuations on the exchanges he may close them for three months. Although these measures give him no direct power to govern prices, his control over exchanges and transportation and his power to requisition factory output at prices fixed by him (subject to review by the courts) could certainly be used indirectly to attain that end.

There remains an urgent need for the creation of stock piles of strategic materials for use during this emergency period. For instance, there would be no time to obtain tin and rubber in the East Indies after a crisis in that area had cut off both the supply and our access to it. Legislation providing for the purchase and storage of strategic materials is now before Congress, also a proposal to barter American surplus wheat and cotton for them. Action along these lines should not be deferred.

Should Congress for any reason fail to pass legislation granting war powers to the Executive immediately on the outbreak of what appears likely to be a major war, the President has two

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alternatives open to him. He may do what Lincoln did, and what Buchanan failed to do — take whatever measures appear imperative to preserve the nation, and seek legislative authorization when Congress assembles. Presumably this would be unnecessary today, since Congress could assemble in two days. Or, like Wilson, he could broadly interpret the authority already granted him by Congress. For example, Wilson created the whole system for mobilizing industry which centered around the War Industries Board on no more authority than the Overman Act permitting the reorganization of the Executive branch.

Another course would seem to be the most sensible — to ask Congress in advance for whatever powers would be needed to meet an emergency. The American Legion recommended the enactment of adequate legislation to the War Policies Commission in 1931, and has continued to advocate it since. The War Department recommended specific legislation in its 1933 version of the Industrial Mobilization Plan. The Nye Committee favored such a grant, though in different terms. Each session of Congress sees bills of a similar nature introduced. They fail to pass for two reasons: the delegation of so much power is considered dangerous; and, until recently, the necessity for it has appeared remote. As a matter of fact, experience indicates that in a major war, power finds its way into the President's hands whether it has been specifically placed there or not. But this country has never waged war against a totalitarian state; in such a conflict we could not afford to delay giving the President full powers.

Looking at the Plan in general, we find little in it that does not find some sort of precedent in what happened in the World War. It does not set up a completely planned economy, but allows individual initiative to continue, encouraging or discouraging it according to its effect on the Government's needs. It preserves the profit motive as an incentive to production. It also recognizes the right of workmen to change jobs and seek higher wages, although it restricts the opportunities for finding them to necessary war industries. It institutes no limitations on the Constitutional Bill of Rights other than those applied during the World War. And it is based on the principle that time is of the essence and can best be saved by speeding up existing methods and smoothing the way for producers already in business.

The fear is frequently expressed that the complete system of

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controls envisaged in this Plan would inevitably create just that sort of totalitarian régime which we now so vigorously condemn. The Plan undoubtedly modifies sharply the sort of government we enjoy in time of peace. However, it will be put fully into effect only in a major war, and in any case provision has been made to prevent the organization which carries on the war from continuing its existence after hostilities are over. A line has been carefully drawn between present government departments and wartime super-agencies, in order to deprive the latter of any postwar function. All bills granting extraordinary war powers to the Executive limit the grants to the duration of the war emergency.

The World War showed what obstacles lie in the way of any attempt to build a permanent Executive dictatorship based on agencies staffed by businessmen and industrialists temporarily drafted into Government service. In 1918 the nation recognized only dimly that it was living under a form of dictatorship. As soon as the war was over the executive personnel of the agencies created for the emergency lost interest in their work. They simply wound up their affairs and went home to resume their ordinary vocations, leaving the process of cleaning up to the permanent officials of the regular government departments.

If the Plan is to work efficiently, and at the same time along as democratic lines as war conditions permit, its formulation should be regularized and broadened. Until recently only the War and Navy Departments have had any official part in planning. The National Defense Act authorized the Assistant Secretary of War to undertake the work. When the Army allocation system began cutting into the Navy's sources of supply, the two departments made joint plans. No other branches of the Government have an interest comparable to that of the Army and Navy, and until recently none of them took any initiative, merely advising the Munitions Board when invited to do so. But the personnel of the Board is limited both in number and tenure of office. Like the personnel of the Planning Branch and the Industrial College, it is composed of Army and Navy officers subject to the usual changes in assignments. For Army men these changes are made every four years, and for Naval men every two. No matter how vital their part in planning, they move on at the end of their assignment. The students in the Industrial College attend a nine months' session, and then return to ordinary duty, often at tasks quite unrelated to those they have just left.

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Two means could be employed to broaden participation and give greater continuity. The first would be to submit different parts of the Plan to interested groups of outsiders for their judgment and suggestions as to possible modifications. This method is now being developed by the Board, though on a limited scale. More interdepartmental committees should be formed for study in such fields as war trade, where the Department of State and the Treasury Department (through the customs service) must coöperate with the Army and Navy. Closer contacts should be made with the trade associations, so that they can work out with the Board the details of their wartime rôles. Reserve officers are now recruited from every field of civilian activity; officers from each field should participate in the work of the Board, and bring to it the benefit of their specialized knowledge.

A second method would be to broaden the policy-forming group to include prominent civilians. This was done in the World War. The Council of National Defense, consisting of the heads of the principal Executive departments, created an Advisory Commission of civilians, each prominent in some field of activity, including industry, finance and labor. Out of this group of able men grew the War Industries Board organization, which brought to the Government the administrative services of many of the best-trained executives in the country.

As now organized, however, no civilian leaders have any controlling part in the plans being made. This seems particularly an error in planning for the super-agencies. The Munitions Board proposes to turn over its control to civilian administrators as soon as the super-agencies are established. But these administrators will not be bound by the plans of the Munitions Board and may have ideas of their own; to that extent the Board's plans might lose their value. If these plans had been passed on and approved by a powerful civilian advisory committee, composed of men of the type from which the administrators would be chosen, there would be less chance of their being scrapped later on.

Whenever a war crisis comes, the transition from our normal form of government to that outlined above will be greatly facilitated by wide and accurate knowledge of the Plan's provisions, and the feeling that those to whom it is to apply have participated in its creation. If these conditions are fulfilled, there ought to be little anxiety that the provisions of the Plan will be invoked on any occasion less solemn than one which would warrant it.

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# THE STRATEGY OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK

*By Walter H. Mallory*

"Matching our blood and flesh against the enemy guns, even if we are defeated in battle, in the end we will win the war." — Chiang Kai-shek, July 1934.

JULY 7 marks the second anniversary of the outbreak of the conflict between China and Japan. It started with a small skirmish at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peiping. Although the Japanese still refer to it as the "China incident," it has developed into a life and death struggle between the two principal nations in the Far East. Millions of troops have been engaged, great cities destroyed, and untold wealth expended. In terms of combatants, costs and extent, it is the biggest war that the Orient has ever experienced; and no one knows how or when it will end.

In reviewing the course of hostilities we find difficulty in discerning any clear-cut plan of the Japanese. They seem to have pursued a policy of expediency, with each new expedient involving greater effort and greater risk. At the start, their objective seemed limited to the occupation of North China. Then they attacked Shanghai and the Yangtze valley. Now they are involved along the entire China coast and far into the interior, and the seizure of Hainan and the Spratly Islands extends their operations beyond Chinese waters. They started to conquer a small part of China. They are now committed to securing the domination of Eastern Asia.

The Chinese have had a great deal to do with bringing this about. They have long been aware of Japan's overweening ambition and they have consciously sought to lead her beyond her depth. An examination of the record of events will show that Chiang Kai-shek has had a consistent plan. Much of it was formulated prior to the outbreak of hostilities, and it has been developed logically under the pressure of events. It is the purpose of this article to examine this plan in its economic, financial and diplomatic as well as its military phases.

In a nutshell, the Chinese purpose has been to resist desperately, and while so doing, to extend as widely as possible the theatre of operations; to make Japan's progress as costly as possible; to withhold from her the fruits of victory and to seek foreign help for a hoped-for counteroffensive.

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## I. CHIANG'S MILITARY STRATEGY

In its military aspects the Chinese action falls into three phases: (1) the defensive, until the Japanese were completely extended; (2) a period of guerrilla fighting to keep the invaders occupied while reorganizing the main forces; (3) the counteroffensive. The struggle is now in the second phase.

In July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek delivered a series of lectures to his officers at Kuling in which he laid down the basis for China's resistance to Japan. The lectures were secret, since China was then nominally at peace with Japan and Chiang was pursuing a policy of appeasement while preparations for the inevitable conflict were being made. These lectures have now been published. They show clearly that the Generalissimo expected the attack. "Japan believes that with her present military strength she can, if she wants, occupy the whole of China without much difficulty. . . . How much time we still have on hand we can easily guess. It is right in front of us, from three or five years to ten years." This was said just about three years before the war started.

Chiang believed that the Japanese underestimated the Chinese strength and will to resist. "Contempt for China on the part of the enemy is his weak point. Knowledge of this weak point is our strong point." He was cognizant of the superiority of the enemy's equipment, but not hopeless because of it. "It is not quite essential to match big gun for big gun, aëroplane for aëroplane, a new weapon for a new weapon. . . . It is quite possible for us to resist the enemy's new inventions with old weapons, especially China's traditional, time-honored weapons . . . the knowledge of how to utilize whatever we see or can get hold of — whether man power, manufactured articles, mountains, streams, trees or blades of grass — is of the greatest military importance. We should exert our intelligence and ability to the utmost to make full use of the materials at our disposal."

Chiang did not expect to fight the war alone. "Japan cannot conquer China with America in her rear, Soviet Russia on her right and England on her left — her most powerful enemies in the South Sea all flanking her. It is this international situation that constitutes one of Japan's great weaknesses. An understanding of this situation cannot but give us a feeling of security and inspire us in finding the means and the strength to resist."

Chiang stressed the importance of arousing the Chinese people

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to withstand the attack and he realized that the outcome would depend upon their morale. "We must pay special attention to the organization and training of the masses so that the entire countryside can be mobilized to assist the regular troops in the prosecution of the war. . . . Regardless of trouble, dangers, adverse circumstances, and the strength of the enemy, we must find the ways and means to fight him successfully. The only question is whether we have the determination and the spirit of striving incessantly to the utmost of our ability."

These were some of the general ideas of the Chinese leader long before the outbreak of hostilities. Let us see how they have been followed in the course of the war.

## II. THE FIRST PHASE OF THE WAR

The first phase of the war consisted of three principal battles. China lost them all, but I think it can be said that she gained most of her objectives. Into those battles Chiang threw the flower of his army, whatever he had of mechanical equipment, and his new air force. Although his army was defeated, it was never surrounded, never completely broken. The Japanese spoke confidently of a "Tannenberg" but failed to bring it to pass. The Chinese troops always withdrew at the eleventh hour, usually in good order, and took up new positions — in each case always a little farther from the coast than the ones just lost.

When hostilities began in North China, Chiang did not make a strong stand in that area. He did send reinforcements northward, but his best troops went to Shanghai, some 600 miles from the scene of the initial conflict. By this means he frustrated Japan's plan to achieve a quick triumph in North China as she had six years earlier in Manchuria. Japan's interests in Shanghai were great, and her large population there had been swelled by her nationals coming from interior China. She could not but accept Chiang's challenge, and the first major battle of the war was soon raging. It lasted three months. The Chinese army took a severe beating but retreated in good order. Japan's losses were heavy, but her casualties were estimated to be but a third of Chiang's.

The Japanese pushed on to Nanking, China's capital, which they took without much difficulty. Then there was a lull. The Japanese people thought the war was won and celebrations in Tokyo lasted for five days. But the Chinese did not sue for peace, nor would they even discuss it. Instead they moved their capital

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to Hankow and concentrated their forces at Suchow at the junction of the north-south Tientsin-Pukow and the east-west Lunghai railways and dared the Japanese to come after them. Once again the challenge was accepted and the second battle of the war ensued. It also lasted three months. At Taierchwang the Chinese administered to the Japanese their most severe military defeat in modern times. But the Japanese won through and Chiang was once more forced to withdraw. His casualties were not proportionately so severe as at Shanghai. It is estimated that he lost two men to Japan's one. He retreated upcountry, with the Japanese in hot pursuit, and finally established his next base of operations at Hankow, a port on the Yangtze about 600 miles from the sea.

The battle at Hankow, like the two former major engagements, took about three months. Chinese resistance to the Japanese along the Yangtze River was determined, but Chiang started to evacuate Hankow well in advance of giving up the city and withdrew his forces in better order than at Suchow. His Government had previously been shifted to Chungking, in the far west, and the Japanese again found themselves with a somewhat empty victory, for the Chinese were still unwilling even to discuss peace.

With the fall of Hankow the first phase of the war ended. Japan had occupied the great coastal plains of China and could move about in them at will. The Chinese forces were withdrawn to more mountainous country. Positional warfare, with great concentrations of troops, gave place to a dispersion of a large part of the Chinese troops and the initiation of guerrilla tactics.

### III. THE SECOND PHASE OF THE WAR

One characteristic of the present phase of the war is the absence of "fronts." We are apt to think in terms of an extended line held by the Chinese in the face of an invading force. The Japanese have penetrated deeply into China, but they have not occupied very much territory. Their advance has been along the arteries of communication which they hold; but the countryside in between is in Chinese hands and under local Chinese administration. Literally, tens of millions of Chinese people, even in the coastal plains, have never seen a Japanese soldier. The present plan of Chiang Kai-shek is to organize these rural people; to support them with army units established in the mountain regions which surround and dot the plains; and to harass the Japanese at

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as many points as possible. Thus their lines are being constantly broken, isolated groups of the invaders destroyed, regular traffic over the railways impeded, and the pacification of any extended area made extremely difficult. Chiang hopes by these means to keep the Japanese fully occupied so that they must maintain their present large forces in China, and at the same time to prevent them from establishing order, without which they cannot restore business and recoup their costs. Meanwhile, he is using the time to reorganize his main forces for the hoped-for counteroffensive.

### IV. THE PROBLEM OF SUPPLY

The equipment and provisioning of China's fighting forces have become increasingly difficult as the war has progressed. Of food there has been sufficient. During the past two years China has had good crops. Since her economy is essentially agricultural, even the interruption of her rail and some of her water traffic has not resulted in serious food shortages. The countryside is not dependent on the cities and has existed in spite of being divorced from them. Rail transport was meager even before the invasion, and the bulk of China's primary products has always been moved by water, cart, barrow and on the backs of coolies. Chinese troops have been accustomed to living off the country, and now that they are more widely dispersed than in the first phase of the war they will do so more easily.

The supply and transportation of munitions is a much more serious problem. Much of the equipment of China's armies has been destroyed, captured or worn out during nearly two years of war. She has no facilities for manufacturing anything but small arms, ammunition, and perhaps trench mortars. Many of her arsenals even for these necessities have fallen into the hands of the Japanese; but wherever possible the machinery from them was laboriously transported into the far west and is now being established there. In the first year of the war China was able to buy appreciable quantities of military supplies abroad, but one by one her ports have fallen under Japanese naval or military control, so that now only a trickle of war essentials gets through.

It is clear that Chiang Kai-shek expected to lose his seaports and laid his plans for defense accordingly. In fact, before the war began he said: "The enemy's striking force has been prepared, and his warships have been stationed in strategic positions along the seacoasts and the rivers. He can occupy any point in China."

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While the Chinese ports were being closed and the railway lines occupied, Chiang therefore began the building of roads toward the remote frontiers in the northwest and the southwest in order to form an avenue to foreign ports over which goods could be brought in. He also succeeded in building up reserves of munitions and supplies over and above day-to-day consumption. The amount of these stocks is unknown. They are obviously unbalanced, for example gasoline is scarce. But the fact remains that Chiang has munitions sufficient for a long resistance.

At the time of writing there are three routes connecting the outside world with that part of western China to which the Chinese have moved their center of resistance. The longest of these, and for that reason the least efficient, is a motor road from Chungking, the present capital, to the northwest through Kansu and Sinkiang provinces to the Turk-Sib railway in Soviet Russia. The shortest is by motor road from Chungking to Kunming and thence southward by a narrow-gauge railway to the French port of Haiphong in Indo-China. The third is from Chungking to Kunming and thence westward by road across the border of Burma to Lashio. Lashio is connected with the British port of Rangoon by a railway which proceeds southward through Mandalay. In addition to these trunk lines, the Chinese have been feverishly constructing branch and connecting roads in order to bind the area together and increase its power of resistance. In addition to the 1,540-mile road to Russia, 1,990 miles of highways have been built in the west and southwest since the war started.

These new lines of communication have by no means solved the problem of supply for Chiang Kai-shek's forces. The route from Russia is long, no gasoline supplies are available along its course, and the amount of freight which can be brought over it is small indeed. The railway line through Indo-China is only meter-gauge, the grades are steep, rolling stock is inadequate, and trains have been running only during daylight hours. In addition, the Japanese have brought such pressure on the French that they have declined to transport munitions. The Burma road is the most remote and safest from Japanese air attack, but it also is limited in its capacity and will be very difficult to maintain during the rainy season. It is being paralleled by a railroad line, but this will not be finished for many months.

Hundreds of trucks have been purchased abroad and many of

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them are now being operated over these new roads. But the old-style methods of transport have by no means been abandoned. Mules, carts and coolies are also being employed. In addition, water transport has been much improved. As the Chinese retreated up the Yangtze they sent their native junks and power-boats ahead of them. At Chungking in early April, a half year after the fall of Hankow 830 miles down river, boats carrying refugees and general cargo were still arriving every day. These have been put in service on the rivers of Szechwan province.

Chiang has made a Herculean effort to salvage what he could of China's meager industrial plant as he moved his forces farther and farther inland. Wherever possible, factories and arsenals were dismantled and the machinery sent far into the interior. It had to be transported much of the way by cart or pack animals or on the backs of coolies. The Yangtze River was the only route by which machinery of any size could be shipped. No one knows how much of an industrial plant Chiang now has or what supplies of raw materials for manufacturing the sinews of war. It is safe to say that it must be inadequate to sustain any large-scale offensive. Planes can be flown in, trucks and light artillery and tanks can be driven in. But planes and trucks need gasoline and guns need ammunition. Most of this must come from abroad.

## V. FINANCING THE WAR

Although China is considered to be a poor country, the cost of the war has fallen more lightly on her than on her enemy. In the fiscal year which ended just before the outbreak of hostilities, the Chinese Government spent a total of some $990,000,000 in Chinese currency. At three to one, that would be 330,000,000 American dollars. During the same year the American Government spent $8,105,000,000. The per capita cost for China, in our currency, was 73 cents; for the United States, $62. Despite the fact that the financial resources of the Chinese Government were so small, it had been able to build up a huge army and has managed to continue the war against Japan with very little financial help from abroad. The fact that China's normal expenditures were so small was a source of strength to her when the exigencies of war threw an added burden on her. Though she has lost the main sources of her revenue, the amount involved has not been so great that new sources could not provide it — from either taxation or borrowing. The income of her Government in 1937 (expressed in

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terms of an American dollar worth three Chinese dollars) was made up as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Customs | $105,990,000 |
| Salt | 63,060,000 |
| Other taxes | 57,560,000 |
| Other receipts | 29,720,000 |
| Borrowing | 73,890,000 |
| | $330,220,000 |

Of this total, $169,050,000, or more than half, was made up of customs and salt receipts. But these revenues are pledged for the debt service. The charge for the loan service that year was about $79,000,000, and this amount was not available to the National Government. In addition, $35,000,000 was allocated as subsidies to provincial governments and $17,000,000 for administrative expenses of the customs and salt services. If these items are subtracted, it will be seen that the National Government expended for all of its activities a total of only $199,220,000. Of this sum $107,303,000 was for the military establishment.

China has lost 80 percent of her revenue from maritime customs since most of her ports are in Japanese hands; she has also lost a large proportion of her revenue from the salt gabelle. Meanwhile the new income tax which went into effect in 1937 is yielding important sums, and inheritance, war profits and other taxes have been inaugurated. The bulk of the taxes for the Central Government used to come from the port cities. Now that the Government has been moved into the interior, it is likely that the revenue of the provinces still in Chinese hands — revenue which in the past seldom reached Nanking — will find its way into the national treasury.

In addition to finding new sources of income the Government has been able in two important ways to support its currency and finance the war. The first was through the nationalization of silver. This provided Chiang with a war chest, and since the United States has continued to buy silver at a good price, the Chinese have shipped it out and secured the necessary foreign exchange to balance their accounts. While the $25,000,000 loan of the United States Export-Import Bank was not designed as a currency support, it has provided exchange for Chinese purchases abroad and so indirectly has contributed to that end. Secondly, Chiang has succeeded in getting British help to support his currency.

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Remittances from Chinese abroad have always been an important item in China's balance of payments. The Generalissimo has won the allegiance of Chinese all over the world, and a steady stream of contributions has helped to support the currency and to furnishing direct material aid to the Government. The Chinese have been so successful in the management of their national finances that at the time of writing the yuan is accepted more willingly in the Shanghai exchange market than the Japanese yen and stands at practical parity with it. In the battle of the currencies, less spectacular than the clash of arms but equally hard fought, China has scored a series of smashing victories.

## VI. POISONING THE FRUITS OF VICTORY

Japan has had a major military success in China. Judged by the usual standards of conquest, she has subjugated a huge area and an enormous population. Presuming that her troops move in sufficient numbers, she can proceed wherever she likes in China's great coastal plains; and there are tens of millions of unarmed Chinese in the area which she nominally controls who are subject to her power. But her leaders constantly remind the Japanese people that the war is not yet won — that they must gird up their loins for further fighting which, they are promised, will continue for a long time to come.

It is hard for westerners to understand why Japan has been unable more rapidly to consolidate her position, even in North China which she occupied nearly two years ago. They are accustomed to judging events by the light of experience in the West. But events in Europe and in the Orient cannot be judged by the same criteria. When Hitler moved into Czechoslovakia, for example, he was not only able to assume effective control at once, but whatever there was of wealth or of organization became his to utilize for his own purposes. When the Japanese went into China, they encountered entirely different conditions.

The reasons for this are threefold. First, the Chinese are extremely individualistic. They are not integrated either economically or socially (except in the family, which is a small unit). Their integration is racial and cultural and this is a liability to an invader, not an asset. Secondly, Chinese economy is essentially agricultural; the countryside is therefore easily able to maintain itself without the cities or even the ports and railway lines. Japan has thus found it impossible to lay hold of the really vital

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strength of the occupied areas. Some wealth she has taken; but the real wealth of China lies in the productiveness of her rural population which has been beyond Japan's reach. Thirdly, Chiang has followed a plan of deliberately destroying everything of even potential economic value to the Japanese before he has retreated from a given area. This has come to be called the "scorched earth policy." Factories have been dismantled and what machinery could not be moved has been wrecked; railway rolling stock, and in some cases the rails, have been taken along by the Chinese as they have fallen back. Even the peasants in many regions have deserted their fields and villages, so that when the Japanese moved in they found a barren land. Non-coöperation, at which the Chinese are particularly adept, has been organized in every form and on a large scale. Japanese goods have been boycotted. The paper currency which the invaders have sought to introduce has been accepted only in the towns and villages where their military forces were at hand to force its use. Farmers have been induced to raise food crops instead of cotton or other products which Japan had hoped to secure from the area.

In addition to all these rather negative methods of resistance, positive action has been taken through guerrilla warfare. Local forces, recently joined by regular army units which have filtered back into the occupied territory, have raided and often cut Japan's long lines of communications. Small units of the enemy forces which have ventured away from the main garrisons have been attacked and in some instances annihilated. Positions long in Japanese hands have been won back by the guerrillas, necessitating the dispatch of larger forces to recover them. While each of these engagements is little more than a pinprick, their aggregate scattered along the several thousand miles of Japanese lines has a considerable effect. The guerrilla warfare makes impossible the withdrawal of any substantial part of the invading forces; and it is very wearing on their morale, for there is no satisfactory way to retaliate. When the Japanese counterattack, the guerrillas withdraw, and the shooting of a few villagers as an example does not compensate the invaders nor has it served to intimidate the Chinese.

## VII. THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT

The Chinese have had a firm conviction that their cause was just, and a clear belief that if they could continue their resistance

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long enough other Powers would come to their assistance. There is an old Chinese proverb which says: "Virtue never lacks company; it will ever find support." Chinese diplomacy has been energetic both in making it understood abroad that China's course was virtuous and in seeking support. It has thus far gained widespread moral assistance and even a little material aid.

The Chinese Government has sought to show that it was fighting, not only to save its homeland from a ruthless invasion, but to defend the inviolability of treaty engagements and to preserve or restore some semblance of international morality. It has pictured itself as occupying the front-line trenches in a war which really involves every nation which hopes to live in a world of law. Chiang has declared that China will fight this good fight alone, if need be; but that he has a right to expect like-minded nations to do their duty also. This has been the positive side of the Chinese claim for help. On the negative side the Chinese have sought to show that a Japanese victory would result in the total loss of the rights and interests of all other foreigners in China. While their points have been well taken and ably argued, the actions of Japan have tended to supply the proof. As the war has progressed, foreign countries have come more and more to feel that the Chinese contention is correct. This feeling is doubtless the basis for the financial aid which has been given China by the Western Powers.

After the fall of Hankow, Chiang stated that henceforth any effective action taken by Japan would bear more heavily on the interests of other nations than on China's. Certainly if Japan hopes to control China completely, she must take over the International Settlement at Shanghai and other foreign concessions, which serve as centers of Chinese irredentism. It is not too much to say that Chiang, despite the loss to certain of his countrymen, would greet such an attempt with satisfaction. It would increase very greatly the chance that the Western nations would align themselves more actively on China's side.

## VIII. CHINESE MORALE

The Chinese are a fatalistic race. Nature and their own ineptitude have combined to make them so. No people have such a desperate struggle for mere existence. Floods, famines, poverty and civil wars have for centuries challenged them to survive. But they have survived, and in the process they have built up an immunity to disaster which has stood them in good stead during

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the past two terrible years. This Chinese optimism should serve as an example to some western peoples who, despite an infinitely higher standard of living, feel nothing but complete despair when the business curve dips temporarily downward.

The outcome of the war depends upon the ability of the Chinese to continue their resistance, not only in the military sense that they oblige Japan to maintain a large army in the country, but also in the political sense of denying her any opportunity to profit from her occupation of Chinese territory. Chiang has, of course, appreciated the importance of maintaining the people's morale and in all his speeches and messages lays great stress on the development of the "revolutionary spirit" in order not only to defeat the invader but also to regenerate the nation. The effect of this is to focus attention both on the immediate struggle and on a long-term policy. In other words, it is not a question of months; the people are asked to prepare for long years of patient, resolute, self-sacrificing effort.

The Chinese people are notable for their realism. They are accustomed to compromise. While they seldom change their direction, they are willing to make progress by easy stages. These characteristics may be their undoing, for in order to return to a "business as usual" policy they may make what they would regard as a temporary arrangement with the Japanese, with the idea of postponing the final showdown. They might, led by their merchant class, begin to trade again with the enemy, hoping in the future to edge the Japanese out little by little instead of attempting by a major counteroffensive to throw them out now. Whether the new Chinese nationalism is sufficiently strong to overcome these traditional Chinese traits, time alone will show.

## IX. THE SITUATION TODAY

After nearly two years of war, in which she has won all the battles, Japan still has to maintain in China proper (that is, south of the Great Wall) an army of at least 900,000 men (the Japanese Admiralty spokesman on May 11 said there were more than 1,000,000 men in Central China). These are divided roughly as follows: Canton area, 60,000; Hankow area, 300,000; Shansi, 120,000; Honan, Hopei and Western Shantung, 200,000. The remaining 220,000 are in garrisons and on lines of communications. In addition, there are probably over 300,000 troops in Manchuria and 40,000 in Korea.

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The Chinese forces, if guerrillas and bandits are included, probably number over 2,000,000 men. Of these about a third are at the points of Japanese penetration; a third have been split up into small units and sent back into the occupied area for guerrilla warfare; and a third are in the far west, for reorganization and training. Of those at the "front," probably 350,000 are in the Hankow area south of the Yangtze, 150,000 are in the south in Kwangtung, and 100,000 in the northern province of Shansi.

The Japanese forces have been likened to swimmers in a swimming pool. They can move about wherever they like in the pool, but they do not occupy it. When they are in any certain spot the water surrounds them but offers little resistance; when they move, the water rushes in again to fill the place where they had stood. But to get out of China is not so easy as getting out of a swimming pool. Dr. P. C. Chang has described Chinese resistance in a novel way: "It is not like one fist striking another," he says. "It is like a fist striking soft glue. As the fist advances the glue engulfs it. The fist may feel very proud that it is going ahead. But the farther it goes in, the harder to get it out. So I should not be surprised if the Japanese troops were beginning to be alarmed as to when and how they will ever get home."

One would be very rash indeed to make any prophecies as to when the conflict in China may end, or to pick the winner. It is perhaps possible to say that the struggle is of such a fundamental nature that it will go on in some form for many years to come. And for this same reason it seems unlikely that either side will win a clear-cut and decisive victory.

For China to win, without outside military aid, she must be able to reorganize and on the material side greatly strengthen her armies and carry out a counteroffensive of surprising skill and force. Alternatively, Japan must collapse at home. Neither of these possibilities seem imminent. For Japan to win, she must not only crush all active military resistance and restore order in the country, she must also succeed in getting the Chinese themselves to coöperate with her. This possibility too appears remote. Thus the likely outcome would seem to be some sort of compromise which would afford temporary peace, and later the renewal of the struggle, perhaps in a different form. This leaves out of account the chance that China will get the active military aid of some other Power or Powers. Chiang Kai-shek has counted on this from the beginning, and still counts on it.

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# BRITISH NEWS CONTROLS

*By Sir Arthur Willert*

THE present British Government has been frequently accused of deliberate assaults upon the liberty of the press and other organs of public opinion. Now the most obvious of all political platitudes is that freedom to report, criticize and suggest is the breath of life to democracy. Shackle the newspapers, the radio, the film and the platform, and you have travelled far towards the totalitarian State. The gravity of the charge, then, need not be labored.

Undoubtedly the National Government has been heavy-handed in its treatment of the British news machine, especially since Mr. Chamberlain became Prime Minister. Its latest spectacular lapse was at the beginning of April, when the nerves of Europe were just about as tense as they could be in consequence of Signor Mussolini's piracy in Albania. At a naval meeting in Portsmouth, Lord Stanhope, the Minister in charge of the Admiralty, explained some empty benches by saying that "unfortunately, shortly before I left the Admiralty it became necessary to give orders to man anti-aircraft guns." This sensational announcement, based, it was afterwards explained, upon nothing more substantial than a standing order that certain men should be at their stations at moments of tension, was at once flashed round the world by the news agencies and put on the air by the British Broadcasting Corporation. Nevertheless, when the Prime Minister heard of it later in the evening, he caused to be sent out to the British press the most emphatic official appeal which can be issued against the publication of an item of news, what is called a "D" notice. His belated and arbitrary action caused confusion and irritation and was the subject a few days later of a unanimous resolution of protest by the annual meeting of the National Union of Journalists. The mover of the resolution said that "the censorship mind" dominates at Whitehall.

The Stanhope incident would not have created the stir it did had there not been earlier deeds and words which could plausibly be attributed to a "censorship mind." These words and deeds are on record in the press on both sides of the Atlantic and in *Hansard*, the British equivalent of the *Congressional Record*. *Hansard* quotes Mr. Chamberlain as chiding his critics last autumn for

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describing Munich as a defeat for the democracies. It is not, he said, "one of the characteristics of the totalitarian States . . . that they are accustomed to foul their own nests." This remark quickened the fear that having obstinately misjudged the minds of Berlin and Rome in his foreign policy, he was gravitating towards an equally arbitrary blunder in his domestic policy.

Other things contributing to that fear have been announcements that this or that film has been censored because it collided with British policy; stories of allegedly unusual pressure brought to bear, especially after Munich, upon editors and proprietors not to criticize the Chamberlain diplomacy; stories of efforts to damp down criticism of Herr Hitler; and stories that the Prime Minister had taken publicity on foreign affairs away from the well-equipped Foreign Office in order to run it himself. And in the background has been the report, published soon after Munich, of the Parliamentary committee entrusted with the investigation of the so-called Sandys case of the summer of 1938.

The essentials of the Sandys case are as follows. A young Member of Parliament, son-in-law of Mr. Winston Churchill, and an officer in the Territorial Army, learnt from a fellow officer of serious deficiencies in the British air defenses, which at that time the Government was still pretending were adequately advanced. He submitted his information confidentially to Mr. Hore-Belisha, the Minister of War, telling him that he would like to raise the matter in Parliament. Mr. Hore-Belisha informed the Prime Minister that Mr. Sandys possessed confidential information he could have acquired only from an official source. The Prime Minister advised the Minister of War to see the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General talked to Mr. Sandys in such terms that Mr. Sandys took very seriously the possibility that the Official Secrets Act might be used against him. In Parliament and outside the Sandys affair has been resented as a clumsy and unjustifiable effort to compromise the right of Members of Parliament to criticize administrative inefficiencies.

Nor is it only those at the head of affairs who are accused of possessing the "censorship mind." Minor minions of government have been getting themselves into the press on account of the arbitrary use they have tried to make of their authority against the freedom of news and of political propaganda.

What does it all mean? Appeasement, Munich, the backing of the wrong horse in Spain, the cold-shouldering of Russia for so

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long — all these are widely attributed to the tendency of British Conservatives to be more afraid of the Reds than of the Fascists and therefore to cling, till the ultimate disillusionment, to the hope of making a deal with the dictators. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that some such consideration has, anyhow till lately, been an important ingredient in Mr. Chamberlain's foreign policy. Do reactionary prejudices and predilections account for the efforts of the National Government to control opinion? When the Prime Minister envied the way in which the nests of totalitarian rulers are kept "clean" from criticism, was he merely an elderly politician in a huff or was he giving us a glimpse into his real mind? Is the freedom of the press and all that that phrase connotes in these days really in danger in England, especially if the National Government stays indefinitely in office and under the thumb of the Conservatives?

Let us first glance at the powers which a British Government has over the dissemination of news and views. "The liberty of the press," wrote the great eighteenth century lawyer, Blackstone, "is indeed essential to the nature of a free State, but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publication and not in freedom from censure for criminal matters when published." In other words, the untrammelled dissemination of news and views depends not upon any constitutional guarantee but, first, upon keeping within the laws which in one way or another may limit it and, secondly, upon the generosity of the authorities in interpreting and applying those laws. Like other countries, Britain has certain laws of social censorship — against the publication of blasphemy, obscenity or of moral, medical and physiological indecencies. On these we need not dwell: they do not enter the political field. The law against sedition, on the other hand, does.

The Incitement to Disaffection Act was passed by the National Government in 1934, as a result of the so-called Invergordon Mutiny, to strengthen a previous law passed after the far more serious naval mutiny at the Nore in 1797. It makes it a crime to seduce a member of the forces from his duty or allegiance and also to possess documents, which, if published, would constitute an offense against the Act. It has been invoked only once in a minor case two years ago. But its existence can cramp criticism of the Government. There are, indeed, three cases on record of printers refusing to print passages in periodicals for fear of the Act.

The law of libel, stronger and more ruthlessly applied in Great

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Britain than in the United States, has the same deterrent effect. True, it functions mainly in non-political fields. But there have been various decisions lately that do curtail the scope of what used to be considered safe and reasonable criticism of public men. Thus in 1936 a jury gave an inconspicuous peer £2,000 damages against a London newspaper which had described him as "an unwitting tool of others who needed a not too sophisticated agent for their ends" after he had attacked it for the headline "Italy climbs down." The law governing contempt of court also functions deterrently, mainly in non-political fields. Yet it can be politically restrictive. In 1931 members of the staff of the *Daily Worker*, a Leftist organ, were fined and imprisoned for describing a judge as "a bewigged puppet and former Tory Member of Parliament chosen to put Communists away."

Last but not least come the two Official Secrets Acts of 1911 and of 1920. The primary and professed objects of these Acts are to prevent espionage and to punish officials who disclose confidential information contrary to the national interest. The 1920 Act contains, however, a much-criticized clause which compels people, on the pain of being guilty of a misdemeanor if they refuse, to give to the police information relating to an offense under the Act. This clause has been used against the press. During the last two years two newspaper men have been prosecuted under it for receiving alleged confidential information from officials, though there was nothing whatever prejudicial to the national interest in the publication of the information. In one of these cases the newspaper employing the journalist was compelled, under protest, to reveal his identity to the police, and the journalist was fined for refusing in turn to divulge the source of his information. The Government cannot, however, be seriously blamed for this. Both cases were intrinsically unimportant products of local officialdom. At least one other effort of the local police to make a newspaper reveal its sources of information was quashed as soon as London heard of it; and just the other day the Government agreed that the Act of 1920 should be amended to make it inoperative as a lever for that purpose.

Though a considerable victory for the press, this amendment does not mean that the Official Secrets Act has now no restrictive effect upon the publication of news and views. It hampers the use of official documents or information which might be considered confidential. Two writers of books have been prosecuted since

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1920 for publishing confidential documents or information and at least one reporter has run foul of the Act on that account. The possibility that the editor or printer of a newspaper might be caught in the same net cannot be dismissed, especially after the Government's behavior towards such a privileged person as a Member of Parliament. But it can fairly be said that, except in this Sandys case and perhaps in prosecuting the two authors just referred to, the Government has shown no marked dictatorial tendencies against the freedom of news and views in its use, or threatened use, of the Official Secrets Acts, of the law against sedition, or of the other legal restraints at its disposal.

The position of the radio is a case in point. In Great Britain this immensely important instrument for the formation of opinion is in the hands of a single agency, the British Broadcasting Corporation. The B.B.C. functions under a parliamentary charter which gives the Government considerable authority over it. The Postmaster-General can require the Corporation to refrain from sending any broadcast matter, either particular or general, that he may specify by a notice in writing. Actually this power has never been exercised. The only general restriction under which the B.B.C. operates today is that it may not air its own opinions on current matters. "In case of emergency" the Government can take over the radio stations. Whether it would do this if war came cannot be said, though it is reasonable to suppose that the radio might, for obvious practical reasons, be under closer control than the newspapers.

In peacetime, anyhow, the B.B.C. manages its day-to-day work with a free hand. Except during the week of the Munich crisis, it has been immune for a long time past from Government interference with its programs. At that time at least two talks on foreign affairs were cancelled. There has so far been no supervision of its news bulletins, even at moments of acute crisis. The power which Government departments are given under the charter to require the B.B.C. to broadcast their announcements is gently exercised. Requests are made informally and are often the subject of discussion between the B.B.C. and the department concerned, with the result that they are modified or even abandoned. It is, however, the B.B.C.'s policy to consult freely with the departments and especially with the Foreign Office.

The moderation with which the Government has used its legal opportunities to interfere with freedom of expression was im-

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plicitly recognized in Commons on December 7, 1938. The debate flowed from an Opposition resolution in support of the maintenance of "British democratic traditions of the liberty of expression of opinion, both in the Press and in public meetings and also in other media such as cinema films." It pivoted upon the Prime Minister's efforts to secure a favorable opinion for appeasement. One of his most censorious critics afterwards commented upon the debate as follows:[1]

"While the law remains as it is, censorship can only be effectively carried out by indirect intervention and the use of cajolery and threats behind the scenes. Clearly, in a country where the Press is mainly in the hands of a few rich men, and the cinema controlled by a board of people friendly to the Government, this may prove a very effective censorship. The Government propaganda organization was, in fact, able to arrange that films supporting the Government's policy were widely shown everywhere and that films that challenged this policy were stopped. As regards the Press, unusual efforts were made to see to it that national organs of opinion were brought into line, and there is no doubt at all that Sir Samuel Hoare and other members of the Government took great pains to 'nobble' proprietors and other influential persons in the Press world."

What is there in these accusations of indirect intervention? Regarding the films, there is a good deal. There has, as I have already indicated, been considerable interference with them. It has been indirect interference because there is no Government cinema censorship in Great Britain. The British Board of Film Censors is a trade organization. There is no legal obligation that films shall be submitted to it. But the word of the Board is, in effect, law because the vast majority of local licensing bodies automatically authorize films bearing its imprimatur and reject films which lack it. A list of films vetoed for political reasons was given in the House of Commons on December 7. It has been increased since. "Professor Mamlock," a Russian film unkind to Nazi Germany, is just reported to have been banned in Britain. Like the majority of its fellow-victims it has been shown in the United States. There can be no reasonable doubt but that the Government is essentially responsible for this interference, that in fact the "Government propaganda organization" has been exercising something tantamount to a political censorship over

[1] Kingsley Martin in the *Political Quarterly*, January 1939.

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the cinema, which for technical reasons is more susceptible to such interference than the press and other publicity organs.

Next comes the contention that cajolery and threats are practised upon the press and that the contacts between the Government and the press are misused. These contacts are much the same in Great Britain as they are in the United States or France. There are those for which the politicians are primarily responsible and those which are conducted by the officials of the governmental departments. The Prime Minister can summon a press conference like those which are held at the White House. The difference is that such conferences are infinitely less frequent in London and that, since Mr. Lloyd George left Downing Street, the capacity of British Prime Ministers to conduct them has averaged much lower than that of American Presidents. Other Ministers hold similar press conferences, but again much more rarely than their colleagues in Washington. Like the Prime Minister, they see journalists separately. Here they share an advantage which the President and his Cabinet lack. They also sit in Parliament, and thus have copious opportunities for informal intercourse with the press in the lobbies. Their opportunities of meeting newspaper proprietors and editors are also better, for London contains more of the principal elements of the national newspaper direction than Washington does.

Behind the politicians are the publicity machines of their party and the press bureaus of their departments. The party publicity machines are run partly by the Parliamentary Chief Whips and partly by the central party organizations. They throw their nets wide. In one way or another they reach, or ought to reach, the whole press, from the press galleries at Westminster to the local provincial newspapers. The Prime Minister has in addition his own press officer, a much less important official, however, than the press secretary at the White House.

The departmental press bureaus are a postwar development. The largest of them, and to a great extent the pattern of the rest, is that of the Foreign Office. It was directed for a long time by a journalist and the diplomats now in charge of it still have Fleet Street men with them. It has daily conferences for press agency and other newspaper men who care to attend. Its members further make a point of seeing separately anybody of any nationality who wishes to be so received. Its responsibilities are greater than those of the equivalent bureau of the State Depart-

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ment. It is virtually the only link between the heads of the Foreign Office and the press. That is because, instead of seeing the press all the time as the American Secretary of State and his chief assistants do, the British Foreign Minister and his Permanent Under-Secretary do so only once in a blue moon.

The press and public relations divisions of the other departments deal mainly with the technical avocations of their Ministries and thus avoid the glare of controversy. As the Stanhope and Sandys cases show, the service departments must now be excepted from this generalization. But even their restrictions work pretty well as long as ignorant or over-zealous Ministers refrain from interfering. In these days there are constant movements of troops, etc., which are just as well not published. This is understood by the newspapers, and news about them is willingly suppressed on request. The suppression is voluntary. Even the famous "D" notice has no legal sanction behind it, unless it concerns something patently covered by the Official Secrets Act. Nor do the newspapers dislike its use on proper occasions. On the contrary, they coöperated in its invention. It usually takes the form of a message sent to newspaper offices by the press agencies to the effect that they are asked by this or that Ministry to issue a "D" notice that in the national interests a certain item should not be published. It is only resented when it is used irresponsibly, as the Prime Minister used it in the Stanhope affair, or as another member of the National Government did when he invoked it to prevent the publication of a harmless piece of news in order that he might have the kudos of announcing it himself.

In the event of war, there will, of course, be a censorship over military matters with sanctions behind it as there was in the Great War. How far freedom of political comment and controversy, which was left practically intact in those days, will be abridged cannot be said. The Government's press plans in case of war are being kept secret in a melodramatic and unnecessary manner (unless those are right who aver that mystery is needed as a cloak for muddle). But it may be presumed that all political publicity will be consolidated in a Ministry of Information, which will also be responsible for propaganda at home and abroad. Some such centralization would obviously be necessary. It has its advocates even for peacetime, though it is open to question whether, except perhaps in a time of tension such as the present, a standing Ministry of Information is compatible with the processes

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of democracy. It could so easily become an adjunct of the publicity machine of the party in power, kept up by the taxpayer. Even as it is, the departmental press bureaus cannot, in the nature of their work, keep entirely aloof from politics. They must inevitably be committed to some slight grinding of the political axes of their Ministers. A wise press officer will always give out actual news with impartiality. But in a general discussion he must take account of the politics of his interlocutor. He will naturally tend to discuss the plans of his chief more freely, and therefore more helpfully, with a representative of a newspaper supporting the Government than with one of its enemies.

One damaging affirmative must be made to the allegation that the Ministers have abused the contacts between the Government and the press. The ponderous and disingenuous publicity which characterized the Prime Minister's experiment in appeasement was undoubtedly due to the fact that, after Mr. Eden had been eliminated and the Foreign Office demoted from its constitutional position of expert adviser on foreign policy, publicity on that policy was also largely transferred to unskilled hands. To that extent, the Prime Minister can be accused of having tried to follow totalitarian technique.

The attack on the Prime Minister for developing, as part of this technique, a system of direct approaches to newspaper notabilities — either himself or through Sir Samuel Hoare — seems to have less justification. Well authenticated stories are current of people being approached and having this or that policy suggested to them. But it is difficult to follow the argument that this procedure constitutes an experiment in Fascism or is objectionable to journalists. Every press officer wants his chief to have relations with the big newspaper men, and newspaper men are not prone to resent the approaches of Ministers. Nor has there been any suggestion of undue pressure, unless the "my-country-right-or-wrong" argument be such. There have, for instance, been no threats to withhold Government advertising from recalcitrant newspapers. Stories, it is true, are current that after Munich commercial advertisers tried to persuade newspapers that, in the interests of "prosperity," the Prime Minister should be proclaimed the Great Pacificator; but those actions cannot be laid at the Government's door.

The truth is that the complaint of personal pressure comes from the Left and is mainly actuated by the fact that most of the

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big newspapers and newspaper groups belong to the Right and are usually, but by no means invariably, susceptible to the arguments of a Conservative Prime Minister. The forays of the National Government into Fleet Street would, indeed, have passed almost unnoticed at home had controversy been running less high. Hence it is not perhaps unfair to suggest that the significance attached to them abroad is yet another example of the tendency of foreigners to impute to British Governments an aptitude for Machiavellian propaganda which in point of fact they are far from possessing. Of this tendency the abdication crisis of Edward VIII affords the classic example. It still seems to be widely believed overseas that the silence of the British press during the weeks before the abdication was due to some deep Government intention. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Government gave the newspapers no instructions and no hints. The newspapers, without even coördinated consultation among themselves, followed the unwritten law that the less said about the private affairs of the Monarchy when things go wrong, the better. Even after a provincial bishop had blurted out the truth, nothing passed between the Government and the press. The newspapers simply decided that the time had come when the facts must be printed.

It would, in short, be unfair to saddle Mr. Chamberlain with the accusation of entertaining deliberate designs upon the freedom of news and views, however reactionary and obscurantist his leanings may be in some directions. The repressiveness of the National Government is the result less of calculation than of "nerves" and of ignorance regarding the right technique of publicity. A weak government under the stress of chronic crisis is apt to react tactlessly to criticism, as the Prime Minister did when he betrayed his envy of the dictatorial power of censorship. It will also be fussy and arbitrary along lines of least resistance, as the National Government is over the cinema. It will slash and blunder as the Prime Minister did over the Stanhope indiscretion, or as Mr. Hore-Belisha and the Attorney-General did in the Sandys case. It will do so all the more when the Parliamentary Opposition is weak.

As I have just suggested, the idea that we British are good at propaganda is one of the most curious of contemporary myths. We were not bad at it towards the end of the Great War. But that effort was the ephemeral result of external pressure and of

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having a great Prime Minister and a few good men, notably Lord Northcliffe, in the right places. We soon slipped back into our normal state of indifference and timidity about the large-scale education of public opinion. During my fourteen years at the Foreign Office, I worked with only one Secretary of State, Arthur Henderson, and with one Permanent Under-Secretary, Lord Tyrrell, who really understood publicity. One of my great difficulties with politicians in general was to persuade them to do anything about the press. An important American newspaper man would arrive after having been hospitably and helpfully entertained by half the potentates of Europe. To get a British Minister to receive him often called for more pertinacity than I possessed — that is to say, in London. For abroad, the same men would sometimes be galvanized by unaccustomed surroundings into an amateurish garrulity which could be more embarrassing than their reclusiveness at home. Things are slowly improving, especially among the permanent officials. But our machinery for national advertisement, and above all for counter-propaganda, remains far too small. We make no effective effort to counter the barrage of bluff and bluster with which the dictators prepare the ground for their stratego-diplomatic offensives. We have so far given them a virtual monopoly in the deadly weapon of intimidation. The same unimaginative inefficiency has been noticeable in connection with both material and psychological "preparedness" at home. The drive in those matters has so far been coming from the governed rather than from the Government.

Too little and too bad rather than too much and too efficient management of opinion is really the charge against Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues. Petty and negative efforts to stifle criticism, the futile suppression of news which has already encircled the globe — that sort of thing justifies irritation with the "censorship mind." But it does not reveal the "dictatorial mind" which really can destroy the liberties of life and thought. And even if the National Government really desired to anæsthetize public opinion by laws and regulations, it could not do so. The patient would have something to say in the matter. The British democracy would discover, not for the first time, means of protecting an essential privilege. It may be doubted indeed whether, even in wartime, a British Government could go very far towards a downright political censorship.

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# FRANCO'S PROBLEMS

*By Herbert L. Matthews*

NOW that hostilities are over in Spain, General Francisco Franco's troubles are just beginning. It is easier to run a country in war than in peace. In war everything is subordinated to the single goal of victory and any method or policy gains validity on that basis; in peace there are multiple goals, not the least of which is the well-being of the people you rule. Franco must begin at the beginning, not to reconstruct a previously existing state but to create a new one, for Spain can never return to what it was. One may well question whether the Caudillo will have time and opportunity to create his new state, for events are moving fast in Europe and Spain is riding the same storm as Germany and Italy. But whatever the immediate future brings — war or peace — Franco's problems are worth examining.

First, the reader must grant certain premises for which proof is easily available but outside the scope of this article. From its inception, the Rebel movement was militantly supported by the army, the aristocracy, the Church and "big business," and by certain representatives of the working, farming and student classes to be found chiefly in the Carlist and Phalangist organizations. It had the forced acquiescence of the traditionally peaceful "man-in-the-street." But it could not have succeeded without the constant and overwhelming military support of Germany and Italy, aided indirectly but effectively by the so-called "non-intervention" policy of England, France and the United States. Unless those things are kept in mind, there can be no understanding of what has happened or is about to happen in Spain.

What, in the light of this, are Franco's problems? They can be expressed simply, but not so easily solved. He must form some sort of a permanent government, restore order, disband the army, get business going normally and the land working, reconstruct what has been destroyed, resume education, decide what part the Church is to play in education and national affairs, and what part Spain is to play in world politics. There it is, all in one sentence. Yet there is no single factor involved that does not have its heartbreaking difficulties.

If the Loyalists had won there would have been no question about forms of government: the Republic would have picked up

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where it left off. The supporters of Franco are in the position of all revolutionists who have succeeded. They must put their political theories into practice, and that means a new start.

In general, Franco has made it clear that some form of totalitarian government will be installed, but the details have been left vague. During the war he kept saying that he would define and protect the rights and duties of individuals and of capital and property — after the victory. He did indicate, however, that everything was going to be subordinated to the interests of the State. "The racial doctrines of Germany and Italy will not be applied to Spain," he told the United Press correspondent on November 7 of last year, "but the epoch of the liberal régime is over. The State must intervene directly in the national life." One can call that at least a form of Fascism. Even the promise not to introduce racial doctrines will not apply if, as seems possible, the Phalanx assumes a dominating rôle in the government.

The Phalanx is a frankly Fascist body which according to all accounts is receiving strong support from Italy and Germany. It has a curious Spanish touch of Anarchism along with a *mystique* based on the past glories of the Spanish Empire in the same way that Italian Fascism recalls the glories of the Roman Empire. During the civil war it was accused by its enemies, especially the Carlists who fought so magnificently, of shirking front line duty, of playing a predominant part in the bureaucracy behind the lines, and of opening its ranks to radicals in general and Anarchists in particular. Significantly enough, it was the Anarchist Party on the Loyalist side which welcomed presumably penitent Rightists in the early months of the war. The FAI (*Federación Anarquista Ibérica*) was facetiously called the "Falangistas," while on the Rebel side it was always a good joke to play on the phonetic resemblance between "FAI" and "FE" (*Falange Española*). The joke is slightly sinister now, since the Anarchists in the central zone turned on the supporters of Negrín and helped General Casado give Madrid to Franco.

The Caudillo is reputed to be finding much opposition to his policies among the other generals. The Carlists have earned glory, but heavy casualties have weakened them. Nevertheless many Spaniards believe that the "Legitimist" Monarchy will be restored, probably with an invitation to Alfonso, who will decline in favor of his son, Juan. Even so, Italy has proved that a monarchy is not incompatible with Fascism.

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In short, if Franco and his supporters remain in power — and it seems as if they are going to, at least for the time being — any régime other than an authoritarian one would be very surprising. No one can yet gauge the depths to which liberal, democratic, republican ideals have sunk into the minds and hearts of those millions of Loyalists who considered them worth fighting for. Nor do we know how great is the explosive force of the hatred engendered by the Rebels' totalitarian warfare or by the terrible reprisals now taking place. For the present, all such sentiments must go underground.

We can expect General Franco to restore at least an outward semblance of order without too great difficulty. He has his army still intact and it will certainly not be disbanded until the new régime has a firm grip on power. He still has his Italians, who were reinforced as lately as April of this year by several thousand new arrivals. He has the German Gestapo, credited with doing extremely efficient police work during the war. And above all, there is the "cleanup" now taking place. Last November the Generalissimo gave an interview to a United Press correspondent in which he is reported to have said (the Associated Press and other sources later received the same information): "I believe in redemption through the penalty of labor. Once it has been established what penalty fits the crime in question, the criminal will be able to redeem himself through work and good behavior. We have more than 2,000,000 persons card-indexed with proofs of their crimes, names and witnesses. Those who are granted an amnesty are demoralized."

On February 13 there was decreed a "Law of Political Responsibilities" establishing the loss of citizenship, imprisonment, exile, confiscation of property as punishments for "offenses" going as far back as October 1, 1934 (the time of the Asturian uprising). Anyone who between that time and the beginning of the civil war "contributed to the aggravation of the subversive activities by which Spain was victimized" is to be punished. Further, anyone who during the war was guilty of "grave political acts of omission or commission" is also to receive retribution. In other words, not to have helped the Rebels actively is a crime.

Then there are the executions which have taken place and those which are to come. The details are not available yet, but it is to be hoped that history will record them. After all, Franco cannot

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hope to rule in peace until he has destroyed his enemies or put them out of harm's way. Fascism has improved its technique in recent years, so this should not be a long process.

Meanwhile business ought to return to something like normal. In the Loyalist area there was an economic displacement caused by the necessity of turning every available factory over to war production. That was particularly true of the Catalan zone after Negrín moved his Government to Barcelona and took the situation in hand. Catalonia is the most highly industrialized region of Spain and its forced contribution to the economy of the war alone made it possible for the Loyalists to fight after having been deprived of the right to buy arms abroad. We may assume that Franco's régime will keep those industries going on a war basis, considering the present state of European tension and his close contacts with Germany and Italy.

Dr. Negrín likewise concentrated on producing those industrial and agricultural commodities which could be exported to provide the desperately needed foreign exchange: the Government bought nothing on credit and Negrín wanted to save the Bank of Spain's huge gold stock — which he did to a surprising extent. Catalan rayon and Valencian oranges are two good examples of exports which yielded high returns. Minerals provided another fruitful source of revenue, the Almadén mercury mines alone bringing a huge income. Needless to say, they and other mines were fully exploited and are in perfect condition. During the last Rebel drive on Almadén in the autumn of 1938, it appeared for a short time as if the mines would be taken. If the Government had flooded them to prevent this, two or three years would have been needed to get them going again.

To be sure, there was considerable destruction of factories, chiefly by Rebel bombing; much farming land was also devastated and many cattle were slaughtered. However, the losses were not so great as might be imagined. In the coastal region of the Loyalist zone the Italian bombers from Mallorca wrought great havoc; yet the arms factory at Sagunto, which was bombed nearly 200 times, never ceased operation! The plant in Badalona, outside Barcelona, where electricity was made from coal after the Rebels took Tremp in March 1938, was bombed about a hundred times without stopping production: all four of its smokestacks were still standing at the end of the war. Still, there is much reconstruction to be done — and there seems little doubt as to who

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will do it: not the British, nor the French, nor even the Italians, but the Germans. During the war foreign attention was centered on Italian intervention. But while Mussolini was glorifying his Legionaries, the Germans, though in the background, were helping Franco immensely — with matériel and technicians rather than soldiers — and in the process they quietly obtained control over the major portion of Spain's economic structure. I was amazed after the war to discover how few Americans knew of this. Italy has reaped the glory, Germany the profit.

Here again, the full details are not yet available. The writer was never in Rebel Spain and can offer no firsthand information, but the agreement on the subject among those who have been there is convincing. For instance, the *Dépêche de Toulouse* reported on October 24, 1938, that among other things "the Spanish exports to Germany are increasing every day. They already exceed the total for all of Spain during 1935, although in that year the majority of the exports came from that part of Spain now under the control of the Government. Of the total monthly exportation of iron ore from the Basque provinces, which varies between 90,000 and 120,000 tons, more than half goes to Germany. The Basque smelting industry exports pig iron and steel ingots to Germany: one plant alone has a contract for 60,000 tons per year. Germany also took 38,000 tons of rough-dressed skins between July 1936 and June 1938. In August 1938, 4,200 tons of sugar from the Alava factory were sent from Pasajes to Hamburg. Complete boatloads of oils, fats, skins, fruits and even wheat (very scarce in Spain) are regularly shipped to Germany: for instance, 18,000 tons of wheat were sent to Hamburg on July 25, 1938. Because of the needs of the 'Siegfried Line' the shipments of cement have greatly increased of late."

Those who claim to know will tell you that the Ollorgan mines in the Basque country have passed under the control of Krupp; that Pach Brothers bought the Meazuri and San Narcison mines from the Irún Lesaca Company; that the Berrobia mines are now German and that another German group is seeking control of the Somorrostro mines. The semi-official "Hisma Rowak" are supposed to monopolize the Moroccan ferromanganese mines. The new machinery going into Spanish mines is German. After all, it will be recalled that Hitler, in expressing his satisfaction at the final conquest of the northern provinces, used the phrase "because Germany wants the mineral ore."

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Germany wants other things, too. British newspapers last November reported that Continental A.G., one of the largest tire manufacturers in Germany, was about to enlarge its factory at Torrelavega, near Santander. In the debate in the House of Commons on the second of that month it was pointed out that, while the number of British ships going to Insurgent Spain had declined about 60 percent, German ships had increased by about 65 percent. The Basque paper industry is said to have been virtually ruined by German competition, because of a preferential tariff. Germany and Italy have a monopoly of the air services. One could go on at this rate indefinitely. The two countries complement each other to such an extent that the Germans claim Spain can find in Germany all the manufactured articles she needs and can in turn supply Germany with raw materials. A huge system of barter is already under way.

What about Italy? In the first place, Italy cannot supply many of the manufactured articles which Spain needs. In some industries — rayon, for instance — the two countries compete directly. Even more serious is the competition in one of Spain's two great export fields: agriculture. Both countries are in the same climatic belt; both export citrus fruits, olive oil, wines. It is doubtless in Spain's mines that Italy hopes to get her material reward; but on that score she must come to terms with Germany first. The Almadén mercury mines alone could go far toward repaying Italian expenditures in the civil war, for Spain and Italy together virtually monopolize the world's mercury supply (mercury is a necessary ingredient in many types of explosives).

To be sure, there is the awkward fact that British — not to mention French and American — capital has a large investment in Spanish mining. But this disturbing factor did not prevent Franco and his allies from taking over the output of the mines during the war and paying for it at the rate of 42 pesetas to the pound — pesetas that had no gold backing. The British company which owns the majority of the shares in the Rio Tinto copper mine marked its annual income down to one penny during the war. It remains to be seen whether foreign investors will fare any better now that the war is over. British capital is already wooing Franco in the hope of buying him away from Germany and Italy. Spain needs capital to get her factories running again and to reconstruct what has been destroyed. The City has money to lend. Spaniards have never in modern history tolerated foreign

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invaders on the Peninsula — a fact on which England and France have been counting. But the latter have apparently overlooked two factors: first, that Spain will need time to get rid of the foreigner; second, that in the present state of European affairs Germany and Italy might fight to preserve their hold on Spain.

There is a good deal of physical reconstruction to be done in Spain. In the last offensive, to my personal knowledge, every single bridge of any importance in Catalonia was blown up by the retreating Loyalists. In many cases stretches of road were destroyed. All along the coast port facilities have been wrecked by Italian bombers. The port of Barcelona, for instance, will have to be completely rebuilt. Then there are the houses, the public buildings and the factories that were wrecked by bombs and shells. Spain herself can furnish a large part of the iron and cement needed for this work of reconstruction, and Loyalist prisoners are already providing the man power. Germany could easily arrange for the rest; indeed, whenever new territory was conquered during the war Germans were reported to have been in charge of reconstruction activities.

We do not yet know whether the industries will be returned to their former owners and the great landed estates to the grandees. Presumably they will; certainly the industrialists and aristocrats would not have supported Franco on any other supposition. Still, we should remember the fate that has befallen capitalists and large landowners in Italy and Germany. In recent decades Spain's agrarian problems have furnished a prime source of discontent. They were not solved in Rebel territory during the war, though the Caudillo has made promises for the future. Two factors will now work for change: the feelings of those hundreds of thousands in former Republican territory who knew for a brief time the joy and pride of owning their own land, and the reforms demanded in the program of the Phalanx. Millions of workers and peasants have learned what it means to enjoy some degree of economic and political freedom, and one may well ask whether they will ever again submit to the same degree of repression that obtained before the Republic. They are now utterly war-weary and cowed, but if the new régime is wise it will recognize that the old order can never be restored intact.

This is no place to go into the unhappy question of the rôle of the Church in Spain. For our purposes it need only be kept in mind that during the war Franco had the complete spiritual

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and material aid of the Church, while in the Loyalist area the Church was stripped of all its material and most of its spiritual power. Here again, we must take into account the fact that an established church has so far proved incompatible with Fascism. If the State is all-important and all-absorbing, the rôle of the Church presumably has to be subordinated to it. As a huge owner of land and of industries, the Church will necessarily face the same difficulties that await the industrialists and the aristocratic landowners. The real clash, however, will come over the question of education. By raising these questions the writer does not mean to imply that the Church will cease to play a great rôle in Spain — it has violent champions among the Fascists themselves. But it will never return to precisely its former status. Already there are signs that the Church is finding this out.

No matter from what angle one looks at the Spanish situation, the dominating factor, internally and externally, is Fascism. The decision about Spain's immediate future still lies with Germany and Italy. Are they about to embark on the ultimate adventure? There is no question that the German and Italian military control of Spain and its colonies is already playing an important part in European politics. Spain is a key to the Mediterranean. Most military and naval experts agree that Gibraltar could be isolated immediately and held only so long as its food and munitions hold out. On the other side of the Strait is Ceuta, under Italian control, while the Germans hold Larache and other points of the Spanish Moroccan coast. The Italians have the Balearics, including Minorca, handed over to Franco so graciously by the British. The Germans dominate the Canaries and the Cantabrian coast: German submarine bases, for instance, have been established at Pasajes, Ferrol and Villagarcia in the north, and Seville and Malaga in the south. New aërodromes have been built at Vitoria, Sondica, Bilbao, Lasarte, León, Jaca, Pamplona and many other localities.

Where does this leave Great Britain's life line via the Suez Canal, her route around the Cape, or even her communications with South America? What about France's link to her African colonies? Do not the Riff Mountains of Spanish Morocco dominate the "Taza Corridor" through which run the only road and railway connecting Morocco and Algeria? And what about France's third and unfortified frontier along the Pyrenees? Ask any military expert and he will tell you that it is much easier,

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from the geographical point of view, to invade France from Spain than to invade Spain from France.

Nor must we forget that General Franco could put a million men under arms today and that it would be the only army in Europe aside from Italy's which has seen real service since the World War. The Spaniard is a superb soldier on his own; he did not need Italian infantry to help him. It was Italian and German matériel which won the war for him. And it was not on the Rebel side alone that France and England were hated. In the event that Germany and Italy had Franco's support in a general war, neither one would need to send an army to Spain — only munitions, planes, technicians and staff officers. They probably would have that support.

But suppose the new régime were to remain neutral? Among other things this would mean that Spain could buy war supplies from the United States, now that we have recognized Franco. How convenient it would be for Germany and Italy to have the vast production of America's factories at their disposal via Spain! Many Americans will not consider that a pretty prospect. But after all, it was the American arms embargo which helped as much as anything to insure the Government's defeat. "Non-intervention" lost the war for the Republic. And for its part in this the United States is going to pay a price in South America, where in many countries the ruling classes already have strong Fascist leanings. I do not see how it can be denied that the policy of the United States in the Spanish civil war has definitely helped open the door to Fascism in our own hemisphere. Spain is culturally and traditionally the Mother Country, and a Fascist Spain will enormously strengthen the totalitarian trend among her South American children.

The best that may be hoped for is to gain time. In the long run, Spaniards can be counted upon to rid their country of foreigners. Given time (and inclination), General Franco could perhaps "get out from under" by selling himself, financially speaking, to England. One may well doubt, however, whether there will be time. At the present moment it is not to be supposed that Germany and Italy, having paid for Franco's victory, will step gracefully aside and permit England and France to reap the benefits. Spain is too great a prize to be relinquished without a struggle.

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# MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY AFTER THE FRANCO VICTORY

*By Commander Russell Grenfell*

WHAT will be General Franco's policy in case war comes in Europe between the democratic nations and those which have helped him to power? The Spanish are a proud people and, if their behavior over many centuries is any criterion, they will not willingly permit Spain's foreign policy to be dictated from abroad. Therefore, if Nationalist Spain should enter a general war on the side of the Rome-Berlin Axis, it would presumably be for one of two reasons: either because the two Axis Powers, particularly Germany, had become so firmly entrenched in Spain that Franco was no longer a free agent; or because Franco believed that Spain had more to gain from joining them than from remaining neutral.

There are five principal ways in which Spain could exert pressure against France and Britain on behalf of the Axis. From her bases in the Balearic Islands she could harry French communications with North Africa. In the Gibraltar area she could attack the fortress itself and she could endeavor to cut Britain's communications through the Strait. Further, she could use her western ports and her island possessions as bases from which to attack British, and to a lesser extent French, communications in the Atlantic. And lastly, she could invade France across the Pyrenees. Let us consider these possibilities one at a time.

The threat which the Balearic Islands, if they were in hostile hands, would represent to France's "life line" to North Africa is often spoken of very gravely in the democratic countries and with pleasurable anticipation in the totalitarian ones. Yet the danger is not so great as either pessimists or optimists imagine. German writers speak of the Balearic-Sardinia-Sicily triangle as "barring the way to traffic" between France and North Africa. Such an assertion reveals the obtuseness regarding maritime affairs to which continental strategists are often prone. Bases by themselves cannot bar a route; that can be done only by the ships or aircraft which operate from them. In so far as it is a naval problem, the maintenance of communications between France and North Africa will depend on whether the French fleet can command the sea against its Italian rival. This is an issue to be

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fought out between ships. In a sea area where distances are as short as they are in the Western Mediterranean, the division of the Italian fleet between its continental and Sardinian bases on the one hand and Minorca on the other should prove no more effective in cutting French communications than the similar division of the German fleet between Wilhelmshaven and the Belgian ports during the World War was in preventing Britain from trading with Holland.

To what extent aircraft operating from the Balearics would be a danger to high-speed transports properly escorted by men-of-war is a question to which no one yet knows the answer. In the absence of conclusive evidence, it would be a mistake to assume that a decisive advantage must infallibly lie with the aircraft. The French shipping route need not pass close to the Balearics. It could be made to run midway between Minorca and Sardinia; this would give it 100 miles of open sea on each side. An added protection could be obtained by a judicious use of the dark hours at night for sailing.

Moreover, the Balearics are within bombing range of both France and North Africa, and might therefore be made nearly as unhealthy as Malta; presumably they are also just as liable as the latter to invasion and capture. Furthermore, the establishment of Italian bases, either naval or air, in the Balearics would automatically create an Italian line of communications, which itself would be a source of weakness. We can therefore safely say that the Balearics in Italian hands would complicate France's task of protecting her African communications but would not make it impossible. And even if the Italians should succeed in their intent, the French could still use the alternative route in the Atlantic to carry troops and supplies from North Africa.

An attack on Gibraltar would undoubtedly prevent the use of that place as a naval base. The naval harbor lies on the western side of the Rock opposite the Spanish mainland, which is only four to five miles away; it is thus fully exposed to long-range gunfire. This, combined with an air attack from nearby Spanish aërodromes, would almost certainly make the harbor untenable for men-of-war. Whether the fortress itself would be easy to capture is another matter. The only land approach is across an absolutely flat neck of land, every square yard of which can be completely covered from the Rock. Given the power of modern defense, the task of the attackers would hardly be an enviable one.

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The provisioning of the fortress would, it is true, present a serious problem. Fortunately there is an abundant supply of water, stored in the interior of the Rock and refilled by nature from the rain-water catchments built on its sloping eastern face. Replenishments of food and ammunition for a long siege would be more difficult to effect, but it should be possible to run them in under cover of darkness, if necessary, on the eastern beaches where the towering cliffs of the Rock act as a screen against Spanish gunfire. Even if Gibraltar were captured, its loss would probably be more or less balanced by a compensating gain on the opposite shore in Africa. While the Spanish were attacking Gibraltar, the French North African Army would presumably be advancing into Spanish Morocco. If this manœuvre were successful, it would provide the harbor of Ceuta as a substitute for that at Gibraltar.

It might be objected that the close proximity of Ceuta to the aërodromes of southern Spain would render it untenable as a naval base. But if this is true, then aircraft from French Morocco should be equally able to deny the use of Gibraltar harbor to Spain and her allies, supposing that they had succeeded in taking it from the British.

Whether the Strait of Gibraltar can be dominated by artillery is a question that has given rise to much public concern in England ever since it became known, in the comparatively early days of the Spanish war, that Franco had allowed heavy guns to be mounted near Tarifa. It was freely declared that these guns could paralyze the movement of ships through the Strait and that they therefore represented an alarming threat to Britain's Mediterranean communications. As a matter of fact, this menace from coast artillery is a good deal less dangerous than it has been declared to be. From whichever direction one approaches the Strait of Gibraltar, the European and African coast lines converge steeply towards its narrowest part and as steeply open out on the other side. It is consequently possible for even a slow ship to be well out of sight of the Strait — and therefore out of range of shore guns — at nightfall, to pass through it during the dark hours, and be out of sight again on the other side by the following day. If searchlights were used from the shore, a ship in mid-channel would be almost outside the limit of illumination. Moreover, shore searchlights form admirable marks for warships' guns, and a destroyer or two coming in at high speed after dark

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should be able to keep them from doing any useful work. Star shells, of course, might be employed; but they are not a very satisfactory illuminant for long-range shooting, and destroyer smoke screens ought to be an adequate safeguard against them. At the Dardanelles the heavy guns of the Turks did not prevent British destroyers from maintaining, night after night, a patrol line across the channel at a point where it is only five miles broad. They should not prove a serious hindrance to ships passing through the Strait of Gibraltar, which is eight miles wide at its narrowest point. Aircraft operating from aërodromes located at points on the southern coast of Spain as far east as Cabo de Gata would probably be more troublesome than guns in the Strait. But even such planes would lack that coördination with other weapons which alone could make their attack really effective.

The fact of the matter is that the most dangerous section of the 1,800-mile route between Gibraltar and Suez is not in Spanish waters but in the bottleneck between Sicily and Africa. In this narrow area shipping would be exposed to the full force of an Italian air attack; this might be particularly formidable since Germany's air supremacy in Europe would probably give the Italians a local air superiority over the French. British and French ships would also receive the attention of a large number of submarines, and of steam and motor torpedo boats — in all three of which classes the Italians enjoy a considerable superiority. Whether or not a passage could be forced for commercial shipping in the face of this triple threat from submarine, surface and supermarine attack is a matter of opinion. The point is that the Italian obstacle is more formidable than the Spanish.

In any event, the severance of the Mediterranean route would not be disastrous for Britain. Only about 10 percent of her supplies come through the Suez Canal, and for this comparatively small amount the alternative Cape route would be available. Moreover, an appreciable part of Britain's Suez traffic consists of oil from Persia, which could probably be replaced, if necessary, by increased imports from America. Commodities originating in countries inside the Mediterranean account for another 10 percent of Britain's imports. However, it is significant that all of the supplies which normally reach Britain via the Strait of Gibraltar can be obtained elsewhere. The question as to whether Spain could interrupt British commercial communications at that point is consequently not of cardinal importance. The pas-

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sage of men-of-war is of much greater moment, and it is reasonably certain that these could not be barred from the Strait.

The possibility that the Germans or Italians will attack British communications in the Atlantic from naval bases in the Canary Islands has caused needless alarm. The truth of the matter is that in the Canary Islands there are no naval bases, no sheltered and defended harbors in which raiders can lie immune while fuelling or repairing. The open anchorages, which are all that the islands provide, do not offer enough sanctuary to make their use a question of real concern to the superior naval power — as was demonstrated by the destruction of the German cruiser *Dresden* at Juan Fernandez in the World War. Indeed, were this not the case, it is highly probable that the Union Jack would already have been flying over the Canary Islands for a century or more.

As for the naval bases in Spain proper, those on the west and north coasts would probably be of most use to the Germans and Italians. There are several reasons for this. One is that Spain has fewer good harbors on the Mediterranean than on the Atlantic. Cádiz, Ferrol, Corunna, Vigo and Arosa Bay rank among the finest harbors in the world. But even if the east coast had better naval bases, a German or an Italian admiral would find them of dubious value. To use them, he would have to divide his forces in waters so confined that observation from the air would be fairly easy — and when the French discovered that he had divided his forces, they would pounce on his ships and defeat them in detail.

There is little doubt as to what use the German and Italian fleets would put Spain's northern and western bases. They would first act, after the example of the *Goeben* in Turkish waters in 1914, to bring Spain into the war on the side of the Axis. After that, they would raid the Atlantic communications of their opponents, principally the British. A wide choice of quarry would be open to them. Especially promising would be the heavily-travelled shipping lane across the North Atlantic, and the routes from the English Channel to the Cape (probably augmented by the trade diverted from the Mediterranean) and to South America. In view of the damage done by the *Emden* and other raiders early in the World War, such predatory operations might well cause the British and French naval authorities considerable anxiety.

The best countermove would be what it has always been — the dispatch of warships to hunt out and destroy the raiders.

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This would be primarily a problem of allocating the necessary ships and of providing suitable bases for them. Assuming that Gibraltar were not available, the ideal base would be the mouth of the Tagus River, midway between Ferrol in the northwest of Spain and Cádiz in the south. The Tagus, however, might not be available. The British have an ancient alliance with Portugal, but they cannot take it for granted that their ships will be welcome under all circumstances. Portugal is governed by a dictatorship and many of her leading men are in close sympathy with the totalitarian gospel. This natural concordance of ideas has, in fact, been exploited by agents of the Axis. For several years German propaganda in Portugal has been very energetic. Britain, with her usual reluctance to advertise herself, has done little to counteract these German activities.

Moreover, Portugal cannot be expected to forget that she has a common land frontier with Spain. If the Portuguese should give aid to the enemies of Spain, the latter might inflict military reprisals on them in spite of the recently signed non-aggression pact between the two countries. The chance that the British can persuade the Portuguese to let them use the Tagus as a British naval base in a war against Spain does not at present appear very promising. Nevertheless, such permission was granted in similar circumstances some 140 years ago — and it might conceivably be granted again. Fortunately, the increased endurance of modern war vessels and the wide range of air reconnaissance, especially from airplane carriers, make it less essential than formerly that ports of observation be spaced close together. The bases at Plymouth, Brest, Bermuda, Freetown (Sierra Leone) and in the West Indies might under modern conditions afford adequate facilities for the British and French ships engaged in tracking down the raiders.

Up to this point our survey indicates that Spain could not inflict serious injury on the Anglo-French combination. But this is only part of the story. It must not be forgotten that Spain herself would be open to damaging counterblows. While Spanish guns were pounding at the limestone cliffs of Gibraltar, French guns, not far away across the Strait, would be covering the advance of the French North African Army into Spanish Morocco. This invasion would probably result in a rapid conquest of the Spanish Zone, in spite of the fact that most of the Moorish troops that had been fighting for Franco in Spain were hurriedly re-

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turned to Africa immediately after the end of the civil war. Spain could also expect to lose her Rio de Oro territory and the Canary Islands, both of which would certainly be occupied by French or British forces.

Even more unpleasant would be the Anglo-French economic pressure applied against Spain immediately after the outbreak of war. With a superior British fleet to the west of her and a superior French fleet to the east, and with France controlling her only land connection with the continent, Spain would find her trade completely cut off. Spanish industry would consequently be deprived of the foreign capital goods and raw materials (*e.g.* cotton and chemicals) on which it is largely dependent. This would be especially disastrous in Catalonia, a former stronghold of the Loyalist Government where economic distress might have untoward repercussions. The loss of the orange, olive oil, almond, wine, iron ore and copper export trade would be particularly damaging to Spanish economy and would inflict great hardships on the Spanish people.

In short, Spain would have much to lose and very little to gain from supporting the Axis Powers — unless, of course, she could confidently rely upon their final triumph. If Franco really believed in the ultimate victory of the German-Italian combination, his most effective contribution could be made along the Pyrenees frontier. A land and air attack across these mountains would be a serious menace to France. It would force her to weaken her all-important eastern defenses and reinforce her southern front. It would expose her war factories, tucked away in the supposed security of the southwest, to attacks by German, Italian and Spanish planes operating from the airfields of Navarre and Catalonia. It would also have serious psychological effects on the French people by subjecting them to invasions from both front and rear. Germany's obvious advantage in thus getting the French between two fires is in itself enough to explain her efforts to increase her influence in the Spanish Peninsula.

But there is a reverse side to every medal. If France can be bombed from Spain, Spain can also be bombed from France. Moreover, Spain is exposed to air attack from French North Africa. A Spanish land attack on France would have to be made over the rugged Pyrenees, where the advantage would to an unusual degree rest with the defense. The French, furthermore, would have the benefit of interior lines, whereas Spain's com-

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munications with Germany and Italy would be almost completely severed. Not a single German or Italian soldier could, with security, be sent to Spain after war had broken out.

On or near the very long coast line of Spain stand many military and industrial targets open to aërial bombardment by planes flying in from carriers out at sea. This weapon would be particularly useful to the French and British because of the naval mobility given them by their command of the sea. A carrier could wait over the horizon, out of sight of land, until the moment chosen for attack; then it could send its aircraft roaring in on any one of a hundred different Spanish ports. In this way, two or three carriers might keep the whole Spanish seaboard in a state of constant alarm. It is one of the axioms of sound strategy that diversions against an enemy's flank and rear effectively distract his attention from the main front. The Spaniards could be kept so busy defending themselves from constant air and naval bombardments that they would have little time or energy left for invading France. Further, if Britain and France controlled the seas, they could land one or more military expeditions on Spanish soil under cover of a high degree of secrecy. The threat of such a hostile landing should prove particularly effective in easing Spanish pressure on the Pyrenees frontier. If, in a general war, the democratic Powers were to adopt the strategy of "knocking away the props," a pro-Axis Spain stands out as the obvious recipient of the first knocks.

Presumably, Franco has already taken all these possibilities into consideration. In addition, he must also be fully conscious of the difficulties he would encounter in exacting his reward from a victorious Italo-German bloc. A triumph for the dictators would make Germany the new master-state of Europe — the modern Rome. In such a Europe, Spain could expect to be little more than a vassal of Berlin. Signs multiply that the Portuguese people are becoming fully aware that coöperation with Germany is a case of "heads you win, tails I lose." Should this growing sentiment be reflected by a similar movement of opinion in Spain, the democratic Powers might find that the Spanish prop in the Axis combination was more than half ready to be knocked away.

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# THE SHIFTING STATUS OF FRENCH LABOR

*By André Philip*

BEFORE 1936 the French trade union movement was a rather feeble affair and had little influence on the country's social evolution. The Confédération Générale du Travail (usually referred to as the C.G.T.) had been founded in 1895, and during the prewar years, when it was under the influence of revolutionary syndicalism, its membership never exceeded 600,000. During the war both its structure and its methods were modified. Its administration became more centralized and it began working more harmoniously with the public authorities. In the period immediately following the war the membership of the C.G.T. rose suddenly to 2,500,000 by the inclusion of categories never before organized — clerks, agricultural workers, civil servants and technicians. A new trade unionism developed under the name of "Syndicalisme Constructif," which sought not only to make collective bargaining and arbitration universal but also to formulate a plan for the general economic reorganization of the country.

This development was rudely interrupted by the propaganda of the nascent Communist Party. In their attempt to gain control of the workers' organizations the Communists violently attacked the trade union leaders, created internal dissensions, and finally in the spring of 1922 — contrary to the better judgment of the leaders of the C.G.T. — succeeded in unleashing a general strike. It ended in disaster. The ensuing schism within the trade union movement eliminated it for fifteen years as an important factor in the social evolution of France.

The branch of the labor movement which was under Communist control — the Confédération Générale du Travail Unitaire, known as the C.G.T.U. — soon experienced the unhappy results of having to follow the shifting policies of a political party. One opposition group after another was roughly expelled. The practice of the C.G.T.U. in calling frequent strikes, which were thought of as "revolutionary gymnastics" rather than as efforts to gain tangible results, so discouraged its adherents that its membership fell from the 600,000 it had numbered at the time of the schism to less than 300,000 at the beginning of 1936.

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On the other hand, the old C.G.T., after its initial setback, began rebuilding, and slowly regained its former influence over the working classes. As it was too weak to engage in large-scale social struggles it tended to make less use of the strike, seeking instead to settle conflicts through conciliation and arbitration. At the same time, it drew closer to its old antagonist, the State. To be sure, it still maintained the principle of direct action and sought to bring pressure to bear on the Government from the outside without itself entering into the political arena. An exception occurred in 1924 when it submitted its minimum program, drawn up in 1918, to all the candidates at the parliamentary elections.

In the international field the C.G.T. collaborated with such institutions as the International Labor Office and the League of Nations, where it came into daily contact with the representatives of the Government. The essential part of its domestic program was to look after the application of certain social laws and to get further legislation favorable to the workers onto the statute books. For ten years the C.G.T. fought to maintain and to extend the application of the 8-hour-a-day law passed in 1919; it also demanded the 40-hour week, vacations with pay and a social insurance law. The latter was put into effect in 1930, and thereafter one of the principal activities of the C.G.T. was the setting up of social security funds (known as "Le Travail"), administered autonomously under the control of the trade unions. This prudent course bore good fruit. One by one the different trade unions were reorganized, with the result that the C.G.T., which in 1923 had had only 1,296 component organizations with less than 400,000 members, in 1936 counted 2,500 unions with 900,000 members.

Even these figures were nothing compared with what they might have been if the labor movement had not been divided. After 1930 the rank and file plainly showed a desire for unity; nevertheless, six years were needed to bring this about. The C.G.T. and the C.G.T.U. declared themselves in agreement on principles, but neither would consider unity unless it seemed to constitute a triumph for itself. The Communists wished to form an alliance between the two organizations on an equal footing (even though the C.G.T. had three times as many members), with a mixed commission afterwards effecting a fusion between the competing units. But the program of the C.G.T. was to carry out the fusions first; then, with unity actually realized by the

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return of everyone to the old C.G.T., a congress would be called to determine the future direction of the movement.

This procedure was finally adopted. The amalgamation of the trade unions was carried out in the autumn of 1935, and in February 1936 an "extraordinary congress of unification" convened at Toulouse. On the whole this congress was a success for the old C.G.T., for its relatively decentralized structure was maintained against the wish of the Communists, who would have preferred what they called "democratic centralism" (in which the executive committee of the C.G.T. would be elected directly by the congress and would thus dominate the industrial federations). The new by-laws left to a national committee elected by the congress the task of choosing an executive committee responsible to it; this committee was composed of four out of the six secretaries of the C.G.T. and two of the leaders of the C.G.T.U. The C.G.T. continued to adhere to the Amsterdam International, and the congress confirmed its participation in the work of the I.L.O. and the League of Nations.

Lastly, the Toulouse congress affirmed that the French trade union movement must remain independent of all political parties and forbade members of the central committee of the C.G.T. to hold trade union and political offices at the same time. Nevertheless, trade union independence was not interpreted so strictly as it had been during the World War, for it did not exclude a certain amount of collaboration with the political parties in order to realize the organization's legislative program. It was on this basis that the C.G.T. adhered to the Popular Front, which was to assume power three months later following its electoral victory of May 1936.

Thus it came about that trade union unity had scarcely been regained when the formation of a Socialist-minded Government gave the workers the consciousness that, for the first time, the State would not use coercive measures against them in the event of a social conflict. The consequence was that the advent of the Popular Front saw the beginning of a tremendous wave of sit-down strikes throughout the country. The peak was reached at the end of June when there were 12,142 strikes and 1,830,938 strikers.

These events have aroused lively controversy. Some have interpreted them as a Communist attempt to create difficulties for a Socialist Government; others have detected in them evidence of

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action by extremists, Trotskyites in particular. The truth probably is more simple. For five years the workers had suffered from unemployment, low wages and a steady drop in their standard of living. For the first time they were in a position to turn the tables, to demand an improvement in their living conditions. That is why the strikes, originating in the minds of the working masses, escaped from the control of the trade unions or of any political party.

The C.G.T. immediately began the task of coördinating and directing the movement. It was not easy at the beginning, for in less than a year the membership grew from one to five million and there were not enough officials to take care of this crowd of newcomers. For a month the trade union secretaries, swamped with work, could do no more than superintend the general negotiations, leaving to the workers' delegates who were elected in each factory the conduct of the struggle in that factory. As for the Blum Government, it devoted itself exclusively during its first weeks in power to conciliation, arbitration and social legislation. Though it condemned the "sit-down" as illegal in principle, it nevertheless felt that this new form of strike meant that social change could be secured peacefully and that when there are nearly 2,000,000 workers on strike it is preferable for them to sit down rather than march. The Government therefore refused to use police measures and on June 7 and 8 brought the representatives of the C.G.T. and the most important employers' organization (the Confédération Générale de la Production Française) together at the Hôtel Matignon in the offices of the Prime Minister. The two groups quickly agreed to the principle that collective agreements should be immediately made in every French industry and that each plant should contain shop delegates empowered to lay the workers' complaints before the employers. They also decided on an immediate increase in the wage scale of from seven to fifteen percent, to be followed later by supplementary increases in any rates which were abnormally low.

At the same time the Government put through Parliament a group of social laws drastically modifying the status of the French working class. First came the measures providing for shop delegates and collective agreements; then those establishing the 40-hour law and vacations with pay (15 days of vacation each year, or six days every six months). Almost at the same time the more important measures demanded in the electoral program of

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the Popular Front were turned into law: the munitions industry was nationalized, the Bank of France was reorganized, and a National Wheat Board was set up to regulate the marketing of agricultural products.

These measures had their effect. The serious social troubles, which for a moment threatened to start a civil war in France as they had in Spain, assumed a less acute form. By July there were only 1,731 strikes and 181,000 strikers; in August, there were 542 strikes and 56,000 strikers; and in December, 302 strikes and 43,000 strikers. After these great strides forward the labor movement settled down to reorganizing itself and adjusting its activities to the framework of the new social laws.

II

The social reforms of June 1936, together with subsequent legislation, have greatly modified the legal status of the labor movement in France and have created a new juridical framework in which the C.G.T., now officially recognized as the representative of labor interests, occupies a leading place. To show the importance of these innovations we must devote a few moments to explaining the laws on collective agreements and on conciliation and arbitration.

Collective agreements were rather unusual in France before 1936. After an increase following the war they began to decrease. Thus there were 557 in 1919; then in 1920 they dropped to 345, in 1921 to 159, in 1927 to 58, and in 1935 to 29. The law of March 25, 1919, though giving collective agreements a legal status, did not give them much scope, for in effect it preserved all the old concepts of private rights. Further, the agreements were not binding on third parties nor could they be imposed on anyone without his express or tacit consent.

The law of June 24, 1936, altered the juridical status of the trade unions considerably, and brought a new form of collective agreement into being — a contract in private law with regulatory effect in the trade or industry in which it is made. Although the law leaves the responsibility for drawing up the agreement to the interested parties, it specifies precisely what matters must be covered: minimum wages by category and by region, the length of the paid vacations, the organization of apprenticeship, regulations relating to trade union freedom, and the institution of shop delegates. If one of the parties refuses to conclude a collective

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agreement, the law provides that no one can force him to do so; however, the Minister of Labor can call a meeting of a mixed commission to discuss the matter. To this meeting are invited the labor and employer organizations which are most representative of the branch of industry involved. The Government has thus officially recognized a qualified form of industrial unionism.

But the principal innovation was unquestionably the provision for extending the procedure outlined above — that is, the power given the Minister of Labor to transform a private agreement into a code for the whole industry in a given region. This procedure was rapidly put to use, for it met a pressing need. In the large cities, well-organized unions had been able to obtain better working conditions, while elsewhere wages remained at a lower level because the social laws were not always respected. Small-town business concerns thus had enjoyed an advantage over those in larger cities which had to shoulder heavier social responsibilities. Hence it was to the interest of both capital and labor to see that the agreement was universally respected.

In order to extend the agreement a request to that effect must be made jointly by the labor and employer organization which are most representative of the industry and district in question. This agreement must contain provisions required by the law, and no others; for example, an agreement containing a "closed shop" clause would not be acceptable since its general use would destroy trade union freedom, although such a clause would be valid in a private agreement.

If the agreement complies with the necessary conditions, the Minister orders an inquiry to be carried out among both the workers and employers of the district in question. He then decrees that the agreement is obligatory in that particular industry and district. This decree is not for a fixed period; it remains in force until the agreement, thus generalized, ceases to have effect, either because it has been denounced or revised by the interested parties, or because one of the parties is no longer representative, due to the withdrawal from its organization of one or more groups. We have here a curious juridical phenomenon: an instrument of public law — the decree of a Minister — which ceases to have effect as the result of an agreement between the private parties concerned.

The mandatory provisions of the law concerning collective agreements set up a procedure for settling differences as to its

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application and for revising the agreements themselves. In a few weeks French industry had entered into more than 8,000 agreements, most of them containing conciliation clauses and to a lesser extent arbitration stipulations. Since most of them were concluded for six months or a year, they were due to expire at about the same time; and if difficulties had arisen about revising them, the Government might again have been faced with 2,000,000 strikers, as in June 1936. It was to avoid this danger that the Government twice extended the agreements of June 1936, and then finally intervened itself to make sure that they were revised peacefully. These successive steps finally led to the law of March 4, 1938, which set up the arbitration regulations now in force.

First of all, this law reminds the interested parties of their obligation to provide conciliation and arbitration procedures in the collective agreements upon which they enter. In case these procedures are not provided for wholly or in part, the law stipulates that every dispute is to be submitted to a mixed conciliation commission for each Department and that the Prefect shall preside over it. If conciliation fails, the interested parties are invited to choose an arbitrator. If after two days they are unable to agree — as most frequently happens — the arbitrator is chosen in principle by the Prefect from a list of ten persons drawn up by the President of the Court of Appeal, or sometimes, if the problem is of national interest, by the Minister of Labor from a panel of sixty persons chosen by the National Economic Council. The decision of the arbitrator is final on questions of fact, but an appeal to the Higher Court of Arbitration — which sits in Paris and is composed of three judges of the Council of State, two high officials, two representatives of the employers and two of the workers chosen by the most representative organization — is permissible on grounds that he lacked jurisdiction, exceeded his powers or violated the law. Though the Court cannot pass judgment on questions of fact, it may quash an arbitral decision on legal grounds and send the parties back to another arbitrator.

As soon as the Higher Court of Arbitration had been set up it undertook to harmonize the previous decisions of individual arbitrators and to formulate juridical rules as to their legal powers. A preliminary question had to be dealt with immediately: What is the exact field in which the arbitral procedure shall be applied? Unlike legislation in most countries, French law does not distinguish between legal and economic conflicts, nor between the

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interpretation of an existing law or collective agreement and the formulation of a new agreement; all that is left to arbitration, provided the conflict between the employer and the worker is collective in character. To be collective a dispute must: (1) concern a claim presented by an individual against a collectivity of workers either organized in a union or at least represented by chosen delegates; and (2) it must have reference to a rule or principle contained in a collective agreement or in a labor law which concerns the workers as a body and not merely as individual union members.

This question has arisen in particular in regard to the discharge of workers, a matter which the employers have always refused to arbitrate. For the moment it seems to have been accepted that the dismissal of individuals, even of several of them simultaneously, does not establish a collective interest if it was motivated by strictly individual reasons (incompetence, insubordination, adverse economic conditions). An example of a collective dispute which comes within the arbitrator's jurisdiction is the dismissal of a shop delegate on account of his union activities rather than for incompetence at his job; also within his jurisdiction is the discharge of a worker either because of the way he exercises his trade union privileges or because he has violated the terms of a collective agreement. The collective character of the conflict thus depends on the real motives of the employer. To judge them the arbitrator must conduct a thorough investigation. If the workers are unable to refute the plausible and substantial allegations of the employer, the arbitrator declares that he has no jurisdiction in the case. If, however, he finds that the reasons for the discharge as given by the employer seem far-fetched, and if the worker brings out facts which give grounds for believing that the employer has abused his right to discharge, the arbitrator assumes jurisdiction. He may then either oblige the employer to indemnify the discharged worker, or order him to reëmploy him, subject to a penalty for each day of delay in carrying out the order.

In the matter of wages the law of March 4, 1938, lays down specific instructions for the arbitrator. Wages are not to be changed unless during the six previous months the cost of living has varied by five percent, or during a shorter period by ten percent. In either case the arbitrator is supposed to change the wage scale in proportion to the change in the cost of living, unless the

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employer proves that such a readjustment would be incompatible with the local or regional economic conditions of the industry in which the request for a wage adjustment is made. As a matter of fact, such proof has very rarely been presented, and the arbitrators have usually raised the lowest wages to conform to the cost of living, with smaller increases in the higher wage brackets.

There remains the question as to how the arbitrator can enforce his decision. The law of March 4, 1938, made recourse to the arbitrator and acceptance of his decision obligatory; but at the same time it preserved intact the workers' right to strike and the employers' right to lock them out. In other words, the arbitrator had no means with which to enforce compliance; it was perfectly lawful — and this is what happened in most cases — to declare a strike or a lock-out before resorting to arbitration; it was also permissible for either or both sides to continue the dispute by refusing to accept the arbitral decision.

Until recently, therefore, arbitration was not really obligatory in France. All that the State did was set up a new procedure for settling disputes under which both sides would find it more advantageous to accept the arbitrator's decision than to run the risk of offending public opinion or of engaging in a ruinous struggle — unless the issues were of the most fundamental sort. This psychological coercion was reinforced last November by a decree providing for real sanctions against any party refusing to accept the arbitral decision. Recalcitrant employers are excluded from serving as judges in the commercial courts, or as officials either in the chambers of arts and crafts or in the other official organizations; nor can they compete for state contracts. Refractory workers find their labor contracts annulled and themselves legitimately subject to discharge. This is not yet legal coercion; but it does represent a withdrawal by the State of its protection and a refusal to reward those who do not accept the decision of an arbitrator.

III

On the whole, labor sentiment as expressed by the leaders of the labor movement was favorable to the new legislation. The C.G.T. in particular was pleased at what it regarded as official recognition of its position. With its 5,000,000 members it was the most representative labor organization in the country as a whole; while its departmental units in most cases enjoyed a similar

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priority. For it was practically always the C.G.T. unions which signed the collective agreements and obtained their renewal, designated the labor arbitrators and represented labor on the mixed commissions. Under the terms of the new collective agreements, which suddenly rose in number from twenty-odd to several thousand, labor's privileges were augmented by the creation of shop delegates — workers chosen to represent labor in the factories. Even the instrument of arbitration was finally accepted, after some hesitations, and the more militant leaders gradually adapted themselves to the new juridical framework and to engaging in discussions and friendly negotiations. The result has been that they have acquired a new sense of responsibility. As M. Belin, one of the secretaries of the C.G.T., wrote in January 1938: "French trade unionism is no longer in opposition, it is no longer outside the law, for it has accepted the idea of labor legislation. Social reforms no longer seem to it to be one-sided: the worker resorts to arbitration, seeks collective agreements, and places himself under the ægis of the law — which subjugates, yet protects."

This evolution has not taken place without serious resistance. In spite of the apparent unity of the C.G.T., conflicts still continue between the Communists on one hand and Socialists and non-political trade unionists (these latter in particular) on the other. In the executive committee the two Communist secretaries, MM. Frachon and Racamond, though outnumbered by the four representatives of the old C.G.T., are younger and wield a growing influence. They have engaged vigorously in propaganda, have increased the number of meetings, have come most closely into contact with the militants, and therefore have become best known to rank and file members.

The Communists have done the same thing in the departmental unions and the industrial federations, where for a time they were enormously successful in boring from within. Without directly attacking the local secretaries they have carried on a whispering campaign and have sometimes succeeded in replacing them with new men who are not necessarily openly allied to the Communists but who are nevertheless sympathetic with their ideas or willing to be manœuvred by them. Furthermore, the organization of the Communist Party itself, based on the cell, often permits it to elect its own members as shop delegates. Thus on several occasions, especially in the Paris region, which was formerly the stronghold

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of the C.G.T.U., wildcat strikes have spread from one shop or factory to another without previous notice and sometimes against the orders of the union involved, though the latter in the end managed to get control of the conflict and submit the question to conciliation and arbitration. When the arbitrator had issued his decision, it was generally accepted; yet a few days later a new strike would be called on a new pretext.

Unquestionably these Communist activities among the Paris unions during 1937 and 1938 had a great effect in lessening the country's productive capacity, in alarming French public opinion, and in shaking the Blum cabinet, which did not wish to use force against the labor union movement. The dangerous agitation by the Communists led to the complete defeat of the strike of November 30, 1938, and the ensuing serious setback for the trade unions. The C.G.T. congress, meeting at Nantes, decided by an overwhelming majority to call this strike in spite of the hesitation and passive resistance of Secretary Jouhaux, who sought to gain time and prevent hasty decisions. The Communists were able to push their motion through the congress because of the excitement aroused throughout the country by certain decrees promulgated by the Daladier Government, several of which were considered particularly objectionable by the working classes. Among these were the decree prolonging the working-week beyond the 40 hours stipulated by law (the unions had declared themselves ready to accept all the extra hours necessary for national defense on condition that this question was decided by common agreement and not by fiat); the decree limiting overtime pay to ten percent of the regular wage; and the decrees setting severe penalties (discharge and cancellation of unemployment benefits for six months) for workers refusing to work the extra hours, and providing additional taxes on small incomes and a premium on "deserters" who had placed their capital abroad. Above all, intense feeling was created by the contempt shown for Parliament by the Cabinet; the Prime Minister had promised to convoke Parliament on November 15, but by November 30 it still had not been called.

In the form which it took, this strike was a huge mistake. It might have been otherwise had the C.G.T. confined itself to a symbolic stoppage of work for only a few hours, and if the particular object of the strike had been to force the immediate convocation of Parliament. We must not forget that it was the gen-

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eral strike of February 12, 1934, which had saved the Republic from the Fascist menace — and incidentally saved the life of M. Daladier, whom the Right at that time wanted to shoot.

But instead of adopting a limited objective the C.G.T. assumed the rôle of a state within a state; unquestionably it exceeded its labor union function when it decided on a 24-hour strike as a protest against fiscal decree-laws over which Parliament alone had jurisdiction. Furthermore, by announcing the strike several days in advance it gave the Government (no longer animated by the moral and legal scruples of Léon Blum) time to prepare its resistance. By illegally stretching a law which gave the executive the right to requisition forage for the army, the Government was able to take over the important public utilities and to make any worker who went on strike in these requisitioned industries liable to prosecution before a military tribunal. The strike was a complete failure — especially in Paris and especially in the industrial federations under Communist influence. Curiously enough, the only industries where the strike was really effective were those where the unions originally had been opposed to the strike but participated in it loyally once it had been called. The Communists, on the other hand, after having been ringleaders during the agitation, were the first to go to work on the thirtieth of November.

This fiasco unquestionably dealt a rude blow to the C.G.T. For a time there seemed a likelihood that, as with the strike of 1922, it had completely destroyed the progress made by French trade unionism since 1935. The retaliation that followed the strike was drastic. Numerous civil servants were suspended. Most of the employers refused to take back workers who had struck, in particular the shop delegates and the more militant members of the unions. Sometimes even the representatives of the more moderate element were not rehired. The social laws could not be invoked because the Higher Court of Arbitration decided that the strike had had a political motive, that it had injured the employers' rights under the labor contracts, and that the latter could therefore legitimately discharge all their workers.

It looked for a moment as if the employers were going to take the counteroffensive, and attempt to destroy the labor union movement entirely. However, the international events of recent months have rapidly eliminated this danger. In the face of grave perils from abroad, all Frenchmen have realized the necessity for a

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solid national front. As a matter of fact, most of the workers who were discharged have now been rehired. Recent arbitral decisions, after reaffirming the principle of non-discrimination, have gone on to state that the freedom of trade unions had been violated when the employers — whose right to dismiss all their employees who had struck on November 30 was unquestioned — refused to rehire the union leaders and the shop delegates along with the rest of the workers.

It may now be said that the essential features of the social laws of 1936 will probably endure. Even though the workers in the war industries realize that for them there can be no limitation on the length of the working-week, the collective agreements nevertheless remain in effect, while the legislation concerning arbitration is actually being strengthened.

As for the C.G.T., it seems at first glance to have weakened perceptibly. Instead of the 5,000,000 members which it had in 1936 it now has less than 3,000,000. However, the elements that have left were the most unstable, being in the main the workers easily influenced by extremist agitation. Besides, the considerable diminution of Communist influence frees the hands of the C.G.T. leaders and enables them to rebuild the organization with greater care. Of late, labor circles have been discussing the social experiments carried on in Sweden. Last summer leaders among the employers and employees of that country visited France and explained to their French colleagues how industrial peace is amicably preserved between them under the Swedish procedure. Perhaps, if world peace is somehow preserved, we in France are on the threshold of a new concerted social experiment which will finally place relations between capital and labor on a firm foundation.

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# BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE DOMINIONS

*By H. V. Hodson*

THE British Commonwealth of Nations is in another period of transition, marked by two developments. In the first place, the Dominions have now become virtually independent nation-states. Secondly, the manner in which power politics is now being practised by all countries, totalitarian or otherwise, has brought an end to the era of make-believe foreign policies in which both isolationists and supporters of collective security enjoyed their fools' paradise. We are now down to brass tacks.

These two developments have inevitably led to momentous changes in the foreign and defense policies of the Commonwealth as a whole and of its six member-states individually. For we must keep in mind that each of these six nations is able, not only to conduct its own peacetime foreign policy, but to decide for itself the issue of peace and war.

Apart from the United Kingdom, two of those nation-states—the Union of South Africa and Ireland—have publicly declared through their governments that the decision to abstain from, or take part in, wars involving other members of the Commonwealth resides in them alone. The South African Government glosses over the question of formal neutrality, though constantly challenged by the Nationalist Opposition to be precise. Mr. De Valera for his part, while claiming the right to neutrality and insisting that it is Ireland's policy to remain neutral, has frankly acknowledged that it would be extremely difficult in practice for her to do so if Great Britain were involved in a European war. The important facts are that open declarations of principle have been made which imply a possible division of the Commonwealth over the issue of war and peace, and that these have not aroused any protest from the United Kingdom Government. They are indeed accepted by a large part of informed opinion in Great Britain as a logical expression of Dominion status.

In Canada, the Government's utterances on the subject of the Dominion's right to decide between peace and war might be taken as a mere claim to choose how much it is to contribute to a common cause. In a debate on foreign policy at Ottawa, follow-

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ing the March 1939 crisis, Prime Minister Mackenzie King, after jumping off the fence far enough to declare that if Great Britain were the victim of aggression Canada would certainly spring to her aid, resumed his habitual attitude by reëmphasizing that when the time came the effective decision would lie with the Canadian Parliament. He was speaking on a motion to adopt a bill proclaiming that His Majesty could not declare war on behalf of Canada except by and with the consent of his Canadian Government. Mr. Mackenzie King's most clearly defined objection to this measure was that it would help to encourage aggressors by making them believe — what was not true — that in no circumstances would Canada fight side by side with Great Britain. This was indeed a sound reason, but it is a pity that the bill could not have been considered on its merits. The strongest reason for passing it was that — without materially altering Canada's actual status — it might have allayed some of the suspicions of the Canadian nationalists in regard to Whitehall's control, which suspicions in turn prevent them from judging international affairs on their merits.

For the right to neutrality is logically implied in the Dominions' equality of status in the British Commonwealth. There is only one other way in which, in this field, the member-nations could be equal in status, and that would be for no declaration of war (or of peace) by His Majesty to be valid unless he were unanimously advised to make it by the Governments of all his autonomous Dominions. And that would reduce the international policy of the British Commonwealth to impotence. The separate right of neutrality has been held to be incompatible with the indivisibility of the British Crown. But the abdication episode showed that the Crown *is* divisible. King George VI succeeded King Edward VIII on three different days in different parts of the Commonwealth; if that can happen, then there is no greater difficulty in the Crown's being at war on behalf of one part of the Commonwealth and at peace on behalf of another — no difficulty, that is to say, in constitutional logic. In practice there would be very great difficulties indeed, arising both from the personal loyalty of many Dominion citizens to the British Commonwealth and Crown, and from the intimate connection among the economic and defensive systems of the different member-nations. The South African Parliament, for instance, might by a majority decide upon neutrality in a major war in which England was

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fighting; but it could not prevent thousands of its citizens from volunteering in the British forces, or otherwise serving the Mother Country. Nor could South Africa in practice afford the same rights in her ports to enemy ships as to British ships, quite apart from the vexed question of the Simonstown naval base. Similar considerations apply to Canada, indeed to all the Dominions, though it is only in South Africa, Canada and Ireland that there has been serious talk of abstention from a major war involving Great Britain.

In the period of make-believe foreign policy, the issue was neatly turned by the argument that all self-governing members of the British Commonwealth were freely and separately members of the League of Nations, and that the duties incurred under the Covenant made neutrality impossible in a war against aggression, which was the only kind of war that Great Britain would ever contemplate.[1] This was quite true on paper, but it implied that there was no sense in worrying over whether the Dominions would fight to defend Great Britain because they were in any case bound to defend Lithuania. And that made nonsense in any world in which collective security was more than a pious formula. As soon as collective security plainly meant a liability to go to war over an issue in which no direct national interests were involved and which might not otherwise lead to war, the effectiveness of the formula failed.

Nevertheless, it was necessary to have such a formula during the period in which the Dominions, fledglings in international independence, were trying and strengthening their wings. The member-nations of the Commonwealth could at the time sincerely say: We are independent in our foreign policies, but our foreign policies are alike because they are all governed by collective security. The inherent weakness of this argument in a hard world was shown by such incidents as Canada's persistent attempt to limit the obligations of collective security under Article 10 of the League Covenant to a continental basis, by the refusal of the Dominions to endorse the Locarno Pact with their own pledges (though it only made the League obligations more precise in a limited area) or the rustication of Mr. W. M. Hughes from the Australian Government in the midst of the Abyssinian crisis because he ventured to remark, as the present Earl Baldwin

[1] See "British Commonwealth Relations," the report of the first unofficial British Commonwealth Relations Conference, held at Toronto in 1933, p. 179.

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had remarked before him, that effective sanctions meant war. Looking back, we can see from such evidence how superficial, after all, was the unifying power of the collective-security principle in British Commonwealth relations. Yet if that principle had not existed it would have had to be invented; for without it the period in which the Dominions were exercising their new external independence and casting off their old fear of Whitehall's control would have been far more awkward and more dangerous for Commonwealth integrity.

It took the September 1938 crisis to prick the bubble and to force the British Commonwealth either to seek some more realistic means of unifying its foreign policy, or else to face a loss of integrity *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world. That crisis found public opinion in the different nations of the Commonwealth considerably confused. No British nation had any specific pledge to defend Czechoslovakia, and none regarded its undertakings under the League Covenant as automatically binding without judgment on the merits of the case. And as for those merits, many people, both in the United Kingdom and in the Dominions, felt that a German minority ought not to be forcibly prevented from joining the Reich, and that to try to do so meant keeping open a permanent sore in Central Europe. At the same time, opinion throughout the Commonwealth was stirred by wider considerations — by accumulated distaste for the totalitarian states and their methods of diplomacy, by romantic championship of the "little fellow," by faith in democracy and hatred of force, and (much more dimly in the Dominions than in Great Britain) by recognition of the strategic importance of the Bohemian frontier for the whole European balance of power, the maintenance of which has been for centuries one of the cardinal principles of British foreign policy. For these reasons, had Great Britain become involved in war with Germany last September, there is little doubt that she would have had the active support of all the Dominions, with the possible exception of South Africa, where a minority is pro-Nazi, a larger minority is more or less anti-British and isolationist, and a further contingent might have held that abstention was better than risking a civil war. Later, in April 1939, an experienced observer wrote to me from South Africa: "I think there would now be stronger support for firm measures by the British Government than was the case last September. There is little doubt that if war had come then the Union would have remained neutral."

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Despite the probable readiness of other Dominions to follow Great Britain into war last September, the course actually pursued by Mr. Chamberlain undoubtedly suited the wishes and the interests of the member-nations of the Commonwealth, both separately and jointly. From the late Mr. Joseph Lyons to Mr. Mackenzie King, leaders in all the Dominions have applauded Mr. Chamberlain's policy in unequivocal terms, not merely amid the emotions of the crisis, but also upon much later reflection. The Dominion Governments were continuously consulted last September, and there is strong reason to believe that the balance of their advice was in favor of the policy of separating Sudetenland from the rest of Czechoslovakia. The Australian Government is generally understood to have gone much further than the United Kingdom Government in this direction. New Zealand, whose Government had previously pleaded for the full rigor of automatic collective security, might have been expected to cry with the loudest voice "stand fast against Germany;" but in fact her preoccupation with a general election, fought exclusively on internal economic policies, prevented her official voice from being plainly heard, and her people were patently thankful to be granted a further and perhaps prolonged period of peace in which to pursue their social experiments.

The fact is that not one of the countries in the British Commonwealth was prepared, either physically or morally, for the world-wide war which might easily have broken out had Mr. Chamberlain pursued a different policy in regard to Czechoslovakia. A measure of their lack of physical preparedness at that time is the degree of rearmament that has taken place since. It is scarcely too much to say that in ability to meet and parry a knockout blow, Great Britain herself is twice as strong as she was eight or nine months ago. And if Great Britain was behindhand with protective and counteroffensive armament, the Dominions had scarcely begun to readjust their defenses to the needs of the day. They would not, perhaps, have suffered for their defenselessness in the early stages of a war as Great Britain would have suffered, but they knew that in the end their fate was bound up with hers and that their coasts were virtually defenseless if her protection were shattered — unless the United States should step into the breach.

They were as unprepared morally as they were physically. The outlook of their people on international affairs was still

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largely bounded by the optimism of the collective-security period. They were still arguing isolationism and neutrality regardless of the danger that within a few weeks, perhaps within a few hours, freedom might have its back to the wall. Australia and New Zealand, though alike in social structure, economic interest and strategic position, had been led under contrasting banners in foreign policy. Australian Labor, in opposition, was isolationist, crying "keep Australia out of wars in the northern hemisphere." New Zealand Labor, in power, was internationalist, demanding collective action against Japan, Italy, Germany. Australian conservatism, in power, was striving to keep Great Britain out of European entanglements. New Zealand conservatism, in opposition, was for following Great Britain wherever she should lead. Canada, according to those qualified to speak, was split into three sections: isolationists, who knew what they wanted, which was to keep out of all wars; imperialists, who were ready to follow Great Britain into war if necessary while hoping that she would keep out of it; and internationalists, who were not at all sure what they wanted, because many of them were against war in principle for Canada although they hoped that Great Britain would "give a lead" by pledging herself to go to war against aggression. In South Africa there was a strong isolationist movement, amounting perhaps to a majority, but the hard facts of the strategic position were being steadily driven home by the evidence of German ambitions in southern Africa. Ireland realized that she was a European Power and that as such her fate was as closely tied to the Continent as was Great Britain's; nevertheless, she was still preoccupied with the remnants of her ancient quarrel with England. In all the Dominions, public thought was mainly directed to internal problems and was relatively unschooled in the facts of international affairs — the first of those facts being the urgent danger of world war.

If the nations of the Commonwealth were unprepared individually, they were also unprepared jointly. The threatened divisions in the national opinion of each of the Dominions had their counterparts in threatened divisions between the members of the Commonwealth. While individually they tried to shelter their economic achievements and aspirations from war, jointly they had to weigh the risk of a breakdown of the British Commonwealth experiment — an experiment in coöperation between free nations under one Crown — under a war strain which it was

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not old enough to bear. The fledgling period of Dominion autonomy had not lasted quite long enough. In general, the Dominions had not yet gained the self-confidence that would have enabled them, in advance of a grave crisis, to enter into close political and military commitments with Great Britain and their sister Dominions. Hence, the plans of the Commonwealth as a whole for mutual aid and joint action in a sudden war were as behindhand as the rearmament of its individual members.

The September crisis thus disclosed two vital needs for the Commonwealth: (1) the rapid acceleration of arming by all the member-nations that had felt the chill shadow of war; and (2) fresh and frank thinking by each of them about their international policies in order to erect a new structure of coöperation between them. British statesmen, indeed all students of Commonwealth affairs, fully appreciate that no country can be expected to base its defense policy or its foreign policy on anything but its own national interests as understood by its people. Alliances, or any other form of international coöperation not resting on recognized national interests, will fall to pieces in democratic countries as soon as they are put to a strain. It is now becoming plain, however, to most people in the British Dominions that their own vital national interests are in the end subordinate to their interest in preserving the strength and independence of the United Kingdom. Canada is the only possible exception, because should British power fail she may look to the United States for the protection of her shores, if not of her ships and overseas interests. Australia and New Zealand too might perhaps be taken under the protective wing of the United States if Great Britain were brought to her knees. But such speculations are not ones on which the policy of a nation can be founded. In any case, the impoverishment of Britain by defeat would gravely injure the economic welfare of these countries. That is why the Dominions, in addition to their own individual national interests, also share the vital interests of the United Kingdom.

This identity of vital interests among the nations of the Commonwealth (always with the qualification about Canada) is made plain by a study of the Dominions' defense arrangements. Though all the Dominions are small and exposed Powers, they are relatively under-armed, gauged by contemporary standards. Australia, the most highly armed among them, thinks herself heavily burdened because she is spending about one-twentieth of

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her national income on arms, compared with Germany's one-quarter and the United Kingdom's one-eighth. Moreover, with the possible exception of South Africa's precautions against a native rising (and of course omitting India from the picture), the Dominions' defenses are apparently intended to meet the contingency, not of local wars, but of a world war. Yet, in a world-wide war their defenses would be hopelessly inadequate either to gain ultimate victory or to prevent ultimate defeat; in fact, they would be inadequate even to withstand a sustained local attack by the concentrated striking force of a great Power. In other words, the Dominions' defenses are all based on the tacit assumption that British power remains strong in the outer world, ready to safeguard their overseas trade and to reënforce them if the outer barrier should be broken.

That defensive situation must be the necessary hard core of foreign policies within the Commonwealth. The facts can be allowed to make their own impression on public opinion in the member-nations, provided the people are told the facts by their political leaders. The need today is not for any straining of the concept of common interest, nor forcing of the pace of military coöperation in advance of public opinion. It is for the Dominions to take up their responsibilities as self-governing nations by enunciating their foreign policies plainly and consistently. As a group, they have hitherto tended to evade this responsibility under the cloak of one or the other of two formulas: first, that "We are bound to follow Great Britain and to be with her whatever happens;" and second that "Parliament will decide when the time comes." These two formulas are equally effective in emasculating public thought and enfeebling national policy.

If indeed it is true that for strategic reasons a Dominion must follow Great Britain, in war and out, this in itself is proof that the Dominion has a national responsibility to influence Great Britain's foreign policy. Such reasons would be no excuse for overriding the democratic rights of its people by failing to tell them plainly how the Dominion's influence was thus being used, and on what grounds. The only way the people of a Dominion can come to see a national interest in international coöperation is for their Government to take them into its confidence. For the Dominions, the first lesson of the September crisis was that this candid relation between government and electorate was often flagrantly lacking. Hence the bewilderment of a great part of Dominion opinion.

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The second lesson was the futility of the doctrine that "Parliament will decide when the time comes." At the critical moment it was manifest that the fatal decisions were not in the hands of parliaments. The factors of time and distance alone were enough to throw the burden upon the executive. When parliaments met, they found themselves the prisoners of events and of their own past actions, or (more often) of their failure to act. It became clearer than ever that unless democracies are ready to endow their executives with plenipotentiary mandates, they are impotent before the swift manœuvring of the dictators. The pernicious doctrine that parliament will decide when the time comes — which has been pressed on governments by parliamentarians who do not understand foreign affairs and has been conveniently accepted by governments anxious to avoid any odium they might incur by making up their minds — is quite contrary to the theory and tradition of British democratic institutions.

A country which adopts this doctrine automatically bars itself both from a policy of alliance or collective security (either universal, or within a British or other group) and from using its power as a deterrent against aggression. In other words, the only way in which it can stave off war is to run away from it. This perhaps was a minor contributory reason why the Dominions backed the "Munich policy." The changed direction of the United Kingdom's foreign policy since the March 1939 crisis has therefore faced the Dominions with this fundamental issue in their external policies. For the United Kingdom has now decided that war is preferable to the consequences of running away from it any farther; and her decision has forced every other country in the same orbital system to answer the same question: "Are you or are you not a member of the front against aggression?" If the answer is "We are," then comes a further question: "What will you contribute to help deter the potential aggressors, or to win the war if it comes? How is your power to be fitted into the whole scheme of defense against aggression?" This means that the Dominion Parliaments must decide now, not at some vague future date. If the Dominions are to join in the empire's defensive front, it is vitally necessary that plans for mutual military aid between them and the United Kingdom, especially regarding the use of ports and other naval facilities, be laid in advance. Such plans have undoubtedly been laid already, in spite of all the talk about neutrality; but the whole system would be stronger at

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its roots if the governments and parliaments of all the Dominions were to grasp the nettle and decide now whether in a clash between the dictatorships and the forces of decency they will throw all their power on the side of right.

It is felt in some of the Dominions that such pledges would deprive them of the right to have an independent foreign policy of their own. But if this were true, Great Britain herself has already signed away her independence in foreign policy by giving even more rigorous commitments (mutual or unilateral) to France, Egypt, Poland, Greece, Belgium, Portugal and 'Iraq. The only possible kind of independence would then be isolationism. However, isolationism is in reality impracticable for small Powers like the Dominions. No small Power can have the same degree of freedom of choice in mapping its destiny in international affairs as a great Power, at least in a world given over to power politics.

But the Dominions, through their membership in the British Commonwealth, have a greater measure of independent authority in world affairs than any other small Powers; they possess all the ordinary means of expressing their will and exerting their authority that other small countries possess, and more besides. Some of them maintain their own diplomatic missions abroad, yet in addition they can use the diplomatic and consular machinery of the United Kingdom to uphold their interests and protect their nationals throughout the world. They are separate members of the League of Nations, but their voice is much more effective as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, because its corporate pronouncements (such as the reports of Imperial Conferences) are always unanimous. They can avail themselves of whatever sources of information they choose, but they are also kept continuously supplied with all the important information that reaches the British Foreign Office — and knowledge is power, since to be forewarned is to be forearmed. Above all, they have one privilege that distinguishes them from every other small Power that is not a mere puppet state: they have at all times the privy ear of a great Power, and they have the assurance that their voice is heard and considered by its leaders in moments of crisis.

The machinery of political consultation in the British Commonwealth has three main components. First, there are the quasi-diplomatic Dominion High Commissioners in London and the United Kingdom High Commissioners in the Dominion capitals

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(except Dublin). In periods of crisis the Dominion High Commissioners are always brought into personal consultation with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. The High Commissions and their staffs have exceptional access to Whitehall secrets and discussions. The Dominions Office may be described as the Foreign Office of this quasi-diplomatic machine, in that it has general charge over relations with the Dominions, appoints the United Kingdom High Commissioners to their capitals, and deals with such problems of Commonwealth relations as the late Anglo-Irish dispute. On urgent occasions, however, it is short-circuited. Indeed, the second component is the right of direct communication between Prime Minister and Prime Minister, which the long distance radiotelephone has made increasingly important, though the United Kingdom correspondent is often the Foreign Secretary or the Dominions Secretary, rather than the Prime Minister. Finally, there is the Imperial Conference, in which the whole gamut of foreign affairs and defense, as well as economic, constitutional and other matters, is run over in secret conclave and agreement reached on principles and to some extent on details. The last Imperial Conference was held in 1937, and, although they are normally held only every four years, the need to reaffirm principles in the light of new events would seem to point to the holding of another one at the earliest possible date.

These are domestic affairs for the British Commonwealth, but they are of moment to the whole world. For not only is the coherence of the British Commonwealth an important element of strength (or its decline an element of weakness) in the front against the totalitarian aggressors; it also represents an experiment in international coöperation pregnant with object lessons for the whole world. Within itself the Commonwealth contains a microcosm of the world's problems, not least among them the problem of relations between different races and different continents. Its disruption through the impact of war would be a major disaster for civilization and a triumph for the forces of brutality and materialism that threaten us with a new Dark Age. Happily there is strong reason to believe that, just as national opinion in democratic countries solidifies the instant their national homes or ideals are threatened and draws upon the reservoirs of unity that freedom gives, so in this democratic commonwealth of free nations the attack upon its integrity, its ideals and its institutions would weld it into a stronger brotherhood than ever.

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# THE "DRANG NACH OSTEN" CONTINUES

*By Elizabeth Wiskemann*

SINCE Munich the German trade drive in Southeastern Europe has entered upon an entirely new phase. This change became especially marked after Schacht's dismissal from the Reichsbank last January. It was Schacht who had developed the plan by which Germany imported enormous amounts of raw materials and foodstuffs from Danubian and Balkan countries, and forced them to take in payment, usually much deferred, whatever goods she chose to send them. Though this scheme led to a considerable increase in the volume of commerce between Germany and those countries, the latter were far from satisfied. They felt that they were not being treated fairly and they objected to the unnatural use to which Germany was putting her economic relationship with them. However, the Schacht system has served its purpose. The time has now come, the Germans believe, for even more aggressive tactics. Ever since last September they have therefore been making it increasingly plain that they are aiming at nothing less than the economic conquest of Southeastern Europe.

The new trend was inaugurated by Dr. Funk's much-publicized journey to the Balkans last October. Since then, Germany has been making three closely related demands on the countries in that area. She is insisting (1) that they enter into long-term agreements with her; (2) that they push the development of their resources — with German help; and (3) that they allow Germany to monopolize their foreign trade. Obviously, this third demand is of the most far-reaching importance. If it were granted, Germany would have free access to the foodstuffs, the petroleum and certain other of the basic raw materials that she needs so badly. She would also obtain control over commodities she herself does not require but which she could resell in the world market in order to acquire gold or foreign exchange — of which she is also very short. Germany is urging these countries, especially Hungary, to reduce their industrial activities in favor of agricultural production. In this way Germany will obtain a wider market for her manufactured goods as well as insure an adequate and accessible source of cheap foodstuffs and raw materials. In the

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case of Hungary, the new anti-Jewish legislation is likely to accomplish this result whether the Hungarian Government intends it or not.

Munich gave the Nazis the occasion for making these all-embracing demands; but it required the events of March 15, 1939 — the "peaceful conquest" of Czechoslovakia — to bring them close to realization. For it would be inaccurate to suggest that Germany had everything her own way during the first months immediately following the September crisis. With Hungary she was on the worst of terms, due to the Hungarian invasion of Slovakia and Ruthenia. As for Rumania, the shooting of the "Iron Guard" leader, Codreanu — "while trying to escape" — was interpreted in Germany as an act of defiance. Only Jugoslavia, with Stoyadinović as Prime Minister, seemed complacent towards German expansion. Therefore, when in February 1939 Stoyadinović was driven from power by public hostility and the Prince Regent's dislike for his dictatorial ambitions, the Germans felt that the time had come to proceed from the emasculation of Czechoslovakia to her obliteration. The Nazis expected two results to flow from this action. In the first place, they believed that Germany's economic resources would be greatly augmented by the incorporation of Czechoslovakia into the Greater Reich. Secondly, the extinction of the Czechoslovak state would, the Nazis thought, teach the other small nations to respect German might. The Germans soon discovered, however, that their newly-won control over Czech and Slovak agricultural production went only a small way towards relieving their ever-growing food shortage. Nevertheless, subsequent events were to show that the establishment of German "protection" over Czechoslovakia was to accelerate the long-run solution of this problem.

Czechoslovakia, scenting danger, had from the moment Hitler came to power sought to intensify economic coöperation between the members of the Little Entente, hoping in this way to offset the revival of the old German *Mitteleuropa* scheme. Rumania and Jugoslavia were largely agricultural nations with small capital resources and hence they attracted Czech investments. The Prague Government naturally encouraged this movement of capital to countries with which it was politically allied. Thus, Bata and Skoda factories were started in Jugoslavia and Rumania. Nor did the Czechs overlook the tactical advantage gained by arming their allies with the same type of weapon

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that they themselves used. In proportion as Germany forced an ever accelerating pace of rearmament upon Europe, this military consideration increased in importance.

Vienna, which before the World War had been the financial and industrial headquarters for Southeastern Europe, was only a shadow of her former self after the fall of the Hapsburg Monarchy. Nevertheless, Austrians continued to hold important investments in the Successor States. In the twenties, Austrian and Sudeten German industrialists opened factories in Hungary, Rumania and Jugoslavia in order to evade the high tariff walls erected by those states. The annexation of Austria and the Sudeten areas, and finally the occupation of Czechoslovakia — all within the space of a single year — placed this vast wealth in Hitler's hands. Above all, these events gave him possession of the Skoda works, one of Europe's largest arms plants.

In the case of Rumania, the effect of these successive *coups* seems to have been decisive. Rumanian rearmament had been proceeding in a dilatory fashion. Consequently, when the Germans threatened to prevent the Skoda works from shipping any more arms to Rumania, King Carol had no alternative but to capitulate — in particular, since this threat was made at the very moment when he wanted to counter-mobilize against Hungary. Therefore, exactly eight days after the German troops entered Prague, Rumania accepted a five-year commercial agreement with Germany. Though the Rumanians managed to evade the German demand for a trade monopoly, they had to accept a plan by which German experts, under the nominal control of joint German-Rumanian companies, were to be given facilities for developing all forms of Rumanian production.

Jugoslavia had distributed her armament orders more diffusely than Rumania, and was thus not tied so closely to Skoda. But Jugoslavia was much more dependent upon Czech capital — invested, for example, in her textile and sugar industries. Now that Czech and Austrian capital is under Nazi control, Germany's position as an investor in Jugoslavia has completely altered: at the beginning of 1938 she controlled only 55 million dinars in Jugoslavia, or less than one percent of the total foreign capital in that country; today she controls 1,500 million dinars, or 19 percent — and instead of coming fourteenth on the list, she now comes first. Jugoslavia has also relied more upon Greater Germany to absorb her exports: in 1938 only 36.1 percent of Ru-

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mania's total exports went to Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, while 50 percent of Jugoslavia's foreign sales went to them.

There is another aspect of Germany's economic drive which, if less conspicuous, is possibly the most important of all — her currency policy towards her small neighbors. The effects of this policy have probably been most evident in Jugoslavia. The Germans have tempted the Jugoslav farmer with preferential prices in his own currency; but at the same time they have increased the value of the Reichsmark in relation to the dinar in order to keep the price of Jugoslav produce, in terms of Reichsmarks, as low as possible. The results of this manipulation have been various. In the first place, prices within Jugoslavia have been pushed up and the value of the dinar has been depressed. Secondly, trade between Jugoslavia and other countries besides Germany has been made more difficult. Inasmuch as the currencies of those countries, unlike the Reichsmark, have not been artificially increased in value, non-German purchasers can no longer buy Jugoslav products on favorable terms. Furthermore, Jugoslavia's capacity to pay for non-German imports has been cut by the decline in the value of the dinar. Thirdly, the increasingly large rôle of Germany in Jugoslavia's foreign trade has reduced the latter's supply of free exchange, and this has had the further effect of driving foreign capital, which fears for its dividends, out of the country, thereby depressing the dinar still more. Meanwhile, wages lag badly behind prices, and this augments social unrest. The Germans have pursued a similar currency policy towards Rumania and Hungary, though not as yet with the same results. The deliberate intention of these policies is to detach those countries from the world market and, by aligning their prices with those in Germany, to tie them to the economic life of the Reich.

Hungary was not affected by the Nazification of the Skoda works. Nevertheless, she is now sending nearly 70 percent of all her exports, including 90 percent of her agricultural produce, to Greater Germany. In other words, the Germans have a virtual monopoly over Hungary's foreign trade. The events of March 1939 included Hungary's seizure of Czechoslovak Ruthenia. This seems to have been undertaken originally at the instigation of Poland and against Germany's wishes. However, Germany abruptly acquiesced in order to liquidate her quarrel with the

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Magyars by posing as the restorer of Hungarian rights. Hitler decided that this concession was worth making in order to get Hungary to join the Anti-Comintern Pact (which she did in February 1939) and to obtain unimpeded access to her grain supply. At the same time, Hitler had to permit the suppression of the Hungarian Nazis and the liquidation, temporarily at least, of the pro-German Ukrainian movement in Ruthenia. (A rather strange incident occurred in connection with this last affair — a number of officers in the Ukrainian National Guard who were shot by the Hungarians turned out to have been Germans.) Later, when the Hungarians also appropriated a corner of the new Slovak state, which had just been taken under German "protection," the Nazis redoubled their efforts to bring Budapest into line with German policy. An obedient Hungary can be used by Berlin as a stick with which to beat Rumania; while the Hungarian minorities in both Rumania and Jugoslavia can be used to advance Axis policies.

II

Since Munich, the German drive towards the southeast has been characterized by direct political and economic pressure plus an incredibly versatile propagandistic activity, unrestrained by any ethical or logical considerations. This technique has been particularly successful among the German minorities in Hungary, Rumania and Jugoslavia, where there are 500,000, 750,000 and 500,000 German inhabitants respectively. But Nazi propaganda, showered on them in growing quantities ever since 1933, has met obstacles, especially in Hungary.

The Hungarian ruling class has always insisted on the Magyarization of the national minorities within the country and it is entirely opposed to granting even the smallest of the German demands for a special status. It therefore strongly objected to the program of concessions to the German minority which Imrédy, then Prime Minister, promulgated last December. The rights of the German-speaking inhabitants in Hungary are therefore still very much restricted. Dr. Franz Basch, the local *Fuehrer*, complains very loudly of the lack of German schools and in his *Deutscher Volksbote* expatiates in the shrill tones which characterized Henlein's newspaper *Die Zeit* on such themes as the "brutality" of Hungarian gendarmes towards the Germans. The height at which feeling runs is illustrated by incidents such as

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that at Pécs last February: on this occasion, when some Magyars turned up at a local German meeting, they were greeted with cries of "Out with the Hungarian dogs!" and were compelled to leave. This action caused bitter Hungarian resentment.

In Rumania and Jugoslavia the situation is somewhat different. In those countries there has never been much question of trying to assimilate the Germans; in the early years following Hitler's accession to power their so-called cultural organizations were therefore freer to receive propagandist visitors from the Reich. Consequently the younger German generation in both countries warmly embraced the tenets of National Socialism in order to expel the older generation from its position of leadership. This naturally led to some very serious quarrels. Only after Munich were the young people able to carry all before them and to insist upon the complete Nazification of the German minorities in each country.

The Germans in Rumania and Jugoslavia are taught to feel superior to the local non-German populations and to regard themselves as outposts of the Nazi Empire. It should not be forgotten that these German minorities, though largely under Magyar rule, were subjects of the Hapsburgs until 1918, and it seems natural and desirable to them that Hitler should succeed to that dynasty and thereby — so they hope — bring back the "good old days."

In Rumania there are two main groups of Germans: the 250,000 so-called Saxons whose ancestors settled in Transylvania in the early Middle Ages, and the 300,000 Swabians who descend from eighteenth century colonists; the former are Protestant, the latter Catholic. The Saxons are among the most bellicose Nazis in the world; there are Swabians, however, who still voice opposition to Hitlerism. Since the German Legations in these countries have now become Nazi Party centers, they concern themselves very closely with the affairs of the German minorities. For instance, a Reich German named Konradi is now attached to the Legation at Bucharest in some commercial capacity, though in fact he serves as a liaison officer for all Germans in Rumania, whether they are Reich citizens or not. Following the conclusion of the German-Rumanian commercial treaty on March 23, German technicians have been crowding into Rumania. The local Saxons are prominent in Rumanian industry and will probably help the Nazis to gain control of it, little by little. A Rumanian law of

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1934 provided that 80 percent of the people employed in each category in every factory must be Rumanian citizens; the number of Saxon and Swabian Rumanians who can be hired is therefore legally unrestricted. In the past, the Rumanian authorities have not let the minorities exercise their rights under this law; in the future, Nazi pressure may oblige them to give the local Germans even more than their due.

In Jugoslavia the events of 1938 have had the same general effect upon the German minority as in Rumania. When the Sudeten Germans demanded that they be released from the ordinary obligations of Czech citizenship, they received the warm approbation of the Germans in Slavonia and Voivodina. Within a short time the latter were putting forward similar claims. In 1934 an important group of young pro-Nazi Germans in Jugoslavia, who had broken away from the conservative *Kulturbund*, had formed a new body, the *Kultur-und-Wohlfahrtsvereinigung des deutschen Slawoniens*. Its leader was a retired officer named Altgayer, who suddenly found it desirable to change his Christian name from the Croatian Branimir to Siegfried. In May 1938, Altgayer's newspaper published a five-point program on the Henlein model which culminated in a demand for the right to "organize our people in a racial community inspired by the National Socialist ideology, which is our own." After Munich the Germans in Jugoslavia accepted complete Nazification and the old conservative *Kulturbund* agreed (November 1938) to embrace Altgayer's program and incorporate his followers.

In Jugoslavia, as in Rumania, the German minority includes several important industrialists whose capital may be reckoned as an asset to the Reich. The most striking example is the industrialist Westen, who owns the foundries at Jesenice and Celje in Slovenia. Westen is a Jugoslav citizen of German origin and is in close touch with Neuhausen, the ubiquitous German Consul-General at Belgrade and head of the German Tourist Agency in Jugoslavia. The German minority also owns considerable land in Jugoslavia, and this fact is being exploited by the Nazis in their "Drang nach Osten." One of the tenets of the old Austrian Pan German movement was that Germans should acquire land in non-German or disputed districts — "He who has land has power." Under the impulse of this program, "Defense Societies" were organized; these helped their members to buy land, which then magically turned into "sacred German soil." This activity has

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been revived in recent years, in particular through the initiative of Neuhausen. In 1936 Germans began to buy up land both in Slovenia and along the Danube in Slavonia and Voivodina. These holdings were acquired in such a way as to indicate that the Germans were planning to possess a compact area along both banks of the Danube. The Jugoslav Government therefore decreed that transfers of land in frontier districts must have official approval; but so long as Stoyadinović was in power it was widely felt that the Germans continued their purchases in the Danubian districts much too easily.

In Slovenia the authorities have fairly effectively put a stop to the buying of land by Germans. Some anxiety is still felt about the Austrian family of Auersperg which, in spite of agrarian reform, continues to own large estates. But Slovenia is a special case, and in spite of its small German population (only about 40,000) its position and history make it particularly susceptible to pressure from Germany. Before the war Slovenia was under the direct rule of Austria, and its northeastern area was actually a part of the Austrian province of Styria. The Nazis believe that Slovenia will soon belong to Austria again. The German Consulate at Ljubljana, which has a huge staff, recently established a branch at Maribor near the German frontier. It is perhaps even worth recording that some of Henlein's close collaborators at Eger in the pre-Munich days have had business at Maribor lately. Soon after the German occupation of Prague there were particularly fervent white-stockinged[1] demonstrations — without police interference — in a small town northeast of Maribor largely inhabited by Germans. However, at a similar manifestation a week later, mysterious counter-demonstrators appeared, apparently from nowhere, and the police looked on while the pro-Nazi crowds were rather roughly handled.

Many of the younger Slovenes are much opposed to the Nazi campaign. Yet it would be inaccurate to overlook the fact that a number of the older generation still respond to the glamour of German imperialism; before the war it was customary for Slovenes, especially those in the towns, to accept Germanization rather willingly. German propagandists are now busily trying to reclaim these people, who in many cases resent union with the "primi-

[1] In the small countries bordering Germany the Nazis make use of the white stocking as the Party emblem, particularly where they are forbidden by the local authorities to display the swastika or to wear distinctive uniforms.

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tive" Serbs. This is one reason why Germany insisted last April on being permitted to start about thirty new *Kulturverbände* in Slovenia. The wealth and vigor with which these bodies are endowed make them important centers for Nazi propaganda.

III

Nazi agitation in the Danubian countries also seeks to stimulate the discontent of non-German minorities. The one and a half million Hungarians in Transylvania, given to Rumania at the Peace Conference, provide the Nazis with some excellent material for this purpose. The Hungarians do not form a majority in this region, for the Rumanians alone constitute 58 percent of the total population.[2] It would be impossible to exaggerate the sentimental importance attached by these Rumanians to Transylvania's remaining an integral part of the Kingdom. But this deep feeling collides with the equally strong determination on the part of the Hungarians in Hungary to see that Transylvania is reincorporated into the Hungarian fatherland. Minority conditions in Rumania have always compared unfavorably with those in pre-Munich Czechoslovakia, and during the last few years the Bucharest authorities have allowed the status of the Hungarian minority to deteriorate. Nor has the Minority Statute issued last summer improved matters noticeably. The extensive mobilization of the Rumanian army, ordered this spring in response to Hungary's seizure of Ruthenia and to her massing of troops along the Rumanian frontier, inevitably led to the further embitterment of feeling in Transylvania. Firearms and wireless sets owned by Hungarians were confiscated by the Rumanian police, and there was an obvious, though quite natural, distrust of the Hungarians who were called to the Rumanian colors.

German agitators have worked in close collaboration with young Rumanian Iron Guardists. Yet the Iron Guard continues to profess harsh intolerance towards all talk of revising the treaties or of acceding to the demands of the minorities. The fact of the matter is that the question of Transylvania cannot be solved along ethnic lines, since the various nationalities do not live in homogeneous blocs but are inextricably mixed up with each other. Furthermore, the Magyars in Transylvania are not accustomed to the same feudal conditions that prevail in Hungary

[2] This figure, taken from the 1930 census, applies to Transylvania together with the additional Hungarian territory given to Rumania in 1919: Crişana, Maramureş and much of the Banat.

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proper and they look askance at any proposal for their complete subordination to Budapest. The Transylvanian Germans, for their part, are certainly far from being Magyarphils, while many of the Rumanians in Transylvania dislike what they regard as the "Balkan" characteristics of the Bucharest régime. For the moment, Transylvanian sentiment is important chiefly because it is susceptible to the Nazi-inspired suggestion that Transylvania's present ills would disappear if only it could regain its autonomy — under German "protection."

In appraising this situation we should bear in mind that in Rumania, Jugoslavia and Hungary the press is forbidden to cast any aspersions on Germany or Italy, though it is free to abuse the Western Powers. The humiliation of the Western Powers at Munich made it easy for Nazi propaganda to paint them as decadent. Yet, if those Powers succeed in arriving at a *modus agendi* with Russia, there are indications that the Balkan peoples may still seek to resist the "Drang nach Osten." Even the Magyars are not sure where they will stand.

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# OUR INVISIBLE TARIFF

*By Percy W. Bidwell*

ON March 18 Secretary Morgenthau announced that after a certain date German goods entering the United States would be subject to additional or countervailing duties equal to 25 percent of their value. This action, popularly interpreted as revealing President Roosevelt's disapproval of German aggression in Central Europe, was explained officially as necessary to compensate for German export subsidies. News of this sort is not infrequent nowadays. The President is urged to use his latent tariff powers to dissuade Japan from closing the Open Door in China. Puerto Rican sugar mills protest Secretary Wallace's cut in their import quota allotments. American exporters, suffering under Argentina's discriminatory exchange control, demand relaxation of the sanitary embargo on Argentine meat. American nurserymen ponder the effects on their business of the proposed revision in the Plant Quarantine Act. State legislatures in New York and Massachusetts, not satisfied with federal marks-of-origin requirements, debate new ways to make sure that no consumer can purchase Japanese or German goods without knowing it. New state and federal "Buy American" laws restrict the expenditure of hundreds of millions of public money to the purchase of domestic goods.

Now, matters such as these were not the stuff of the American tariff problem as it has heretofore been known. From the Civil War until the Great Depression, "tariff discussion" meant either the consideration of the general issue of Protection *vs.* Free Trade, or else the question as to whether the rate on a particular commodity, such as sugar or raw wool, was too high or too low. These were matters for Congress, not for administrative officers, to decide.

## I. THE VISIBLE AND THE INVISIBLE TARIFF

In a series of general tariff revisions, embodied in the acts of 1890, 1894, 1897, 1909, 1913, 1922 and 1930, Congress erected the towering structure of the visible tariff. Each successive tariff act was a major legislative event, attended by months of public discussion. Meanwhile, however, there was arising a second tariff structure, a comprehensive system of administrative con-

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trols over import trade. Attracting much less attention in the public press, rarely debated in Congress, and never the subject of discussion by women's clubs or businessmen's forums, the invisible tariff has spread its intricate network over an ever-increasing area of our foreign trade. Today, administrative measures are more comprehensive than the visible tariff, since they affect goods which are on the free list as well as those which are dutiable; they are more effective, since they make use of quotas and embargoes as well as tariff duties; they can be put into operation more promptly, since they do not need to wait upon discussion in legislative assembly. It was a customs lawyer who, appraising in 1922 the proliferation of administrative control of imports, shrewdly remarked, "Let me write the Administrative Act and I care not who fixes the rates of duty."

Extra-tariff controls over imports are objects of suspicion. In every customs regulation and every sanitary restriction on the importation of animals and plants, a measure of economic protection may possibly be concealed. Hence the origin of the phrases "indirect protection" and "administrative protection." But since legislatures are often responsible for such chicanery, the first of these expressions seems preferable. The United States, having acquired a reputation for ultra-high protection in its visible tariffs, has been accused of having used administrative controls unfairly to reënforce its protectionist system. Such accusations are not without foundation, as the following paragraphs will show. But the American record, when compared with that of other countries, is not bad. In all countries every additional measure of import control — whether it refers to tea, milk, meat, alcoholic beverages, obscene literature, sealskins, grapes, narcissus bulbs or lottery tickets — constitutes an added handicap to imports; however, if the new measure applies with equal force to domestic trade in the regulated articles, it does not afford economic protection. In the United States the administrative regulation of domestic trade is as comprehensive and exacting as that of imports.

Everywhere the world over since 1914, administrative measures have been attaining greater importance in the control of foreign trade. So great has been this change that rates of duty in certain foreign countries have ceased to have much significance when contrasted with the new invisible tariff barriers, the import quotas, exchange controls, clearing and compensation agreements

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and barter deals. From such measures, the commercial policy of the United States has until now been almost entirely free. The reason for this is to be found, not in any stronger attachment on our part to the principles of free trade, but in our continuing surplus of exports over imports. Our balance of payments has been active; the movement of gold has all been in our direction.

## II. ORIGINS OF THE INVISIBLE TARIFF

Recently, increased administrative control over American imports has been urged as a weapon necessary to combat the aggressive trade policies of foreign countries, particularly the so-called totalitarian states. As we shall presently see, steps have already been taken in this direction. But the origins of our invisible tariff are of an entirely different character. They are to be found (1) in the growth of protectionism as a principle in our foreign trade policy, and (2) in the increasing regulation of interstate and intrastate commerce through the police powers of the federal and state governments.

Protectionism was firmly established in the United States by the Civil War. In the tariff legislation of the succeeding half-century, import duties were raised repeatedly. Also, in successive tariff revisions the classifications of dutiable goods were refined and narrowed so as to bring duties to bear more directly on specific types of imports. Both of these processes of change in the "visible tariff," entailing greater and more important activity on the part of customs officials, were responsible for the development of customs law. The increasing complexity of tariff schedules gave rise to innumerable disputes over the classification of dutiable merchandise; the higher duties put an increasing premium on smuggling, undervaluation and other evasions of the tariff law. As the tariff barriers rose higher and higher, greater attention had to be given to stopping the chinks through which illegal imports might seep.

To the layman, much of the customs formalities and customs procedure which has evolved in legislation, administrative regulations and court decisions appears absurdly technical. Some of the regulations, and more of the court decisions, appear to have been devised expressly in order to make things as difficult as possible for importers. Certain congressmen have given color to this view by taking the attitude that importing was a privilege, not a right, and that bringing foreign-made goods into this

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country was not a suitable occupation for patriotic citizens. But their attitude is exceptional; it would be absurd to contend that the purpose of our customs law, either statutory or administrative, is to obstruct imports. It is nevertheless true that, given the complex character of the import trade and the corresponding complexities of our visible tariff, any system of customs laws, no matter how neutral in intent and in administration, inevitably interposes added obstacles to the entry of foreign merchandise.

### III. THROUGH THE CUSTOMS MAZE

In a little book called "Through the Customs Maze"[1] a well-known customs lawyer once outlined the process of importing. The metaphor is appropriate. The safest and quickest ways through the intricacies of customs procedure are known only to a highly specialized group of customs brokers and lawyers. The costs of their services constitute a part of the costs of importation. The premiums on bonds which are not infrequently demanded are another cost. Litigation must sometimes be resorted to for the protection of importers' rights. Competing domestic interests sometimes take advantage of privileges afforded them in the invisible tariff to harass importers. Importing has thus become an expensive, even a hazardous business.

When all this has been admitted, it is nevertheless true that American customs procedure is not nearly so burdensome from the point of view of importers as the corresponding procedure in many foreign countries. Nowhere is notice of impending changes in tariff duties or in customs regulations given more promptly than in the United States; nowhere are more liberal facilities afforded importers for appealing to the courts against abuse of authority by customs officers and against misinterpretation of customs laws. Importers complain of the occasional delays of months, sometimes of years, that ensue in the final liquidation of their entries, but they freely admit that such delays are not owing to inefficiency or an obstructive attitude on the part of customs officials. On the contrary, the desire of these officials to conduct their affairs with maximum efficiency coincides with the importers' desire to get his goods through the customs house as soon as possible. The greatest cause for delay is in appraising the value

[1] Benjamin Arthur Levett: "Through the Customs Maze: A Popular Exposition and Analysis of the United States Customs Tariff Administrative Laws, Including the 'Anti-Dumping' Law and the 'Flexible Provisions' of the Fordney Tariff." New York: Customs Maze Publishing Company, 1923.

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of dutiable goods. American statutory definitions of value are extraordinarily detailed and the results of appraisement are often unsatisfactory to importers. But they would probably be unanimous in preferring the American system, with all its defects, to the system of arbitrary official valuations used in certain other countries.

### IV. DEFENSE AGAINST UNFAIR COMPETITION

Statutes and regulations designed to protect American business against unfair competition from abroad are essential components of our protective system. An important sector of our invisible tariff is made up of (1) laws requiring the identification of foreign goods by "marks of origin," (2) anti-dumping legislation, (3) laws applying countervailing duties to bounty-fed imports, (4) prohibitions on the importation of products made by convict labor and forced labor, (5) laws penalizing imports from countries that discriminate against American commerce, and (6) prohibitions and penalties against unfair competition in general. All of this formidable array of weapons of commercial warfare was designed solely for purposes of defense. They were intended, not to introduce new obstacles to "legitimate" importing, but to prevent or to neutralize unfair tactics on the part of foreign producers and exporters, or unfair advantages accruing to them through subsidies or bounties. Except for marks of origin, these weapons have been infrequently applied. Some have proved too clumsy for effective use, and all are double-edged, dangerous to the defender as well as the offender. Nevertheless, the presence of these laws on our statute books, and their occasional use, act as a deterrent to the acts and policies against which they are aimed. Also, they furnish a further opportunity for domestic interests to harass importers. Hundreds of complaints are lodged in Washington alleging dumping, infringement of patents, payment of bounties, and other types of unfair competition. Upon investigation the bulk of such charges prove unfounded. But meanwhile, the rumors that action has been initiated and the chance that penalties may be applied add to the hazards of the importing business.

The requirement that imported goods should bear marks indicating the country of origin aims to safeguard domestic producers against the danger that foreign goods may be palmed off as domestic. Just now the label "Made in England" or "Made in

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France" may help to sell imported goods, while "Made in Germany" or "Made in Japan" has quite the opposite effect. In general, marks-of-origin laws usually handicap imports even when not designed for that purpose. Marking adds to the cost of production. Our laws, which are unusually detailed, may not be understood by exporters; hence, importers find their goods held up on what appear absurd technicalities. By the 1938 revision of the customs law, some objectionable features of American marking provisions were eliminated. Also, the discretionary powers of the Secretary of the Treasury have been enlarged. Whether the new powers will be used to facilitate or to handicap importing will depend upon the attitude of this and succeeding administrations, and upon the interpretation given to the statute by the courts.

### V. THE DEFENSE OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS

American protectionism is not confined to helping domestic industrialists and farmers compete with foreigners; it extends its aid, in varying degree, to inventors, designers, authors, playwrights, scenario writers, musicians and artists of all kinds, and to the printers and publishers of their works. In other words, the invisible tariff applies to intangible property rights as well as to material wealth.

A general prohibition against unfair competition in the import trade has on several occasions been invoked to exclude foreign articles that infringe on American patents. American law, however, is unusually liberal in the facilities it accords to owners of foreign patents. They are subjected to no special taxes and are not required to "work their patents" in order to sustain their validity. Furthermore, foreign manufacturers licensed to use American patents may export the patented articles to the United States.

American artists and writers are the objects of more tender solicitude. Our copyright law aims to force publishers to manufacture in the United States all books that can find a substantial market here, to protect American authors and the publishers and printers of their books, and to promote the publication of American editions of books printed in the English language. With the opening of new and wider markets for American musical and literary genius in popular magazines, the radio and motion-pictures, the area to which copyright applies has been enormously

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extended. Protection against unfair foreign competition in these new fields is provided principally through the requirement of registration and through compliance with formalities prescribed by statute or by the regulations of the Copyright Office. Certain magazine publishers, motion-picture producers and broadcasting companies, on this account, oppose the adherence of the United States to the International Copyright Union, since such action would automatically give thousands of foreign artists full copyright protection in this country without the necessity for registration or compliance with other legal technicalities.

### VI. THE BOGEYMAN OF FOREIGN TRADE

Dumping has long been the bogeyman of foreign trade. Manufacturers in every industrial country, fearing the unloading of foreign goods at cutthroat prices in their domestic markets, demand protective legislation. (The fact that they themselves practice dumping when they have a chance makes them no less active in trying to prevent foreigners from employing the same tactics.) In response to these complaints, legislatures in England, Canada and other countries, as well as in the United States, have enacted anti-dumping laws, most of which fail to accomplish their purpose. Ours, although very skillfully drawn, are no exception.

"Dumping" to the layman means any kind of underselling; to the economist, and usually to the legislator, dumping has nothing to do with the comparison of the prices at which foreign goods sell in our markets with the prices of comparable American goods. The comparison is rather between two sets of foreign prices, prices for sale abroad and prices of the same goods for sale in the United States. In other words, the phenomenon is price discrimination between national markets. Dumping in the technical sense occurs only when a foreigner sells more cheaply in the United States than in his own market.

The authors of the American anti-dumping law were fully aware that a carelessly drawn statute might be used as an engine of administrative protectionism. In fact, they were so preoccupied with avoiding this danger that they made their statute practically unworkable. The Treasury Department has received hundreds of complaints about dumping, but has very rarely authorized the application of anti-dumping duties. The trouble is that the law requires two sets of facts to be estab-

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lished: first, that foreigners have been selling goods here more cheaply than in their home market. That is very difficult to prove when, as the law requires, proper account is taken of quantities sold, terms of sale and other details which might invalidate comparisons. Secondly, the law requires, before a finding of dumping is issued, that the Treasury shall make sure that an American industry has been injured. These restrictions on administrative action have to be taken seriously. Occasionally when Treasury officials have been inclined to cut corners in their zeal to penalize dumping, they have been rebuked by the courts and their orders have been set aside. Since 1934, no new findings of dumping have been made. As long as the courts insist upon a strict interpretation of the statute, it is significant principally as a warning to would-be dumpers.

### VII. THE DELEGATION OF TARIFF-MAKING POWERS

In the field of the tariff, as elsewhere, the remedy for legislative incompetence has been sought in the delegation of power to administrative boards. At first, these boards have only investigatory powers; later, they are given authority to exercise positive control over business operations. The inability, and unwillingness, of Congress to deal with the tariff problem honestly and effectively explains the transfer of tariff-making powers to the Executive in the "flexible provisions" of the tariff law and in the Trade Agreements Act. The United States Tariff Commission was originally, in 1916, merely a fact-finding body. It had no authority to recommend changes in rates of duty, and it was very careful not to do so. Rate-making powers were delegated in 1922 to the President, not to the Commission. To the latter was given the task of finding the tariff rates which would even up the difference between foreign and domestic costs. Upon receiving the Commission's findings, the President proclaimed changes in rates of duty.

This so-called "scientific solution" of the tariff problem proved a dud. It was not scientific, and it did not take the tariff out of politics. Instead it put so much politics into the Tariff Commission that it nearly wrecked an organization formerly distinguished for the high quality of its work. Unfortunate personal conflicts between members of the Commission added to the inherent difficulties of getting costs and comparing them. Few changes in duties were made, and those in the upward direction. The Presi-

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dent still retains the power to adjust tariff rates to differences in costs of production, but this power is now entirely overshadowed by the new tariff bargaining powers granted in the Trade Agreements Act of 1934.

### VIII. TARIFF BARGAINING, AN ADMINISTRATIVE JOB

The 21 trade agreements already concluded under this Act represent a decided reversal in the upward trend of American protectionism. For the first time since 1913, American tariff duties have been actually reduced. It is significant that Congress did not itself undertake to cut the high rates it had set up in the Hawley-Smoot Act; instead it turned the job over to the Executive. From the point of view of good government, the results have been revolutionary. For the first time in over a century, lobbying, logrolling and other obnoxious accompaniments of tariff revision have been relegated far to the background. The expert administrators who have the negotiations in charge are sufficiently insulated from contact with pressure groups to be able to consider primarily the public interest. Special interests are not neglected, but they are placed in their properly subordinate position. From the point of view of our foreign trade, the results are promising, though not revolutionary. After five years of tariff bargaining, dutiable commodities still constitute only 40 percent of our total imports; our trade balance still continues active; our farmers still complain of unsalable export surpluses. Upon examination, it appears that most of these conditions result from causes, such as political instability abroad, which cannot be immediately altered by changes in the American tariff. In the long run, they probably will be affected; but there is always the danger that Congress will not give Mr. Hull's program a long run. Protected interests, both agricultural and industrial, are bringing increasing pressure on congressmen to repeal the Act or to destroy its force by amendment. Recent proposals to increase import taxes on several fats and oils, under the guise of excise duties and in violation of the terms of four trade agreements, illustrate one of several types of sabotage that are being attempted. Producers for the domestic market oppose the program because it has done too much, or because it *may* do too much; exporters, on the other hand, are dissatisfied because it has done too little. The policy of bargaining and conciliation, they claim, is inadequate to meet the menace of totalitarian trade policies. They demand that

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stronger medicine — barter deals, clearing agreements, exchange control and the like — be administered to countries discriminating against American trade.

### IX. QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS

So far, the United States has rather successfully avoided the extreme measures of administrative protectionism which now characterize the tariff policies of other great trading nations. We do not practice exchange control, nor have we entered into clearing or payments agreements. But we should beware of a pharisaical attitude, for our skirts are not entirely clear. For example, notwithstanding our denunciations of quantitative restrictions on trade, we already have our quotas. Most of those introduced thus far have been fixed so high that they do not restrict imports. But the quotas on sugar do not fall into this harmless category. The restrictions on imports of Cuban and Philippine sugar are real restrictions; they have succeeded in accomplishing the usual results of quantitative restrictions, *i.e.* they have not only raised our domestic sugar prices but have insulated them from the fluctuations of world market prices. Moreover, under the powers granted the Secretary of Agriculture in the Soil Conservation Act, there is wide opportunity for the imposition of new quotas, not only on farm products, but on industrial goods as well. We have probably not seen the end of this system.

Thus far, the Administration has been very reluctant to authorize quotas on imports of manufactured goods. But what could not be accomplished by legislation, certain industrial interests have accomplished extra-legally. The recent agreement between the Cotton Textile Institute and an association of Japanese exporters, whereby the latter have limited their sales of piece goods in the American market for two years to 100,000,000 yards annually, is what is usually called a voluntary quota. One may perhaps be permitted to question the use of the adjective. If the Japanese exporters had not sensed in the background the threat of a legal quota, why should they have agreed to this restriction?

### X. CONTROL OF DOMESTIC BUSINESS BRINGS CONTROL OF IMPORTS

The steady extension of government regulation over domestic business is generally recognized as a leading characteristic of our economic history in the past half-century. It is not so generally

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recognized that this development has been accompanied by a corresponding extension of administrative controls over imports. Pure food and drug legislation, the control of trade in alcoholic liquors and in narcotics are all illustrations of measures aimed primarily at the protection of American consumers of domestic products. But such protection, obviously, cannot be effective if the new American standards and regulations are not applied to imports.

Plant and animal quarantines are apt to be the touchiest spots in international trade relations. Every modern country feels the obligation to defend its livestock and its crops against the invasion from foreign countries of germs of contagious diseases, against parasites, insect pests and other kinds of crop enemies. But how far should such defense be carried? Perfect protection can be secured only by a 100 percent exclusion of all foreign plants and animals. Since this is obviously absurd, some reasonable compromise has to be worked out.

It is clear that many measures of biological protection inevitably provide economic protection as well. The more foreign cattle that are excluded, the larger the market for domestic cattle. Hence suspicion, often justified, attaches to all sanitary embargoes and quarantines. To the layman, the dictum of the biologists and entomologists that practically all of our most destructive animal diseases and parasites and crop enemies have been introduced from abroad sounds like peculiarly virulent xenophobia. But it is probably true. For, after all, practically all our domestic animals originally came from overseas, as did our more important bread grains, fodder crops, fruit trees and ornamental shrubs. But all that is ancient history now. Two centuries of experimentation have resulted in control measures which make the unwelcome visitors much less destructive. The balance of nature has been at least partially reëstablished; with due diligence we can keep the pests under control. But there is always present the danger of new invasions and, with the growing speed of transportation and frequency of service of steamers, trains and airplanes, the danger becomes each year more real. In the days of sailing vessels, an ocean voyage of six weeks rather thoroughly disposed of stowaway insects; their life cycle came to an end before the voyage was completed. Insects can now board an airplane in Guatemala or Venezuela and arrive safe and sound in Texas or Florida. It has been estimated that

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foreign countries harbor some 10,000 varieties of insects and plant parasites which have not yet made their appearance in the United States. In their native habitat, where they are in balance with their hosts and with other insects and parasites, they are not causing serious injury to plant life. But once introduced into the American environment, any one of them may so upset our balance as to prove a serious menace to our forests, our crops and our orchards. Considerations such as these justify our rigid control over the importation of foreign plants and animals by means of quarantine measures, and in some cases by embargoes.

### XI. BIOLOGICAL VERSUS ECONOMIC PROTECTION

Under the guise of biological protection, however, it is very easy to introduce economic protection. European governments taught us this trick 30 or 40 years ago when they maintained embargoes on our pork products long after the danger of trichinosis had been eliminated. But it must be conceded that our cattle ranchers and our nurserymen have proved apt pupils. They have not hesitated to insist upon sanitary restrictions which on biological grounds were far from defensible. The outstanding example is the embargo on fresh meat imposed in the Tariff Act of 1930. Earlier legislation had given the Department of Agriculture full authority to impose restrictions on imports of meats and live animals from any country, *or part of a country*, found to be infected or exposed to infection with contagious cattle diseases. For some time the Department had exercised this discretionary authority without arousing serious complaints. But in 1930, Congress, yielding to pressure from American livestock interests and against the advice of the Secretary of Agriculture, made *country-wide* embargoes mandatory. As a result, his Department was forced to issue orders prohibiting imports of live cattle and meat from a very large part of the earth's surface, including important meat exporting countries such as Uruguay and Argentina.

Now it happened that, although large areas of Argentina are infected, Patagonia is free from the disease. Consequently, the exclusion of meat from that area could not be justified on biological grounds. Argentina, already embittered by our tariff increases of 1922 and 1930 on her major export products (beef, wool and mutton, hides and tallow, wheat, corn and flaxseed) protested, but without avail. The Roosevelt Administration, in line with its Good Neighbor policy, negotiated a Sanitary Con-

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vention which would have replaced our 1930 legislation with a policy defensible on biological grounds. But the same pressure groups which were responsible for the embargo have been successful in preventing ratification of the Convention. The repercussions on Argentine-American relations are unfortunate, to say the least. With British encouragement, Argentina has instituted an exchange control that discriminates against American exporters, and at the same time her attitude in Pan American affairs has remained uncoöperative.

This Argentine episode is valuable because it shows that many of the worst features of so-called administrative protectionism are not administrative at all, but legislative. The federal officials who administer the invisible tariff are in general not concerned with the economic effects of their policies. Occasionally one finds men who want to help domestic producers, or who want to help the importers; but they are exceptions. As a rule, the motive which animates the customs officers and the officials of the Department of Agriculture in dealing with imports, is to move the goods as rapidly as is consistent with the spirit and letter of the law, keeping in mind always that their decisions are subject to review and, perhaps, reversal by the courts. When Congress, however, has deliberately injected an element of economic protectionism into customs law or into sanitary legislation, the administrative officers have no choice. They must enforce the law, and bear the brunt of the criticism.

## XII. THE PRESENT DANGER

The danger that the administrative control of imports will be abused lies at present, not in the economic, but in the political aspects of our foreign relations. The American people have been greatly disturbed by the aggressive policies of the so-called dictator states. They want to do something to show their disapproval without, however, getting involved in war. As a halfway measure, economic sanctions have been proposed, in the form of embargoes on trade with the offending nation. But since it would be difficult, probably impossible, to obtain economic sanctions by congressional action, why not secure the desired result by administrative action?

In the armory of the invisible tariff many powerful trade weapons stand ready at hand: anti-dumping duties, duties penalizing trade discrimination, and countervailing duties to

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offset export bounties. It is true that none of these weapons can be used legally except under conditions specified in statutes. Furthermore, these conditions concern the direct effect of specified policies on the part of foreigners, or of their governments, on American commerce and industry; they have nothing whatsoever to do with foreign disregard for international law, nor with military aggression. Ordinarily, these distinctions do not need emphasis, but under the influence of "crisis" hysteria, they may be forgotten or disregarded. Even highly-placed officials speak of fighting fire with fire. This is dangerous talk. A democracy, if it is to remain a democracy, cannot afford to imitate totalitarian methods. We cannot afford, in order to gain a tactical advantage in foreign policy, to encourage administrators to disregard not only the letter but even the spirit of the law.

The danger is real. Many thoughtful observers believe that economic sanctions are only a prelude to war. If this is true, then it is of the utmost importance that whatever new controls are imposed on our foreign trade for political purposes — that is, as measures of foreign policy *per se* — shall be imposed by Congress, not by administrative action.

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# GERMANY'S COLONIAL CLAIMS: A SOUTH AFRICAN VIEW

*By Jan H. Hofmeyr*

GERMANY'S colonial aspirations are confined largely to Africa: that is the classic field for colonial exploitation and there lie the most important of the former German colonies. The problems created by those aspirations are of special interest to the Union of South Africa, the only place on the African continent where European civilization is firmly established on a relatively large scale. What happens in the former German colonies — South West Africa, Tanganyika, the Cameroons and Togoland — is therefore a matter of concern to South Africans.

I

Of particular interest to the Union is the Territory of South West Africa, which borders it on the northwest and for which it holds a Class C Mandate. This area is generally regarded as a desolate region devoid of economic value. Its seaboard is almost harborless, its coast lands are a sandy waste, while the border zone between it and the Union for the most part is barren and unattractive. Yet the territory has considerable mineral resources, its grassland interior is suitable for stock-raising, and its climatic conditions are such as to permit Europeans to rear healthy families. The German protectorate was proclaimed in 1884; by 1914 the German population had grown to 15,000. During the World War and the years which immediately followed it, the German population was reduced by more than 40 percent. But this loss to the white element was more than made good by immigration from the Union. Today the European population of the Territory is around 31,000, of which about thirty percent is German. The non-European population — Bantu, Hottentot and Bastard — numbers over 330,000.

During the early postwar years both the German Government at Berlin and the German colonists in South West Africa seemed to have accepted their new status under South Africa's Mandate and to have reconciled themselves to eventual incorporation into the Union. In 1923 the South African Government made an agreement with Germany (usually referred to as the London

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Agreement) under the terms of which German nationals in South West Africa were automatically to become Union subjects unless they contracted out before a fixed date. The German Government even undertook to urge them to accept this new status, and 90 percent of them did so. For its part the Union Government pledged itself to make several concessions in the administration of the Territory: it promised, among other things, to permit the use of the German language for certain specified official purposes and as a medium of instruction in government schools. In the preamble of this agreement the German Government specifically recognized that "the future of South West Africa is now bound up with the Union of South Africa."

The negotiation of this accord seemed to foreshadow the peaceful development of the Territory, and it was in this spirit that in 1925 the Union Parliament passed the South West Africa Constitution Act, creating a Legislative Assembly, an Executive Committee and an Advisory Council. This meant in effect that the Union took the citizens of the Territory into partnership with itself in respect to a considerable portion of its legislative and administrative functions under the Mandate. But unhappily, the actual working of this Constitution led to friction between the Germans on the one hand and what had come to be called the Union section of the population on the other; and grievances began to arise which were to serve as the starting point for subsequent Nazi agitation. One such grievance was that German had not been made an official language along with English and Afrikaans, even though its use was recognized for most purposes. Another was that the administration's land settlement policy, which primarily benefited settlers from the Union, was calculated to swamp the German element. A third complaint was that the Union's Nationality Law, passed in 1926 and increasing the period required for naturalization from two years to five (a provision aimed at bringing the law into line with the legislation on British nationality in the rest of the Empire), weakened the relative position of the German element in the electorate. The settler from the Union, since he was already a British subject, qualified for the franchise without any delay, whereas the newcomer from Germany had to wait for five years.

The Germans have made much of this particular grievance. They have, for instance, demanded the institution of a Mandate citizenship, for which settlers both from the Union and from

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Germany would have to qualify in the same way. This proposal has been resisted on the ground that the Union, as the Mandatory Power, can share its responsibilities with citizens of the Territory only if the latter are under the same obligations of allegiance and possess the same responsibilities as its own citizens in the Union itself. Another by-product of this grievance has been a demand that Germans automatically naturalized under the London Agreement shall be recognized as having dual nationality — that in other words they shall remain German nationals, with all the privileges and obligations which that implies, in addition to possessing Union nationality. Among Germans in the Territory this claim has had a large part in creating the attitude that they are still members of the greater German nation.

For some years these grievances — and others also — were put forward along the more or less orthodox lines of political controversy. Indeed, at one time a settlement of the outstanding issues in dispute was very nearly reached. Then in 1933, Nazism came to South West Africa, brought by new arrivals from Germany. A Nazi organization was established. The Hitler Jugend also soon made its appearance. Before long the agitation was being pressed so vigorously that a Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance was passed empowering the Administration to deal with persons or organizations whose activities were calculated to disturb the peace of the community. In pursuance of this Ordinance the offices of the Nazi organization and of the Hitler Jugend were raided, and some very important papers were seized. Shortly afterwards, the Union Government appointed a Judicial Commission to investigate the whole situation in South West Africa.

This Commission unanimously found that the existing form of government was a failure and should be abolished; it also found that there was no legal obstacle to governing the Territory as a fifth Province of the Union, subject to the Mandate, though it was in complete disagreement as to what form of government should be instituted. Public interest in the report was mainly concentrated on its disclosures — based largely on the confiscated documents — concerning the extent and the dangerous nature of Nazi activities in the Territory. The Commission found that a far-reaching system of Nazi control, directed from Germany, had been introduced and was being applied in such a manner that freedom of speech, of political association and even

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of personal conduct, had ceased to exist for a large number of naturalized Germans. To quote the Commission's own words: "Union subjects were 'verpflichtet' to the head of a foreign state. Union subjects who exercised the right to follow a line of conduct approved by Germany in the London Agreement were called traitors and treated as traitors. Union subjects were threatened with reprisals if they exerted their right of free speech in a way which was considered detrimental to the policy followed in the territory at the dictation of the *Auslandsabteilung*. The [German] Consul-General [in the Union] and a party leader from Germany who came in ostensibly to further German cultural objects, really welded the German population, naturalized as well as others, into a political machine to maintain a favorable position for the return of the Territory to Germany." To this may be added a statement from another section of the report: "It is clear from the correspondence placed before us that the Nazification of German-speaking school children of Union nationality in South West Africa was directed from Germany."

As a matter of fact, even before the Commission got around to issuing its report, the Nazi movement in South West Africa had been formally suppressed. However, no changes were made in the Territory's constitution or in its system of administration, and since the Nazi organization, though suppressed, had in reality merely been driven underground, the situation did not improve. The Nazi organization has in effect been reconstituted as the "Association of German Professional Groups," while the Hitler Jugend has to all intents and purposes become the "Pathfinders." The change has been little more than external. Consequently the great bulk of the Germans of the Territory, whether naturalized or not, are today closely banded together. The German Consul at Windhoek keeps in such close touch with them that it is safe to say that the private lives of the 10,000 Germans in South West Africa are largely subject to control from his office. One of the most effective among the methods he employs to "*gleichschalten*" these Germans is to inculcate the fear that the penalty for any recalcitrance on their part may fall on their relatives or their property in Germany. The atmosphere in South West Africa has become worse in proportion as Germany has grown more aggressive in Europe. After Munich nearly every German in the Territory went about proclaiming that: "South West will return to Germany," "The Fuehrer will see to it that we

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become part of the Greater Germany," "The future of South West will be settled not here, nor in the Union, but in Europe." Radio propaganda and newspaper comment from Germany have played their part in stimulating these sentiments, while every one of Hitler's successes has led to an access of German arrogance in the Territory. And all the time young Germans are coming back from the Fatherland, indoctrinated with Nazi ideas and methods, and trained in the arts of war.

Of course all this has meant political strain and tension; nor has it been without effect in the economic sphere. The majority of the settlers from the Union have a sense of insecurity, while the influx of Union capital has largely ceased. The figures for recent land transfers show that the German section has become disproportionately active in the acquisition of property. The establishment, a few months ago, of a "South West Africa League" to carry an educational and propaganda work represented an attempt to bolster the morale of the Union element.

Not all the Germans in the Territory are happy at the trend of events. There exists an anti-Nazi organization, though it has perforce to conduct its activities in secret. It is understood to be organized in cells and to have a Fuehrer of its own. However, it is not, and of course cannot be expected to become, a powerful body.

The non-European peoples of the Territory, who constitute the vast majority of its inhabitants, are likewise apprehensive. Their recollections of German rule are not pleasant. During the German régime before the World War several native rebellions took place, and in some cases they were ruthlessly suppressed. Many millions of marks were spent on tribal "pacification" — and pacification, especially in the case of the Hereros, often meant the merciless killing of defenseless natives and the confiscation of their lands and cattle. Under the Mandate, the Union Government has had special obligations towards the native peoples of the Territory. It has substantially increased the amount of land set aside for them; it has done a good deal for their economic development; it has largely changed the spirit of the administration — so much so that alleged pampering of the natives is now one of the grievances of the Germans. There is some evidence that Nazi agents have sought to stimulate native unrest in the Territory. If so, they have had little success, for the leaders of all the chief native communities have informed the Union

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Government that they do not want to be handed back to Germany.

Of what economic value would the restoration of South West Africa be to Germany? The facts can be stated very briefly. The total of the Territory's import and export trade in 1937 was £6,000,000. Of this about £2,000,000 represents trade with Germany. The Germans therefore stand to gain only £4,000,000. Even if they succeeded in doubling this, as they claim they could within ten years (though this would presumably necessitate the seizure of native lands and the institution of a system of native forced labor), it would still mean an increase of only one percent in the present volume of Germany's foreign trade. The benefit would, moreover, be almost entirely confined to diamonds and karakul pelts (for astrakhan coats). South West Africa contains no economic resources of special value to Germany — indeed, she desires its return for motives, not of economics, but of prestige and of strategy.

II

What about Nazi activities in the rest of Germany's former colonies? In general the same can be said about them as about South West Africa, with local variations. Let us first take Tanganyika Territory, once known as German East Africa and now under British Mandate. As regards its suitability for European settlement, Tanganyika occupies an intermediate position between South West Africa on the one hand and the Cameroons and Togoland on the other. Parts of Tanganyika are fit for European settlement, but most of the Territory is regarded as native country. It has, in fact, a European population of only 9,000, against a total of 5,000,000 native inhabitants and an Indian community numbering 30,000.

To a large extent the course of events in Tanganyika has paralleled that in South West Africa. After the World War only a few Germans remained there. When the Ordinance discriminating against them was repealed in 1925, they began gradually to return and to recover some of their old plantations and to acquire new ones. In 1929 Germans owned only 44 square miles of land in the Territory. But today, out of about 3,200 square miles that have been alienated from the natives, 700 are in German hands while no more than 1,300 are under British ownership. Moreover, the German population, which numbered

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3,132 in August 1938, represents the largest European group in the Territory, if no account is taken of the British officials temporarily stationed there. The Germans have been active chiefly in the northern part of the Territory, where Nazi party-cells have been established and the *Fuehrerprinzip* effectively applied. Busts of Hitler, swastikas and maps of "Deutsch Ost-Afrika" have been displayed in the German schools. The Nazi propaganda which is being disseminated among natives on the German-owned estates assumes that Tanganyika will become German again. All these activities are clearly directed from Germany. On the whole, the Nazi campaign has been much less intensive in Tanganyika than in South West Africa, though there has been a marked increase in its aggressiveness since Munich.

The possibility that Tanganyika will be given back to Germany has always seemed more likely than the return of South West Africa. British statements of policy have lent color to this belief. The formation of the "Tanganyika League" to combat such a possibility preceded that of the "South West Africa League," and it has been much the more active body of the two. It is interesting to note that the local Indian community is co-operating heartily with this League.

Of the Cameroons and Togoland little need be said. They are both black men's countries in which whites can live for only short periods — as administrators, missionaries, commercial men or plantation managers. Each of these two colonies is divided into British and French Mandates, the larger share in both cases going to France. The British and French have followed different policies *vis-à-vis* the Germans in their mandated areas. The French have squeezed practically all the Germans out; whereas the British have allowed most of the great plantations to remain in German hands and under German management. Even so, the number of Germans in these territories does not exceed a few hundred and the opportunities for such Nazi activities as have been taking place in Tanganyika and South West Africa are therefore very limited. In her campaign for the restoration of the Cameroons and Togoland Germany can, therefore, look for little aid from within those territories.

III

There seems to be a widespread impression in Europe and America that South Africa is not unsympathetic towards Ger-

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many's colonial aspirations. Is this impression well-founded? First of all, we must distinguish between South West Africa and the other former German colonies. South Africa is the mandatory for South West Africa: it therefore has a very direct interest in its future and a right to be heard in any matter concerning its disposal. Now the Union has asserted in unequivocal terms that it will resist with all its power the return of South West Africa to Germany. South Africa is not, however, the mandatory for the other territories; there it is Britain, France and Belgium that must speak.

The average South African has only recently commenced to take an interest in the former German colonies other than South West Africa. Among these he has become most concerned over Tanganyika. He remembers that it was South African troops under General Smuts who played the leading rôle in the conquest of that colony during the World War; and he knows that a considerable proportion of the white settlers there came from the Union. He is also quite aware that, if Tanganyika were again to become German East Africa, Britain's imperial air communications along the Cape-to-Cairo route would be cut. But most of all he has been aroused by the realization that, thanks to the annihilation of distance by the modern conquest of the air, Tanganyika is for him just around the corner. The southern border of Tanganyika is only a thousand air-miles from the Transvaal, where lies the golden Witwatersrand. The heart of South Africa would thus be within bombing distance of German air bases.

There can be little doubt that the Government of the Union and most of its citizens are very anxious that Tanganyika should not be returned to Germany. There are some South Africans, however, who think that Germany cannot be kept out of Africa indefinitely and who therefore go only so far as to say that Tanganyika should not be retroceded to her as long as she is possessed of the spirit and aspirations which at present characterize her. But there is also the Nationalist Opposition which has not expressed itself against such a retrocession even under present circumstances. This party is composed almost exclusively of those Afrikaans-speaking people who have been unable to accept General Hertzog's policy of coöperation with the English-speaking section.

In the fate of the Cameroons and Togoland, South Africa has

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so far almost completely disinterested itself. These mandated areas are remote from the Union and their return to Germany would seem to represent no serious strategic danger. Indeed, some South Africans, including the Minister of Defense, Mr. O. Pirow, support the suggestion that Germany's colonial aspirations in Africa might be satisfied not merely by granting her the Cameroons and Togoland but by carving an extensive German colonial empire out of the present possessions of Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal in West Africa. In support of this project it has been argued that a settlement along these lines would secure the position of the Union in South West Africa and of Great Britain in Tanganyika.

Yet despite this speciously attractive argument, the proposal is by no means free from danger for South Africa. Certain questions at once suggest themselves. Would even such a large-scale empire satisfy Germany in her present mood for more than a short time? There is the question of prestige, which makes her desire the return of *all* her old colonies. There is also the question of economics, which would arise when Germany discovered that this West African colony was not adequate to realize all the aspirations of the Nazi colonial theorists. South Africans could well ask themselves whether the Germans might not use their new possession as a base for expansion southward to South West Africa and eastward to Tanganyika? And what of the threat to the sea route between South Africa and Great Britain? The spectre raised by these possibilities will explain why a substantial majority of the people in the Union would probably oppose any such proposal.

IV

In regard to the Union's specific attitude towards South West Africa, two of its Ministers, General Smuts and Mr. Pirow, have declared emphatically that South Africa will fight rather than surrender its Mandated Territory. The Prime Minister, General Hertzog, has asserted that the Union is as little likely to run away from South West Africa as it is to surrender any part of South Africa itself. And his party, which includes many who, like General Hertzog himself, opposed the invasion of South West Africa by Union troops in 1914, has enthusiastically acclaimed this declaration. What are the factors that have led to the adoption of this firm line?

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Let us not forget that South West Africa was conquered solely by Union troops during the World War, and that its frontiers march with those of the Union. As has been stated above, from its ports the sea route between Britain and the Cape could be dominated both by aircraft and by submarines. The urban centers of the Union, including the Witwatersrand, are within easy flying range from South West Africa. If the Union had an aggressive Germany as a neighbor, then, as long as there was a chance that the British might be defeated in a war with the Germans, it would have to spend so much on defense that the country's financial resources would be strained to the utmost. But apart from this, a German South West Africa would be a base, even in peace, for the dissemination of doctrines which the Union regards as subversive. Nazi propaganda has, in fact, already invaded the Union. South Africa is by no means an unfruitful field for the preaching of anti-Semitism since the Jewish proportion in the total white population is one of the largest in the world. Moreover, it is not forgotten that when war broke out in 1914, rebellious elements in the Union received aid from the Germans in South West Africa. Many fear that history may repeat itself. And finally, would it not be an act of treachery to hand the 20,000 South Africans in the Territory over to the mercies of their present German opponents?

These reasons are in themselves sufficient to account for the strength of the Union's determination to resist the retrocession of South West Africa. By way of confirming that attitude, the Government recently decided to make a special defense appropriation of £6,000,000 over and above the normal annual expenditure of about £2,000,000. This has had the effect of strengthening the bonds between Pretoria and London, for South Africa knows that it cannot retain South West Africa without British support.

Much light was thrown on the Government's position by the action it recently took to prevent a possible *putsch* in South West Africa. The authorities had received information indicating that such a move was being planned for Hitler's birthday, or thereabouts. There seems to have been a genuine fear that the Nazis would use this *putsch*, and its presumable suppression, in the same way that they had used a similar uprising in Austria — to assert that law and order were no longer being maintained and that strong action by Germany was therefore justified. The Government acted promptly. It dispatched a strong reinforcement of

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police to Windhoek, though under the Police Act it had no power to send men outside the borders of the Union, and it came to Parliament for an indemnity. The great bulk of the Union's population and of its parliamentary representatives rallied to the Government at once. The leaders of the Dominion Party and of the Labor Party opposition groups pledged their full support. Only the main Opposition, consisting of the Nationalist Party, headed by Dr. Malan and constituting less than one-fifth of the House, criticized the Government's action.

The line of criticism taken by the Opposition in this instance was not without significance. Officially the Nationalist Party has always been against the retrocession of South West Africa. Yet it has also enthusiastically advocated a policy of neutrality, and in so doing has undoubtedly stimulated the feeling, which is widespread among the older section of the population, against Union participation in war alongside Britain. In this instance, therefore, the party was pulled two ways. But in the end its desire for South African neutrality prevailed. The available evidence concerning the dispatch of the police justified the inference that the information on which the Government had acted came from London. It was easy to represent this as an instruction from Downing Street, and to argue that South Africa was simply being used as a pawn in the British imperialist game. This was done with fervor, but not, it would seem, without heart searchings in the case of some members of the party.

No less significant, however, was the reaction of the Prime Minister, General Hertzog. He has, of course, always maintained the constitutional doctrine that South Africa is not necessarily at war if Great Britain or any other part of the British Commonwealth is at war. Moreover, apart from emphasizing that Great Britain is the Union's best friend, he has made no statement committing South Africa in advance to participate in such a war. But in this present instance he made it absolutely clear that if the question of South West Africa's future were in any way involved, there would be no delay whatever about South Africa's entry into the struggle. If the Germans in South West Africa had counted on any sort of sympathy from former leaders of the old Boer Republics like Generals Hertzog and Smuts, they must by now have been completely disillusioned.

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# REHABILITATION IN THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

*By R. G. W.*

MEASURED in terms of area or of population the Virgin Islands, acquired by the United States in 1917, do not seem very important. The fifty-odd islands and islets of this diminutive American possession cover in all no more than 140 square miles, and the three which are sufficiently large to be inhabited by settled communities — St. Thomas, St. John and St. Croix — have a combined population of only 25,500.

There are two reasons why the Virgin Islands are interesting and important to a far greater degree than is suggested by these statistics. First, they are of strategic value to the United States. In fact, the United States bought the islands during the World War primarily for military motives. We did not want them to fall into German hands, and as long as Germany was undefeated there was the possibility that she might purchase the Danish West Indies or, by annexing Denmark, lay claim to them by right of succession. Of course, it is difficult to imagine that the United States would have permitted Germany to seize the Virgin Islands even had she overrun Denmark. Nevertheless, to make assurance doubly sure, the American Government bought them for $25,000,000 — more than it had paid for any other territorial acquisition.

It is often said that the possession of the spacious, landlocked harbor of St. Thomas is necessary for the defense of the Panama Canal. This would appear to be true in a negative rather than a positive sense. It is not so much that the United States requires St. Thomas for its own naval purposes as that it does not want a hostile Power ensconced at a place where it could threaten American naval supremacy in the Caribbean, our *mare nostrum*. The expression "hostile Power" is appropriate because we must not forget that three presumably friendly Powers — Britain, France and The Netherlands — already possess West Indian harbors that are just as well situated for forays against the Canal as St. Thomas. The United States Navy could therefore get along without St. Thomas. Command over the northern entrances to the Caribbean could easily be maintained from the base at Guantánamo Bay and from San Juan harbor in Puerto Rico. Should the Navy need further *points d'appui*, there is always the fine harbor at Culebra Island, within sight of St. Thomas but administered as a part of Puerto Rico, or Samaná Bay, an excellent site that might be leased from the Dominican Republic. What the American Navy really requires to insure its complete control over the Caribbean is a base at the southern end of the Lesser Antilles in the vicinity of Trinidad. Only thus can it cover all the approaches to that sea.

The American naval station, established at St. Thomas after its purchase from Denmark, was abandoned in 1931 when the administration of the colony passed from the Navy to the Department of the Interior. Since then the Marine Corps air base has been the only important military establishment on the islands. As if to underline the fact that St. Thomas is not an indispensable element in American defense plans, the Government recently decided to

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expend large sums on San Juan harbor, one hundred miles west of St. Thomas, in order to make it the center of American naval activities in those waters.

The other reason for the current interest in the Virgin Islands is the significant experiment in economic rehabilitation which is now under way there. Throughout the West Indies the economic and social conditions of the masses are becoming progressively worse. In some of the islands, where the twin plagues of decreasing production and increasing population have reached alarming proportions, the situation is indeed tragic — hopeless, some observers say. This is certainly true of Puerto Rico and several of the Lesser Antilles. Last year the British Government became sufficiently alarmed at conditions to send out a Royal Commission to investigate conditions in the British colonies and propose remedial measures.




The Virgin Islands are comparable to many of the other Lesser Antilles in size, in their largely Negro population (approximately 90 percent of the total), in climate and products, and in economic and social problems. In a very real sense, the attempt now being made by the United States to rehabilitate the Virgin Islands is of much more than local importance and is being followed with wide interest. The British Royal Commission, for instance, visited St. Thomas and St. Croix, where they were quite favorably impressed with the American rehabilitation projects.

Originally the Virgin Islands depended almost entirely on agricultural products, largely sugar and cotton. Sugar production reached its peak in 1812; thereafter it declined, especially in St. Thomas and St. John where it had practically disappeared by the middle of the last century. On St. Croix cotton cultivation reached its highest point in 1797; today it is non-existent, having been wiped out by the pink boll worm. In St. Thomas the decline of agriculture

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was compensated by the rise of commerce. Its harbor became the busiest entrepôt of the West Indies, a position which it began to lose only when the sailing vessel gave way to the steamship. The World War and the American purchase, by depriving St. Thomas of its long-enjoyed neutral and free port status, only hastened the decay, which the withdrawal of the naval station in 1931 all but completed. This evolution is reflected in the population statistics for St. Thomas. In 1797 the island had 4,734 inhabitants; in 1835, 14,022; in 1901, 11,012; in 1930, 9,834. Some ninety percent of the inhabitants live in the city of Charlotte Amalie, where they or their forebears were attracted by the thriving activities of the port in its heyday. Though that day is now long past, most of the unemployed have refused to return to the land. A large part have been reduced to living on public charity — indeed, at the height of the depression one half of the population was affected by unemployment.

When the first civil Governor, Professor Paul M. Pearson of Swarthmore College, arrived in 1931 he found the population in despair and on the verge of starvation. Obviously a thoroughgoing program of rehabilitation was called for. Under his direction comprehensive plans for putting the islands back on their feet economically were drawn up and set in motion. When the New Deal took power early in 1933, this process was speeded up by increased government expenditures on both temporary relief and long-range rehabilitation. These activities were carried on by such agencies as the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation, the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Federal Housing Commission, the Subsistence Homesteads Corporation, etc.

Each of the three islands has its own peculiar geographic, economic and social characteristics, and in each the process of rehabilitation has followed independent lines. In St. Thomas the terrain is so rugged that only a small part of the population stranded by the decline of commerce can be "homesteaded" on the land, either to cultivate it or to raise cattle. The rest of the unemployed must find some other occupation in Charlotte Amalie or else emigrate — an outlet that can no longer absorb the numbers it once did. Among the activities encouraged by the Government are the tourist trade (there are those who think St. Thomas can become an American Bermuda), various coöperative handicraft industries and low-cost housing. There are also several privately-owned plants making rum, bay rum, bitters, etc. Progress is slow and setbacks discouragingly frequent; yet the present Governor, Lawrence W. Cramer, has expressed the hope that eventually the island's dependence on shipping and on federal relief can be broken.

St. John, though nearly as large as St. Thomas, has only 750 inhabitants, of whom less than a dozen are whites. A century ago, before slavery had been abolished, its population was 2,500 and its landscape was dotted with sugar estates. The latter are now in ruins and the inhabitants have returned to the more or less self-sufficient state of primitive peasantry that prevails in the nearby British Virgin Islands. About the only commercial products of St. John are bay leaves (for bay oil and bay rum) and charcoal (for consumption in St. Thomas).

It is on St. Croix that we encounter in their most acute form the serious problems characteristic of the West Indies in general. Efforts to diversify the

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agriculture of St. Croix have failed. Cotton, once an important item of export, is grown no more. Until recently cattle were raised for sale in Puerto Rico, but this market has been cut, at least temporarily, by a tick quarantine imposed by the Puerto Rican authorities. In recent years attempts have been made to cultivate tomatoes, limes, sisal and onions, only to be abandoned as unprofitable. St. Croix has thus had to fall back on sugar and its by-products.

Immediately after the World War the sugar industry everywhere enjoyed a brief moment of fabulous prosperity — the "Dance of the Millions" it was called in Cuba. In St. Croix the principal beneficiary of this boom was the West Indian Sugar Factory, Ltd., a Danish company owning over one fourth of all the land as well as the largest sugar mill. Then in 1920 the bubble burst, and raw sugar prices on the New York market dropped in half a year from 20½ cents to 4 cents. During the following decade the St. Croix sugar industry failed to recover from this staggering blow. Other setbacks, such as the American prohibition legislation (which ruined the rum industry), the hurricanes of 1924 and 1928, and the general increase in costs of freight, labor and local government, only accentuated the industry's difficulties. The West Indian Sugar Factory, which in 1920 had made a profit of over $1,000,000, suffered during the decade 1921–30 a total net loss of $1,204,190 — a sum equal to more than one-third of its gross sales. In 1930 it went bankrupt and ceased operations. Disaster stared St. Croix in the face, and only the timely intervention of the American Red Cross saved many from starvation.

The American Government sought to persuade private capital to buy up the bankrupt sugar lands and mills, but without success. Consequently, the machinery in the mills fell into disrepair; the land grew up to brush or was given over to cattle grazing,[1] an occupation which employs few people; while the municipal treasury required increasingly large financial subsidies from Congress.[2]

Having failed to interest private capital, the Government itself was obliged to assume the task of restoring the land to production. Therefore, in April 1934, the Colonial Council of St. Thomas and St. John chartered a corporation known as the Virgin Islands Company. This concern was financed by the National Industrial Recovery Administration and its function was to revive trade and industry in the islands. It is interesting to note that the charter had to be obtained from the Council of St. Thomas and St. John because that of St. Croix, the island that stood to profit most from the operations of the Company, refused to grant it. This refusal reflected the deep social cleavages that have persisted there since the days of slavery. A few facts will illustrate this situation. In 1930 a score of men owned 80 percent of the entire island, while 65 percent of all those who died were buried in paupers' graves. In 1933 only 43 out of the 14,000 inhabitants paid an income tax. At that time the property qualification for voters was an annual income of $60 or the ownership of property valued at $300 (universal adult suffrage was not introduced until 1938). No more than 400 men were eligible to vote; and in the Council elected by them policy was naturally dictated by the prejudices of the private growers, the mill operators and the small commercial class. This gentry opposed the

[1] Eighty percent of the island's total area was so used in 1935.

[2] The Virgin Islands are divided into two municipalities, one for St. Thomas and St. John, one for St. Croix.

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Government's going into business on the grounds that it was "socialistic" even though they had no reasonable alternative to propose.

The Virgin Islands Company was conceived, according to Governor Pearson, as "a partnership program by which the Government of the United States and the people of the Virgin Islands coöperate in a long-range social, economic, and industrial program, the profits being available in the islands for educational and social purposes." The Company is not a relief project in the ordinary sense of the term for it is supposed to make whatever legitimate profits it can, those profits to be used in the islands for general social amelioration.

When the Virgin Islands Company was created, the economic life of St. Croix had been at a virtual standstill for four years. In order to get the wheels of production into motion again the Company bought up a considerable amount of idle land and two dilapidated sugar mills, one of them with a rum distillery. By June 30, 1938, the Company had spent $2,463,439.41 in reclaiming 5,000 acres of land, repairing the plants and getting operations started. Its total income during the same period was $522,730.54 — a good showing when we consider that its production is only now getting under way.

The Company engages in what it describes as a "general business." It manufactures raw sugar, some grown on its own land and some bought from private growers and homesteaders; it sells this sugar to refineries in the United States; it manufactures high-grade "Government House" rum; it prepares a special distillate used by the Angostura-Wuppermann Corporation in St. Thomas for making bitters; it raises poultry and eggs for the local market; it sells cattle and milk; it crushes rock for sale to the Government; it rents tractors and other equipment to the private growers of St. Croix; etc. Sugar accounts for 57 percent of the Company's business, and rum and the special distillate for 34 percent.

According to the official estimates for the 1939 crop only about 39 percent of the island's cane was produced on the Company's land; 22 percent was raised by 356 different growers on Government homestead land (about which more will be said shortly), 9 percent on the land of a large private mill, 7 percent by 9 estates, and 23 percent by some 572 miscellaneous small growers. Over 60 percent of the total crop was thus produced under the Government's rehabilitation program. Further, the Company ground 63 percent of all the island's cane. At the time of writing, one third of the employable persons on St. Croix depended on the Company for their livelihood.

The Virgin Islands Company thus occupies a predominant but hardly a monopolistic position in the island's principal industry. However, it is the only producer able to continue operations under adverse conditions or to experiment with new industries. On it falls, in a very real sense, the responsibility for keeping St. Croix going economically, as was the case this last year when the sugar crop was seriously blighted by drought. St. Croix is marginal sugar land, for the rainfall is not always adequate to insure a normal crop, and it is up to the Company to attenuate the spread between the bad and the good years.

The homestead program, which was started in 1932 and is administered independently of the Company, is another promising phase of rehabilitation. Several of the old estates on which it had become impossible to make a profit were bought up with Federal funds, subdivided into homestead plots

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and sold to capable agricultural workers on easy terms. A municipally-owned estate has also been cut up and sold in small parcels. Altogether these subdivisions amount to 374 homestead allotments averaging 6½ acres each. Up until 1938, when the drought greatly reduced the crop, a high proportion of the homesteaders made their interest and amortization payments in addition to caring for their current living expenses. The homesteaders are not as scientific producers as the estates or the companies. But that is really a secondary consideration, since the primary object of the program is to make as many people as possible self-supporting rather than to expand production, which is limited by the Sugar Act of 1937 to 9,200 tons a year. The homesteaders are provided with new and proper homes, which contrast strikingly with the wretched hovels they lived in previously. The Virgin Islands Company is likewise supplying some of its laborers with improved housing, gardens and community centers. In addition, two low-cost housing projects for urban-dwellers have been erected by the P. W. A. Housing Division.

One more Government-sponsored agency deserves mention — the Agricultural Experiment Station. Its object is to improve the techniques and breeds in the sugar and cattle industries, and to develop small, subsidiary agricultural occupations. It tries to popularize the use of better methods among the homesteaders and to encourage the cultivation of food crops — the Virgin Islanders produce no more than half the food they consume. The educational and research work of the Station is an indispensable part of rehabilitation.

The Government has done much towards putting St. Croix on a self-sustaining basis. But it must do more if it is to clinch the victory already within its grasp. At present raw sugar leaving St. Croix pays an export tax of $6 a ton, which puts local producers at a disadvantage. Congress might well repeal this duty and in its place provide that the Federal internal revenue taxes now collected on St. Croix rum be turned over to the local treasury, as they are in Puerto Rico. The sums returned to the island in this way would balance its municipal budget, thus obviating the necessity for any more deficit appropriations from Washington. Further, the Virgin Islands, alone among all the sugar producers under the American flag, are at present denied benefit payments from the sugar processing tax. Congress should remove this discrimination against the St. Croix sugar industry. The Government has done so much to revive the Virgin Islands that it would be unfortunate if its whole program were to be jeopardized by a failure to effect these simple changes in the law.

In the Virgin Islands the United States has spent, for relief and for reconstruction, many times more per capita than has been spent by any European Power on its West Indian colonies. The Virgin Islanders are American citizens; we do not regard them as subject peoples whom it is our duty merely to keep alive. We seek to raise their material standard of living, to improve their sanitary and health conditions, to open the door of opportunity to all of them by means of universal education. Yet this is not done purely in the name of sweet charity. Our ultimate object is to prepare these hitherto underprivileged people to support themselves by their own industry. Only in this way can the islands remove the stigma placed upon them by President Hoover when he described them as "an effective poorhouse."

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# RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

*By Robert Gale Woolbert*

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## *General: Political, Military and Legal*

EUROPE ON THE EVE. By FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN. New York: Knopf, 1939, 586 p. $3.50.

This book, by the Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government in Williams College, covers more ground than its title might indicate, for its purpose is to trace the decline of Western civilization as reflected in the rapid disintegration of the ideal of collective security and in the concomitant rise of the aggressor — "gangster" — states during the last six years. Professor Schuman sees no hope for the "democratic" states, which have become flabby both morally and physically. He finds that they have been bemused into impotence by their devotion to Property and Sovereignty (by which he means Nationalism). The future, he believes, belongs either to the Berlin-Tokyo-Rome Triangle or to Moscow; and he is not reassuring about the likelihood that America can escape Europe's fate. Most readers will doubtless think Professor Schuman too pessimistic, though they may find his "realism" refreshing in this day when so many of the best minds in the democratic countries have surrendered to intellectual "appeasement." In any event, this is one of the most important, if baffling, books of the year. In it are combined brilliant scholarship and partisan diatribe, acute analysis and Spenglerian cosmology.

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLITICS. EDITED BY FRANCIS JAMES BROWN, CHARLES HODGES AND JOSEPH SLABEY ROUCEK. New York: Wiley, 1939, 718 p. $5.00.

Some 35 American writers have contributed chapters to this symposium intended to serve as an introduction to international problems. There are numerous "fact pictures" serving to illustrate the subject matter and each chapter has a bibliography.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WORLD SINCE 1918. By J. HAMPDEN JACKSON. Boston: Little, Brown, 1939, 480 p. $3.00.

The world's postwar history readably chronicled by countries.

A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1920–1938. By G. M. GATHORNE-HARDY. New York: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939, 487 p. $3.50.

A standard outline brought up to date.

CONSCRIPT EUROPE. By RANDOLPH LEIGH. New York: Putnam, 1938, 308 p. $3.00.

One after the other Mr. Leigh finds the European countries to be dreadful places with which America would do well to have as little truck as possible.

OUR BATTLE. By HENDRIK WILLEM VAN LOON. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1938, 140 p. $1.00.

A call for democracy to gird up its loins against the Fascist peril.

DAYS OF OUR YEARS. By PIERRE VAN PAASSEN. New York: Hillman-Curl, 1939, 520 p. $3.50.

The publishers frankly advertise some of the scenes in this as "incredible."

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WORLD COMMUNISM. By F. Borkenau. New York: Norton, 1939, 442 p. $3.75.

Dr. Borkenau, formerly a member of the German Communist Party, was until 1929 *rapporteur* on the international labor movement for the Comintern. Now living in England, he has forsworn Marxism. This work on the history of the Communist International, though not always objective, is nevertheless an invaluable mine of information, much of it hitherto inaccessible, about the activities of that body in all parts of the world. In effect, the book is an account of how and why the Comintern has failed.

OUT OF REVOLUTION: AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WESTERN MAN. By Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. New York: Morrow, 1938, 795 p. $6.00.

A not altogether successful attempt to create a new philosophy of history, by a German émigré, now professor of social philosophy at Dartmouth College.

THE SCIENCE OF WORLD REVOLUTION. By Arnold Lunn. New York: Sheed, 1938, 355 p. $3.00.

The only revolution which Mr. Lunn seems to fear is that from the Left, an aberration no doubt explained by his religious preoccupations.

APOSTLES OF REVOLUTION. By Max Nomad. Boston: Little, Brown, 1939, 467 p. $3.50.

Biographical sketches of seven revolutionists, including Nestor Makhno, the Ukrainian leader who fought both Bolsheviks and Whites after the World War, and Stalin, whom Mr. Nomad thoroughly dislikes.

ISLAM. By Henri Massé. New York: Putnam, 1938, 270 p. $2.50.

A comprehensive, scholarly history of the evolution of Mohammedanism by a professor of Arabic and Persian literature at the University of Algiers.

UNSOLVED MYSTERIES OF THE ARCTIC. By Vilhjalmur Stefansson. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 381 p. $3.50.

A famous explorer tries his hand at unravelling some of the great question marks in the history of the Arctic, including the fate of the Levanevsky aërial expedition.

ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY. By Samuel Van Valkenburg. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939, 401 p. $3.50.

As an academic discipline, political geography is still in its experimental stage. This text represents a diligent effort by an American scholar, professor of geography at Clark University, to organize the subject matter of the field along rational lines.

LES TECHNIQUES AU SERVICE DE LA PENSÉE. By Étienne de Nalèche and Others. Paris: Alcan, 1938, 264 p. Fr. 18.

Lectures on the cultural and political rôle of the press, the cinema and the radio.

IL GOVERNO COLONIALE, ORGANAMENTO E AZIONE: CONCETTI GENERALI. By Santi Nava. Florence: Casa Editrice Poligrafica Universitaria, 1938, 255 p. L. 38.

A somewhat theoretical treatise not confined to Italian colonies, by a recognized authority on colonial jurisprudence.

RECENT EXPERIMENTS IN CONSTITUTION MAKING. By B. M. Sharma. Lucknow: Upper India Publishing House, 1938, 367 p.

A discussion of constitutional experiments in Ireland, Germany, Russia and Italy.

WAR AND THE CHRISTIAN. By Charles E. Raven. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 186 p. $1.75.

The pacifist position defended by the Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge.

GAS IN THE NEXT WAR. By Major-General Sir Henry F. Thuillier. London: Bles, 1939, 180 p. 5/.

Another volume in the Liddell Hart series, in which the author deflates some of the current ideas about the effectiveness of poison gas.

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WORLD COURT REPORTS. VOLUME III, 1932–1935. Edited by Manley O. Hudson and Ruth E. Bacon. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1938, 549 p. $2.50.

The latest addition to an authoritative series.

NATIONS ET DROIT. By Umberto Campagnolo. Paris: Alcan, 1938, 305 p. Fr. 50.

An examination into the supposed incompatibility between the sovereignty of the national state and an international juridical order.

LE DROIT D'ASILE. By Egidio Reale. Paris: Sirey, 1939, 133 p.

A timely legal study by an exiled Italian lawyer.

LA CONCEPTION NATIONALE-SOCIALISTE DU DROIT DES GENS. By Jacques Fournier. Paris: Pedone, 1939, 252 p. Fr. 60.

An exposition of Nazi legal concepts as applied to international relations.

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1937. Edited by Stephen Heald. New York: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939, 850 p. $14.00.

The texts of the significant speeches, interviews, communiqués, proclamations, international agreements, etc., arranged by country.

ALMANACH DE GOTHA, 1939. Gotha: Perthes, 1939, 1408 p.

The Hapsburgs are omitted from this 176th edition of a standard work.

## *General: Economic and Social*

WORLD ECONOMY IN TRANSITION. By Eugene Staley. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1939, 340 p. $3.00.

An expert and penetrating analysis of the changes being wrought in the economic structure of the world by contemporary power politics and technological progress. The author is associate professor of international economics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and this book is a report to be presented to the Twelfth International Studies Conference meeting at Bergen (Norway) next August and September.

WORLD TRADE. By Ethel B. Dietrich. New York: Holt, 1939, 458 p. $2.75.

The mechanics of international trade in a chaotic world, outlined by a professor of economics in Mount Holyoke College.

OVERSEAS TRADE AND EXPORT PRACTICE. By G. T. MacEwan. New York: Chemical Publishing Company, 1938, 366 p. $5.00.

A very broad survey, with particular emphasis on British experience.

MÉCANISME DU COMMERCE D'EXPORTATION. By Floriano Nunes Pereira. Paris: Dunod, 1939, 132 p.

How to conduct foreign trade, explained by a Brazilian expert.

LA CRISE DES ÉCHANGES INTERNATIONAUX. By Henry Truchy. Montreal: Éditions de l'A. C.-F., 1938, 188 p.

Ten lucid lectures delivered in Montreal early in 1938 by a French economist, who favors the proposals made in the Van Zeeland Report.

LA POLITIQUE DU POUVOIR D'ACHAT DEVANT LES FAITS. By André Piettre. Paris: Médicis, 1938, 256 p. Fr. 30.

The experiments of the French and American Governments in increasing popular purchasing power, and what they teach.

COMMODITY YEAR BOOK, 1939. New York: Commodity Research Bureau, 1939, 616 p. $7.50.

The first issue of a valuable statistical reference work.

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L'EXPÉRIENCE HISTORIQUE DE L'ÉCONOMIE DIRIGÉE OU L'HOMME À LA CONQUÊTE DE LA LIBERTÉ. By Laurent Dechesne. Paris: Sirey, 1938, 218 p. Fr. 25.

A pedestrian account of past experience.

SILVER MONEY. By Dickson H. Leavens. Bloomington (Indiana): Principia Press, 1939, 439 p. $4.00.

A lively historical treatise on the use of silver as currency in many countries.

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF MARXISM. By Waldemar Gurian. London: Burns, Oates, 1938, 184 p. 7/6.

A Catholic authority on Marxism finds that it has failed.

WAR IN OUR TIME. Edited by Hans Speier and Alfred Kähler. New York: Norton, 1939, 362 p. $3.00.

Illuminating essays on the social implications of the war economy now prevailing in practically every nation, totalitarian or otherwise, by 16 members of the "University in Exile" in New York City.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE NEXT WAR. By Paul Einzig. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 146 p. $2.50.

Dr. Einzig, though he cites twenty-nine reasons why Britain will win in the next war, argues that she cannot afford to enter that war as unprepared in an economic and financial way as she was in 1914.

WHY CAPITALISM MEANS WAR. By Henry Noel Brailsford. London: Gollancz, 1938, 95 p. 1/6.

The Socialist view neatly stated.

FASCISM AND BIG BUSINESS. By Daniel Guerin. New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1939, 339 p. $2.00.

A young French writer dissects Fascism according to pseudo-Marxist formulæ.

DER SOZIALIMPERIALISMUS ALS LETZTE ETAPPE DES IMPERIALISMUS. By Adolf Grabowsky. Basel: Weltpolitisches Archiv, 1939, 126 p. Swiss Fr. 5.

An attempt by a former editor of the *Zeitschrift für Politik* to concoct a theory of imperialism that will explain what he regards as the essentially non-commercial expansionism of the Nazis.

WOMEN AND THE REVOLUTION. By Ethel Mannin. New York: Dutton, 1939, 314 p. $3.00.

Miss Mannin, who is of the Marxist faith, wants Anglo-Saxon women to believe in the constructive nature of revolution. To give point to her thesis she sketches the revolutionary careers of a number of women since the fall of the Bastille. In Part III she describes how social revolution would affect women in England.

LIBERTY, EQUALITY AND FRATERNITY. By Fulton J. Sheen. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 187 p. $2.00.

An exposition of Catholic social doctrine, more critical of Communism than of capitalism, by a professor at the Catholic University of America.

THE MARXIST PHILOSOPHY AND THE SCIENCES. By J. B. S. Haldane. New York: Random House, 1939, 214 p. $2.00.

A British scientist applies Marxist philosophy to chemistry, biology, psychology, mathematics, etc.

COÖPERATION AS A WAY OF PEACE. By James Peter Warbasse. New York: Harper, 1939, 111 p. $1.00.

The leader of consumers' coöperation in the United States describes how that movement operates between nations, and seeks to show that its further extension offers a key to peace.

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POPULATION: TODAY'S QUESTION. By G. F. McCleary. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 222 p. $2.10.

A non-technical, dispassionate introduction to a complex question. Especial attention is given to Britain, where the author warns of serious social and economic consequences of the apparently imminent decrease in population.

CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DE LA POPULATION, PARIS 1937. Washington: Population Association of America, 1938, 8 v. $8.00.

These numerous papers presented at the International Population Congress are printed in the language in which they were read, and cover every aspect of the question, theoretical and practical.

WHITE SETTLERS IN THE TROPICS. By A. Grenfell Price. New York: American Geographical Society, 1939, 311 p. $4.00.

A detailed investigation into the history of white colonization in tropical regions and an appraisal of the lessons to be learned therefrom. There are numerous illustrations, maps, charts and statistical tables, and each chapter is fully annotated.

THE REFUGEE PROBLEM: REPORT OF A SURVEY. By Sir John Hope Simpson. New York: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939, 637 p. $10.00.

This volume replaces the "Preliminary Report of a Survey" noted in our January 1939 issue. It is concerned only with postwar refugees from European countries (except Spain) and the old Ottoman Empire. Its tone is utterly objective; but in the very accumulation of its facts it is a terrible indictment of all who are responsible for sending countless unoffending people into homeless exile.

## *The World War*

GERMANY AND THE GREAT POWERS, 1866–1914. By E. Malcolm Carroll. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1938, 852 p. $5.00.

German public opinion on foreign policy as reflected in the press.

L'ÉPOQUE CONTEMPORAINE. VOLUME II. LA PAIX ARMÉE ET LA GRANDE GUERRE (1871–1919). By Pierre Renouvin, Edmond Préclin and Georges Hardy. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1939, 684 p. Fr. 75.

A factual résumé of fifty years of world history, by three prominent French historians. There are useful bibliographies for each chapter.

MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA V EPOKHU IMPERIALIZMA. DOKUMENTY IZ ARKHIVOV TSARSKOGO I VREMENNOGO PRAVITELSTVA, 1878–1917. Second Series, 1900–1913. Volume XVIII, Parts 1 and 2; Volume XIX, Parts 1 and 2. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1938, 4 v. $8.80.

Russian diplomatic documents for 1911 and 1912, drawn from the Tsarist archives.

STORIA DELLA GUERRA MONDIALE. By Amedeo Tosti. Milan: Mondadori, 1937–1938, 2 v. L. 140.

A beautifully illustrated history of the military operations which naturally stresses the Italian participation.

AMERICA AT WAR, 1917–1918. By Frederic L. Paxson. Boston: Houghton, 1939, 465 p. $3.75.

In this second volume of "American Democracy and the World War," Professor Paxson shows how our democratic institutions were effectively and rapidly adapted to the exigencies of fighting in a world-wide war.

IZBRANNYE PROIZVEDENIYA 1917 GODA. By Lenin and Stalin. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1939, 584 p. 80 cents.

A selection from the writings of Lenin and Stalin in 1917.

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MEMOIRS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE. By David Lloyd George. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939, 2 v. $10.00.

Lloyd George adds his memoirs to those of his two colleagues, now dead, in the triumvirate that ruled the Paris Peace Conference. Historians will find that these two volumes, though they contain much new and valuable information as well as pungent portraits of the leading personages at Paris, are vitiated in many places by the author's desire to present his own case in the best possible light.

BOR'BA ZA KRASNYI PETROGRAD 1919 G. By G. Karayev. Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1938, 87 p. 25 cents.

An account of the Bolshevist defense of Petrograd against Yudenich in 1919.

DIE NIEDERWERFUNG DER RÄTEHERRSCHAFT IN BAYERN, 1919. Berlin: Mittler, 1939, 222 p. M. 4.60.

A thoroughgoing, official report on the military campaign waged against the Communist upheaval in Bavaria during the spring of 1919.

## *The United States*

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1938. By Whitney H. Shepardson in collaboration with William O. Scroggs. New York: Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1939, 397 p. $3.00.

A balanced, non-partisan account of world events during the past year and of America's relation to them. The authors devote special attention to the situation in Europe because of its unusual impact in 1938 upon the attitude of the people of the United States. The volume deals with such timely topics as the growing competition in armaments, the confusion of thought about American neutrality, the reciprocal trade agreement with Great Britain, the refugee problem, the Sino-Japanese conflict, the effort at Lima to promote inter-American solidarity, and the contrast in the relations of the United States with its two nearest neighbors, Mexico and Canada. An appendix of documentary material and a chronology make the book useful not only as a record and interpretation of current events, but as a permanent work of reference.

BLOOD IS CHEAPER THAN WATER. By Quincy Howe. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1939, 223 p. $2.00.

Mr. Howe ceases twisting the British lion's tail long enough to tell Americans that, since they are convinced there is going to be another general war into which they will be almost certainly drawn — a fact uncovered by the *Fortune* poll — they might as well get as much out of it as possible in political and economic advantages. In other words, in this empire-ridden world the United States should collect an empire of its own. Mr. Howe takes it for granted that when the hour of decision comes, the "Peace Party" — composed of isolationists, old-line Republicans, Hearst, Father Coughlin, as well as Socialists and assorted liberals — will be overcome by the "War Party" — likewise a strange aggregation of foreign traders, anti-Fascist liberals, pro-Soviet radicals, led by the State Department whose only policy (according to Mr. Howe) is to follow Britain unquestioningly. The reader is left wondering whether Mr. Howe's tongue is in his cheek, or whether he is just an exhibitionist.

THE NEW WESTERN FRONT. By Stuart Chase. New York: Harcourt, 1939, 196 p. $1.50.

Mr. Chase argues that nature has made it possible for the United States to lead a largely self-contained life, economically and politically. Our problems, he tells us, are very different from those of the European nations in that we need not join in their wars in order to protect our own interests or our system of government.

OUR MAGINOT LINE. By Livingston Hartley. New York: Carrick and Evans, 1939, 315 p. $2.75.

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Mr. Hartley fears for the security of the United States after German hegemony has been established over Europe and Africa, and when Japan rules Asia. Our security, he shows, cannot be purchased by defending our own territory alone, but only by protecting all the Americas from European and Asiatic penetration. He tells us concretely what this will necessitate in terms of policy and strategy. Among other things, Mr. Hartley wants us to coöperate with the anti-aggression Powers. His diagnosis and proposals are more convincing in the political than the strategical field.

MY MEMOIR. By Edith Bolling Wilson. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1938, 386 p. $3.50.

This is the first book of memoirs ever to be published by the wife of an American President. Though Mrs. Wilson has refrained from revealing any important official secrets, her account of the war and of the postwar years inevitably contains impressions and facts of historical importance, in particular concerning Wilson's relations with his intimate friends, such as House and Tumulty.

POLITIQUE EXTÉRIEURE DES ÉTATS-UNIS. By Alfred Max. Paris: Hartmann, for the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 1939, 180 p. Fr. 15.

Chapters on neutrality, the Sino-Japanese conflict, the "Good Neighbor" policy and American relations with Europe (Spain, *Anschluss*, Czechoslovak crisis, etc.), with a brief chronology and bibliography.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY CONCERNING MANCHURIA. By Stephen Chao Ying Pan. New York: Humphries, 1939, 385 p. $4.00.

An important episode in our Far East policy painstakingly recorded and analyzed.

A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS. By Lieutenant Colonel Clyde H. Metcalf. New York: Putnam, 1939, 584 p. $4.50.

Particularly useful because of its detailed chapters on American intervention in Caribbean and Central American countries.

MAHAN. By Captain W. D. Puleston. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939, 380 p. $4.00.

This is a biography of the American naval officer who became the greatest of modern naval strategists; it is written by a former Director of the Naval Intelligence Service at Washington. In preparing this book Captain Puleston drew upon his own experience as a naval officer as well as upon all the available documentary sources, including the private papers of the Mahan family.

DEMOCRACY WORKS. By Arthur Garfield Hays. New York: Random House, 1939, 334 p. $3.00.

One of America's outstanding liberal lawyers rejects the idea that America must choose between Fascism and Communism. He seeks to demonstrate that our democratic processes, in spite of their obvious and numerous shortcomings, offer the best opportunity for creating a social structure insuring security and happiness for the great mass of the people.

BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC. New York: Abingdon Press, 1938, 220 p. $1.50.

The report of an inquiry conducted by the Department of Research and Education of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America into the social, cultural and political rôle of the radio in the United States.

COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT. By Edward S. Corwin. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1938, 273 p. $2.50.

An acute criticism of the Supreme Court's constitutional rôle today, by a recognized authority who is professor of constitutional law in Princeton University.

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THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA. By Marjorie R. Clark and S. Fanny Simon. New York: Norton, 1938, 208 p. $2.00.

A reliable and readable history of the rise of American labor.

LORDS OF THE PRESS. By George Seldes. New York: Messner, 1938, 408 p. $3.00.

A muckraking analysis of the American press which purports to show how it is controlled by men whose interests are not at all confined to printing "all the news that's fit to print."

AMERICAN SHIPPING POLICY. By Paul Maxwell Zeis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1938, 254 p. $3.00.

The record of the United States Government in the matter of encouraging American shipping is not a pretty one. It has poured four billion dollars into private shipping companies without receiving much in return. Mr. Zeis examines the causes for this.

NAZI SPIES IN AMERICA. By Leon G. Turrou. New York: Random House, 1938, 299 p. $2.00.

A sensational exposé by a former G-man.

L'ITALIA E IL FASCISMO NEGLI STATI UNITI D'AMERICA. By Michele Renzulli. Rome: Tipografia Editrice Poliglotta, 1938, 238 p. L. 10.

Miscellaneous essays by a pro-Fascist.

A PURITAN IN BABYLON: THE STORY OF CALVIN COOLIDGE. By William Allen White. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 460 p. $3.50.

A candid, penetrating, sympathetic, but not uncritical biography of one of the great enigmas in American political history, by one of the foremost figures in American journalism. This book is a real contribution to an understanding of our times.

FIGHTING YEARS: MEMOIRS OF A LIBERAL EDITOR. By Oswald Garrison Villard. New York: Harcourt, 1939, 543 p. $3.75.

For many years Mr. Villard has been one of America's leading liberal journalists and editors, connected first with the *New York Evening Post* and later with the *Nation*. Though born to wealth and position, he has put much of his life at the service of the underprivileged. In this unassuming but passionately partisan autobiography he recounts the experiences of his varied and active life at home and abroad. Several of them shed new light on historical events.

FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT. By Basil Maine. London: Murray, 1938, 286 p. 10/6.

A friendly portrait by an English admirer.

## *Western Europe*

MUNICH AND THE DICTATORS. By R. W. Seton-Watson. London: Methuen, 1939, 188 p. 5/.

This postscript to the author's "Britain and the Dictators" contains considerable confidential information about the Munich crisis. Professor Seton-Watson, an eminent historian, may be described as an open partisan of the Czech cause. His book consequently is very critical of Mr. Chamberlain's policy.

OFFENSIVE ALLEMANDE EN EUROPE. By Gabriel Louis-Jaray. Paris: Sorlot, 1939, 271 p. Fr. 20.

A history of the Czechoslovak crisis in September 1938, with a survey of the policies of the major Powers during the subsequent months. There are some good passages, though no hitherto unknown facts are adduced. The book's principal defect is the author's decided pro-French bias.

THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By G. J. George. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1938, 186 p. 6d.

A Czech journalist's account of the Munich crisis, more picturesque than accurate.

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RUSSIA'S WORK IN FRANCE. By Reginald B. Dingle. London: Hale, 1938 278 p. 12/6.

This is a superficial and demagogic attempt, by a pro-Fascist British journalist, to picture the French Republic, particularly the Front Populaire, as the tool of the Third International and as on the verge of a revolution. The author's object is to prevent Britain from becoming closely allied with France.

DISCOURS DE PAIX. By Georges Clemenceau. Paris: Plon, 1938, 285 p. Fr. 24.

Speeches delivered by the "Tiger" between November 1918 and October 1919.

ARISTIDE BRIAND: PREMIER EUROPÉEN. By Raymond Hesse. Paris: Sorlot, 1939, 285 p. Fr. 30.

Briand's career as journalist, lawyer and statesman faithfully recorded by one of his devoted admirers. There are no revelations.

LA POLITIQUE COMMERCIALE DE LA FRANCE. By René Hoffherr. Paris: Hartmann, for the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 1939, 379 p. Fr. 30.

A report based on investigations into France's colonial and international commerce by a study group at the Centre.

LA RÉFORME DE L'ÉTAT: CONCLUSIONS ADDITIONNELLES. Brussels: Centre d'Études pour la Réforme de l'État, 1938, 348 p.

A sequel to the volume reviewed in our April 1938 issue.

DIE VÖLKERRECHTLICHE STELLUNG BELGIENS SEIT DEM WELTKRIEGE. By Franz Babel. Würzburg: Triltsch, 1939, 155 p. M. 4.20.

A legal interpretation more in accord with Nazi *Weltanschauung* than with objective scholarsip.

THE DEMOCRATIC MONARCHIES OF SCANDINAVIA. By Ben A. Arneson. New York: Van Nostrand, 1939, 244 p. $1.60.

The contents of this latest addition to "The Governments of Modern Europe" series are arranged by subject rather than by country.

RATS IN THE LARDER. By Joachim Joesten. New York: Putnam, 1939, 270 p. $2.50.

A jaunty description of Denmark's international position by an exiled German journalist. Mr. Joesten believes that the salvation of Denmark from the Nazi menace depends on how much help is forthcoming from Britain and Sweden.

THE NEW NORWAY. By O. B. Grimley. Oslo: Grundt Tanum, 1939, 169 p.

The social and economic achievements, particularly in the field of coöperation, of one of the world's most democratic peoples.

THE NORWAY YEAR BOOK, 1938. Edited by Per Vogt. Oslo: Sverre Mortensen, 1938, 398 p.

A useful reference book which last appeared seven years ago.

DEMOCRATIC SWEDEN. Edited by Margaret Cole and Charles Smith. New York: Greystone, 1939, 334 p. $3.00.

Good factual essays on various aspects of Swedish life, by 18 trained British observers.

KING GUSTAVE OF SWEDEN. By Basil Herbert. London: Paul, 1938, 288 p. 15/.

A chatty biography of Sweden's King.

MEIN KAMPF. By Adolf Hitler. New York: Reynal, 1939, 1030 p. $3.00.

MEIN KAMPF. By Adolf Hitler. New York: Stackpole, 1939, 669 p. $3.00.

Hitherto there has been no complete translation of this book in English, since the Houghton Mifflin edition of 1933 ("authorized" by the German Embassy in London) accounted for only about half of the original text. It has long been felt that this bowdlerized version should be replaced by a full and honest translation, since only in this way could the entirety of Hitler's thought and "feeling" be imparted to the English-

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speaking peoples. Now, as if to make up for lost time, we have two full translations. Both are competent, the Stackpole one being perhaps a little smoother and for that reason probably less like the turgid verbosity of the German original. In both cases the translations are anonymous. The Stackpole edition lacks an index. The Reynal edition comes out under the sponsorship of a distinguished editorial committee, led by Dr. Alvin Johnson, which has supervised the compilation of extensive footnotes elucidating or correcting statements in the text.

DIE REVOLUTION DES NIHILISMUS. By Hermann Rauschning. New York: Europa Verlag, 1938, 510 p. $3.25.

The author of this remarkable though overlengthy book (its ideas could have been much better expressed in 200 pages) was the Nazi President of the Danzig Senate from 1933 to 1935, when he fled as a result of his break with the Party. He belongs to the Prussian Junker class, whose outlook on most social and political questions he still shares. Perhaps precisely because of his anti-liberal and anti-democratic bias he is admirably equipped to explain National Socialism as an expression of the German spirit. He is now convinced that the only objective of the small core of élite who engineered the Nazi Revolution has from the start been to expand their own power, regardless of means or consequences, and he concludes that this "permanent revolution" must inevitably lead to mob rule and chaos — *i.e.* nihilism. From his close association with Hitler and other Nazi leaders he is able to give us one of the best pictures we have of how the Party's high command operates and of what jealousies animate it. Rauschning is among those who do not oppose a German alliance with Russia. As he points out, Germany's economic and social order is now so similar to the Bolshevik system that an entente with the Soviets can no longer create any serious domestic difficulties for her. The announced English version of this important book will be welcome.

WHY HITLER CAME INTO POWER. By Theodore Abel. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1938, 323 p. $2.75.

A sociological analysis of Hitler's rise, based on six hundred autobiographies of men who joined the Nazi movement before 1933.

CROSS AND SWASTIKA. By Arthur Frey. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 224 p. $2.50.

The unhappy fate of the Evangelical Church under the Nazi régime.

THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF GERMANY. By C. W. Guillebaud. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 303 p. $3.25.

On the whole, this is a sound guide through the maze of Nazi economics. The author, a lecturer at Cambridge University, takes too exclusively an economic view to the exclusion of political factors, which explains why his conclusions are more optimistic than those of most other observers.

ESCAPE TO LIFE. By Erika and Klaus Mann. Boston: Houghton, 1939, 384 p. $3.50.

A daughter and a son of the great German novelist call the roll of creative artists and thinkers who have fled from the Nazi terror, and tell how these exiles are now contributing to the lands of their adoption.

SCHACHT: HITLER'S MAGICIAN. By Norbert Mühlen. New York: Alliance (Longmans), 1939, 228 p. $3.00.

Schacht's amazing career and financial operations are chronicled in a lively manner, though the man himself seldom emerges as a coherent figure.

THROUGH EMBASSY EYES. By Martha Dodd. New York: Harcourt, 1939, 382 p. $3.00.

A gossipy, very personal, frequently trivial and not particularly well-informed or

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well-balanced picture of Nazi Germany as seen by the daughter of the former American Ambassador in Berlin.

FÜNFZIG JAHRE DEUTSCHLAND. By Sven Hedin. Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1938, 256 p. M. 5.

An appreciation of German personalities prominent in the last half-century, by a Swedish explorer who knows Germany well.

SHOWDOWN IN VIENNA: THE DEATH OF AUSTRIA. By Martin Fuchs. New York: Putnam, 1939, 311 p. $3.00.

The author, who was closely associated with Schuschnigg, tells us much that is new about the last two years of independent Austria. On the whole his account of Austria's downfall is the most convincing so far published.

SOMMARIO DELLA STORIA D'ITALIA DAI TEMPI PREISTORICI AI NOSTRI GIORNI. By Luigi Salvatorelli. Turin: Einaudi, 1939, 734 p. L. 30.

A masterly synthesis by an outstanding Italian historian.

STORIA DEL FASCISMO. By Guido Bortolotto. Milan: Hoepli, 1938, 646 p. L. 28.

A handy summary, well-organized and adequately annotated.

DER STAATS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSAUFBAU IM FASCISTISCHEN ITALIEN. By Helmut Vollweiler. Würzburg: Triltsch, 1938, 322 p. M. 12.

Careful scholarship, buttressed by 130 pages of documents.

SCRITTI E DISCORSI DI BENITO MUSSOLINI. Volume XI. Milan: Hoepli, 1938, 306 p. L. 15.

The eleventh volume of the official and "definitive" edition of Mussolini's writings and speeches. In the year and a half covered here (November 1936 to May 1938), Il Duce's utterances showed special interest in autarchy and the Rome-Berlin Axis.

LES DOCTRINES JURIDIQUES CONTEMPORAINES EN ITALIE. By R. Battino. Paris: Pedone, 1939, 192 p. Fr. 50.

A scholarly monograph with an extensive bibliography.

FASCIST ECONOMIC POLICY. By William G. Welk. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938, 365 p. $4.00.

A scholarly work, replete with statistics and references, which, if it errs, does so by taking the Fascists too much at their own evaluation. However, the author, who is professor of economics at St. Thomas College (St. Paul, Minnesota), correctly concludes that the Corporative State is "not an agency for the economic self-government of the Italian people but an instrument of economic control used by the totalitarian Fascist state for the achievement of its ultimate economic and political ends."

ANNALI DELL' ECONOMIA ITALIANA. VOLUME QUINTO, 1901–1914. By Epicarmo Corbino. Città di Castello: Tipografica "Leonardo da Vinci," 1938, 523 p. L. 60.

Professor Corbino has for a number of years been engaged in compiling an invaluable history of the economic development of Italy since the *Risorgimento* of which this is the latest volume to appear. His work is amply fortified with references and statistics.

CORSICA, TUNISIA, GIBUTI. By Beppe Pegolotti. Florence: Vallecchi, 1939, 209 p. L. 7.

A journalist's description of Italy's claims in three of France's possessions and of the woes of the Italian inhabitants there. This book has been officially banned in Tunisia.

ECCO IL DIAVOLO: ISRAELE! By Piero Pellicano. Milan: Baldini, 1938, 231 p. L. 15.

A typical example of the current Fascist anti-Semitic literature.

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THE VATICAN AS A WORLD POWER. By Joseph Bernhart. New York: Longmans, 1939, 456 p. $4.00.

A penetrating interpretation covering the entire history of the papacy.

HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS XI. By Monsignor R. Fontonelle. Cleveland: Sherwood Press, 1939, 278 p. $3.50.

A French cleric bears testimony to the achievements of the late Pontiff but glosses over some of his more difficult battles and defeats.

ALL THE BRAVE. By Luis Quintanilla and Others. New York: Modern Age Books, 1939, 115 p. 95 cents.

Drawings of the Spanish civil war with interesting text by Elliot Paul, Jay Allen and Ernest Hemingway.

LIFE AND PEOPLE IN NATIONAL SPAIN. By Florence Farmborough. London: Sheed, 1938, 222 p. 2/6.

Unstinted praise for Franco and his movement.

THE SPANISH ARENA. By William Foss and Cecil Gerahty. London: Gifford, 1938, 517 p. 18/.

An uncritical pro-Franco account of the civil war down to the summer of 1938, useful for its sidelights on the mentality and aims of the Rebel leaders.

ESPAGNE CREUSET POLITIQUE. By Henri Rabasseire. Paris: Fustier, 1938, 190 p. Fr. 20.

The author, evidently a Spaniard writing under a pseudonym, interprets Spain's problems and civil war from an anarchist angle.

ESPAÑA HEROICA. By Vicente Saenz. New York: Editorial Iberoamericana, 1938, 320 p. $2.00.

Impressions, ideas and eye-witness reports on Loyalist Spain by a Costa Rican journalist of Leftist persuasions.

L'ESPAGNE VIVANTE. By Juan Vicens. Paris: Éditions Sociales Internationales, 1938, 134 p. Fr. 12.

Information on popular education in Loyalist Spain.

## *Eastern Europe*

SLOVANSKÁ VZÁJEMNOST 1836–1936. Edited by Jiři Horák. Prague: Slovansky Ústav, 1938, 428 p. Kč. 60.

A collection of scholarly studies on Pan Slavism.

LES PRÉCURSEURS DE LÉNINE. By Maurice Paléologue. Paris: Plon, 1938, 247 p. Fr. 18.

A former French Ambassador to Tsarist Russia and member of the French Academy skips lightly over two centuries of Russian history, choosing the episodes that help explain the Bolshevik Revolution.

L'ARMÉE ROUGE. By Théodore H. Makhine. Paris: Payot, 1938, 356 p. Fr. 40.

The author served as staff officer in the old Imperial Army, later fought for the Whites in the civil war, and is now in exile. He relies almost wholly on Soviet-printed sources. In spite of this secondhand approach, the book is a valuable compendium of information on the tactical, technical and strategic aspects of Russian defense.

STATYI I RECHI, 1936–1937. By M. I. Kalinin. Moscow: Partizdat, 1938, 179 p. 35 cents.

Articles and speeches by the President of the Præsidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union.

EVERYDAY LIFE IN RUSSIA. Compiled by Bertha Malnick. London: Harrap, 1938, 282 p. 12/6.

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Numerous quotations from Soviet sources pieced together to illustrate the life, from birth to maturity, of the average town-dweller in Russia.

THE RUSSIAN WORKERS' OWN STORY. By Boris Silver. London: Allen and Unwin, 1938, 251 p. 7/6.

This is not so much the Russian workers' own story as the unfavorable reactions of a Belgian-born Socialist to what he saw in the Soviet Union. He reports the workers to be disillusioned with the proletarian dictatorship.

RUSSIA WITHOUT ILLUSIONS. By Pat Sloan. London: Muller, 1938, 268 p. 7/6.

This young Cambridge graduate went to Russia to live and work. He remained there six years, teaching and acting as trade union official. In this book he portrays the life of the average Russian sincerely, if not critically.

SERGEI MIRONOVICH KIROV, 1886–1934. KRATKII BIOGRAFICHESKII OCHERK. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1939, 112 p. 10 cents.

Biographical sketch of the close associate of Stalin, assassinated at Leningrad in 1934.

TORGOVYE OTNOSHENIYA S.S.S.R. S KAPITALICHESKIMI STRANAMI. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, 1938, 350 p. $1.20.

An official analysis of Soviet foreign trade.

FINLAND. By J. Hampden Jackson. London: Allen and Unwin, 1938, 243 p. 8/6.

A history of one of the world's most remarkable nations and an account of its novel economic and social policies.

POLAND: KEY TO EUROPE. By Raymond Leslie Buell. New York: Knopf, 1939, 379 p. $3.00.

A timely and well-documented survey of Poland's domestic and foreign problems, based in part on personal observation, by the former President of the Foreign Policy Association. Undoubtedly the best book on the subject.

THE PADEREWSKI MEMOIRS. By Ignace Jan Paderewski and Mary Lawton. New York: Scribner, 1938, 404 p. $3.75.

The prewar phase of the great pianist-statesman's career delightfully recounted.

FOREIGN CAPITAL IN POLAND. By Leopold Wellisz. London: Allen and Unwin, 1938, 281 p. 7/6.

A statistical study, by the Managing Director of the First Locomotive Works of Poland, Ltd., and Vice-President of the Polish-American Chamber of Commerce.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE DANUBE AND THE LITTLE ENTENTE, 1929–1938. By Robert Machray. London: Allen and Unwin, 1938, 344 p. 12/6.

A sequel to the author's "The Little Entente, 1920–1929" in which especial attention is given to Czechoslovak policy.

NORTH OF THE DANUBE. By Erskine Caldwell and Margaret Bourke-White. New York: Viking, 1939, 128 p. $3.00.

Vivid impressions, literary and photographic, of independent Czechoslovakia.

ILUSTROVANÝ ZEMĚPIS ČESKOSLOVENSKÉ REPUBLIKY. Edited by František Stůla. Prague: Ústřední Nakladatelství Učitelstva Československého, 1938, 554 p. Kč. 110.

A useful book on pre-Munich Czechoslovakia, with numerous illustrations and maps.

MASARYK ON THOUGHT AND LIFE: CONVERSATIONS WITH KAREL ČAPEK. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 214 p. $2.00.

The founder of Czechoslovakia expresses his ideas on philosophy, religion and politics.

T. G. MASARYK A JIHOSLOVANÉ. By Oton Berkopec. Prague: Slovanský Ústav, 1938, 81 p. Kč. 16.

A bibliography on Masaryk's relations with the Jugoslavs.

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CSEHSZLOVÁKIA, 1918–1938. By M. Halász. Budapest: Századunk, 1938, 117 p.
A keen discussion of the history of the Czechoslovak Republic.

WHY THE TREATY OF TRIANON IS VOID. By Louis Kossuth Birinyi. Grand Rapids: V. L. R. Simmons, 1938, 246 p. $2.50.
An American lawyer's bitter indictment of the settlement forced on Hungary in 1919.

A VISSZATÉRT MAGYAROK. By P. Szvatkó. Budapest: Révai, 1938, 205 p.
This book deals with the Hungarians who "returned" to Hungary as a result of the Munich settlement. The author believes that the Magyar frame of mind will become more realistic and democratic.

UJ ÉLET A MAGYAR FÖLDÖN. By M. Matolcsy. Budapest: Cserépfalvi, 1938, 293 p.
A critical analysis of the present agricultural, industrial and financial situation of Hungary with special emphasis on problems of distribution. The author pleads for a radical change in the social and political system.

A KIVÁNDORLÁS. By I. Kovács. Budapest: Cserépfalvi, 1938, 199 p.
A description of the causes which have compelled great masses of the Hungarian peasantry to emigrate to foreign countries, especially the United States.

L'ITALIA E I BALCANI. By Umberto Nani. Tivoli: Mantero, 1938, 169 p. L. 10.
Rapid summaries of Italy's relations with the Balkan countries in modern times.

ALEXANDER OF YUGOSLAVIA. By Stephen Graham. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939, 329 p. $3.00.
In preparing these chapters on the life of the King who was assassinated at Marseilles in October 1934, Mr. Graham states that he received the aid of Alexander's Queen, of Prince Regent Paul, and of several high Jugoslav officials. The first part of the book gives the "inside" story of the King's death and of its part in international terrorist politics. After this introduction, the author returns to Alexander's youth and sketchily follows his career through its various stages.

LA JUGOSLAVIA E GLI JUGOSLAVI. By Sebastiano Visconti-Prasca. Milan: Treves, 1938, 227 p. L. 25.
A former Italian military attaché in Jugoslavia gives a friendly description of that country and its people. Lavishly illustrated.

SCARRED BACKGROUND: A JOURNEY THROUGH ALBANIA. By Nigel Heseltine. London: Lovat Dickson, 1938, 234 p. 10/6.
The people and their country, with sidelights on politics.

DHETË VJET MBRETNI 1928–1938. By Zoj Xoxa. Tirana: Shtypur në Shtypskronien, 1938, 344 p.
An official, documented and profusely illustrated account of King Zog's reign, published not long before its untoward end.

## *The British Commonwealth of Nations*

BRITAIN IN SPAIN: A STUDY OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT'S SPANISH POLICY. By 'The Unknown Diplomat.' London: Hamish Hamilton, 1939, 270 p. 3/6.
An indictment of British policy during the recent civil war.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE: A PROBLEM IN FOUR DIMENSIONS. By Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson. London: Muller, 1938, 342 p. 10/6.
A comprehensive work, full of sound observations on modern war, but which suffers in some respects from oversimplification.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF DEFENCE. By Harold Macmillan. London: Macmillan, 1939, 67 p. 1/.

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A Member of Parliament, after briefly reviewing Germany's effort to create a war economy, tells his countrymen what they will have to do in an economic way to prepare for Britain's defense.

GLASS HOUSES AND MODERN WAR. By Jonathan Griffin. London: Chatto and Windus, 1938, 187 p. 3/6.

Britain is terribly vulnerable to a totalitarian attack, holds Mr. Griffin, who proceeds to give practical suggestions for making her less so.

THE TERRITORIAL IN THE NEXT WAR. By Bt.-Colonel W. E. Green. London: Bles, 1939, 182 p. 5/.

A new title in Liddell Hart's series "The Next War," particularly timely in view of the recent decision greatly to expand the Territorial Army.

THE BRITISH COMMON PEOPLE, 1746–1938. By G. D. H. Cole and Raymond Postgate. New York: Knopf, 1939, 621 p. $4.00.

A good summary of a neglected sector in British history.

THE LABOUR PARTY IN TRANSITION, 1931–1938. By Dean E. McHenry. London: Routledge, 1938, 320 p. 7/6.

An American observer's review of the Labour Party's structure, policies and political fortunes in recent years.

THE TRAGEDY OF RAMSAY MACDONALD. By L. MacNeill Weir. London: Secker and Warburg, 1938, 586 p. 15/.

The author is a Labour M. P. and since much of his book was written at the time of Mr. MacDonald's "betrayal" in 1931, it cannot be described as objective history.

A CENTURY OF BANK RATE. By R. G. Hawtrey. New York: Longmans, 1938, 328 p. $4.00.

How the Bank of England uses its discount rate as a means of monetary regulation, explained by one of its officials.

THE BRITISH CABINET SYSTEM, 1830–1938. By Arthur Berriedale Keith. London: Stevens, 1939, 648 p. 15/.

A scholarly work by the well-known authority on British government. The subject matter is arranged topically rather than chronologically. There is a good index.

THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION. By H. R. G. Greaves. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 296 p. $2.50.

Britain's constitutional machinery and how it operates, brought up to the minute by a lecturer at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND THE FUTURE. Edited by H. V. Hodson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939, 336 p. $3.00.

The proceedings of the second unofficial conference on British Commonwealth relations, held at Sydney (Australia) September 3–17, 1938.

IRELAND — THE NEW ALLY. By John Gibbons. London: Hale, 1938, 286 p. 8/6.

A Catholic Englishman explores Ireland, testing sentiment towards Britain and towards Irish participation in another war on the side of England. He finds that many problems remain unsolved, especially Ulster.

THE JAPANESE CANADIANS. By Charles H. Young, Helen R. Y. Reid and W. A. Carrothers. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Canadian National Committee for Mental Hygiene, 1938, 295 p. $2.25.

A sympathetic account of the problems of the Japanese in British Columbia.

AUSTRALIA'S FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by W. G. K. Duncan. London: Angus and Robertson, for the Australian Institute of Political Science, 1938, 218 p. 6/.

Five factual essays on Australia's imperial and international position.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RURAL AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. By Edmund de S. Brunner. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1938, 70 p. $1.50.

A brief economic study.

NATIONALISM AND REFORM IN INDIA. By William Roy Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938, 485 p. $5.00.

This thoughtful and impartial volume by a onetime professor of history at Bryn Mawr College represents the fruit of eighteen years of study and travel, and will be found indispensable reading by all who are interested in Indian affairs.

HINDUISM AND THE MODERN WORLD. By K. M. Panikkar. London: Kitabistan, 1938, 115 p. 2/6.

A critique of Hindu social organization and ideals.

## *The Near East*

THE LETTERS OF T. E. LAWRENCE. Edited by David Garnett. New York: Doubleday, 1939, 896 p. $5.00.

More light on the exploits and character of one of the most enigmatic figures in modern history.

PALESTINE UNVEILED. By Douglas V. Duff. London: Blackie, 1938, 242 p. 8/6.

The turbulent Holy Land explored by a former police official there.

NOUS VENONS DE PALESTINE. By Willy Chalom and Jules Levy. Paris: Attinger, 1938, 160 p. Fr. 18.

A pro-Zionist description.

ARABIAN ANTIC. By Ladislas Farago. New York: Sheridan, 1938, 319 p. $2.50.

Mr. Farago, "roving correspondent" for the *London Sunday Chronicle*, visits the regions around the southern part of the Red Sea and discovers that Fascist penetration is making great headway in the Yemen. A delightful if not wholly credible book.

SEEN IN THE HADHRAMAUT. By Freya Stark. New York: Dutton, 1939, 199 p. $5.00.

Beautiful photographs and interesting text on the seldom-visited south coast of Arabia, which until recently was completely unspoiled by the intrusion of a discordant culture or of power politics.

## *Africa*

MOROCCO AWAKES. By Captain F. H. Mellor. London: Methuen, 1939, 260 p. 8/6.

In this very informative book, Captain Mellor tells us about recent events in both the Spanish and French Zones of Morocco. His chapters in regard to the Moorish participation in the civil war in Spain and the development of the nationalist movements among the Moroccans are particularly valuable.

SAHARA: GENTI E PAISI. By Ernesto Quadrone. Milan: Treves, 1938, 252 p. L. 15.

The desert hinterland in Libya unveiled by an enterprising Italian who has explored much of it afoot, by car and by plane. There are numerous illustrations.

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN EGYPT. By A. E. Crouchley. New York: Longmans, 1938, 286 p. $2.75.

A scholarly work, with statistical appendices and bibliography.

DESERT AND DELTA. By Major C. S. Jarvis. London: Murray, 1938, 319 p. 10/6.

More reminiscences by the author of "Three Deserts," formerly Governor of Sinai.

ALBORI DELL'IMPERO: L'ETIOPIA COME È E COME SARÀ. By Ciro Poggiali. Milan: Treves, 1938, 525 p. L. 20.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A comprehensive firsthand report concerning the human and natural resources of Ethiopia, the degree of progress already attained by the Italians towards organizing and exploiting their new empire, and what remains to be done.

AFRICANS LEARN TO BE FRENCH. By W. Bryant Mumford and Major G. St. J. Orde-Brown. London: Evans, 1937, 174 p. 5/.

Two British experts report on the results obtained by the French educational system in Africa, the objective of which is to Europeanize France's African subjects.

THE SOUTHERN BANTU. By L. Marquard and T. G. Standing. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939, 262 p. $2.50.

Native problems in South Africa scientifically and sympathetically outlined.

## *The Far East*

UNCONQUERED: JOURNAL OF A YEAR'S ADVENTURES AMONG THE FIGHTING PEASANTS OF NORTH CHINA. By James Bertram. New York: Day, 1939, 340 p. $3.00.

The exciting adventures of a young New Zealander with the Red Army in China.

INSIDE RED CHINA. By Nym Wales. New York: Doubleday, 1939, 356 p. $3.00.

The wife of Edgar Snow, well-known correspondent in China, records her own experiences in "Soviet China" in this entertaining and informative book.

THE TRAGEDY OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION. By Harold R. Isaacs. London: Secker and Warburg, 1938, 502 p. 18/.

A detailed and annotated narrative of Communist activities in China since 1925, by a Trotskyite whose political *parti pris* not infrequently gives his interpretations a bias.

THE SILK ROAD. By Sven Hedin. New York: Dutton, 1938, 322 p. $5.00.

One of the world's great explorers, now nearing the age of seventy, recounts his adventures along one of the roads from Turkestan to China's back door, a route of considerable political importance at the present time.

LECTURES ON JAPAN. By Inazo Nitobé. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938, 393 p. $2.00.

Lectures on the evolution of the Japanese people and their culture.

TORGOVYE OTNOSHENIYA S.S.S.R. SO STRANAMI VOSTOKA. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, 1938, 107 p. 50 cents.

Soviet trade relations with the countries of the Near and Far East.

LA POLITIQUE MUSULMANE ET COLONIALE DES PAYS-BAS. By G. H. Bousquet. Paris: Hartmann, for the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 1939, 167 p. Fr. 25.

The problems of Moslem policy, nationalist agitation and political reform in the Netherlands Indies, examined by a professor at the University of Algiers.

## *Latin America*

THE CIVILIZATION OF THE AMERICAS. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1938, 174 p. $1.50.

Lectures on political, economic and cultural problems delivered by members of the University of California faculty in 1938.

PANAMERICANESIMO E DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE. By Carlo Cereti. Milan: Giuffrè, 1939, 303 p. L. 36.

A professor of international law in the University of Genoa discusses the Pan American Conferences, the so-called "American [continental] international law," "extra-continental law," the neutrality of the American nations, and the Pan American Union.

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CONFERENCIAS INTERNACIONALES AMERICANAS, 1889–1936. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1938, 746 p. $4.00.

Documents pertaining to various inter-American conferences.

MEXICO MARCHES. By J. H. Plenn. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1939, 386 p. $3.00.

Mr. Plenn knows Mexico well from long association, but he lets his enthusiasm for Cárdenas and his policies lead him into apparent contradictions. For instance, he believes that Mexico will emerge from her present period of stress as "a more complete democracy than others past or present," yet he admits that Nazi and Fascist penetration is making great strides, politically and culturally.

NEW DESIGNS FOR OLD MEXICO. By Henry Albert Phillips. New York: McBride, 1939, 336 p. $2.75.

Modern Mexico interpreted in terms of its past.

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GENERAL CLAIMS COMMISSION, UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, UNDER THE CONVENTION OF SEPTEMBER 8, 1923. By J. G. de Beus. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1938, 342 p. Gld. 6.

A valuable contribution to our knowledge of the juridical relations between the United States and Latin American countries.

GUATEMALA PROFILE. By Addison Burbank. New York: Coward-McCann, 1939, 296 p. $3.50.

Entertaining sketches of the people and the country.

CURSO DE INTRODUCCIÓN A LA HISTORIA DE CUBA. Edited by Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring. Havana: Municipio de la Habana, 1938, 463 p. gratis.

Essays on the history of Cuba from the earliest times down to the Batista régime.

CUARENTA AÑOS DE MI VIDA, 1898–1938. By Cosme de la Torriente. Havana: Imprenta "El Siglo XX," 1939, 470 p.

Writings and speeches by a prominent Cuban statesman.

TELL MY HORSE. By Zora Neale Hurston. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1938, 301 p. $3.00.

An American Negro scholar reports on her sociological investigations among the peoples of Jamaica and Haiti.

EFFORTS ET RÉSULTATS. By Sténio Vincent. Port-au-Prince (Haiti): Imprimerie de l'État, 1938, 297 p. Gourdes 5.

The President of Haiti analyzes, with the help of a considerable array of statistics, the principal problems confronting his republic, and describes the manner in which they are being solved.

TRUJILLO: EL CONSTRUCTOR DE UNA NACIONALIDAD. By Gilberto Sanchez Lustrino. Havana: Cultural, 1938, 300 p. $2.00.

A portrait of the strong man of the Dominican Republic by an admirer.

VENEZUELA. By Erna Fergusson. New York: Knopf, 1939, 349 p. $3.00.

This readable and well-illustrated work is more than the usual travel book; it is an excellent introduction to the land, the people, the history, the politics and the culture of Venezuela.

FEUDAL ISLAND. By Desmond Holdridge. New York: Harcourt, 1939, 244 p. $2.50.

Life in the Amazon Delta graphically portrayed.

INTRODUCTION TO ARGENTINA. By Alexander Wilbourne Weddell. New York: Greystone, 1939, 301 p. $3.00.

A friendly description by the former American Ambassador to Argentina. Many illustrations.

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# SOURCE MATERIAL

## *By Denys P. Myers*

## PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OFFICIALLY PRINTED

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Library of Information, 270 Madison Ave., New York. *France:* Gerda M. Anderson, 12 Ave. Ernest Reyer, Paris XIVe. *League of Nations, Perm. Court of Int. Justice, Int. Institute of Intellectual Coöperation:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York. *Int. Labor Office:* 734 Jackson Pl., Washington, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted. Since 1928 a list of Government documents has been printed in the *Monthly List of Books Catalogued in the Library of the League of Nations.*

### AGRICULTURE

SOCIAL PROBLEMS in agriculture. Record of the Permanent Agricultural Committee of the I.L.O. (7–15 February 1938). Geneva, 1938. iv, 162 p. 24 cm. (International Labor Office Studies and Reports, Series K (Agriculture) No. 14.) $1.

### AMERICAN HEMISPHERE

DRAFT of proposed legislation to authorize coöperation with other American Republics. Message from the President of the United States transmitting report from the Secretary of State and the draft of proposed legislation designed to authorize coöperation with any of the other American Republics in accordance with treaties, resolutions, declarations, and recommendations signed by all of the 21 American Republics at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. Washington, 1939. 18 p. 23 cm. (House of Representatives, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., H. Doc. 251.)

EIGHTH International Conference of American States, Lima, Peru, December 9–27, 1938. Report on the results of the Conference submitted to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union by the Director General. Washington, Pan American Union, 1939. 108 p. 23½ cm.

EIGHTH International Conference of American States. Final Act, December 1938. Lima, Torres Aguirre, 1939. vii, 125 p. 29 cm.

### ARABIA

CORRESPONDENCE between Sir Henry McMahon, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca July 1915–March 1916. London, 1939. 18 p. map. 24½ cm. (Miscellaneous No. 3 (1939) Cmd. 5957.) 4d.

REPORT of a committee set up to consider certain correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon [His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt] and the Sherif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916. March 16, 1939. London, 1939. 51 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 5974.) 9d.

STATEMENTS made on behalf of His Majesty's Government during the year 1918 in regard to the future status of certain parts of the Ottoman Empire. London, 1939. 7 p. 24½ cm. (Miscellaneous No. 4 (1939) Cmd. 5964.) 2d.

### ARMAMENT RESTRICTIONS

EXCHANGE of notes between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Bulgarian Government regarding the military, naval and air clauses of the treaty of Neuilly, &c. Sofia, August 12/November 24, 1938. London, 1939. 5 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 12 (1939) Cmd. 5954.) 1d.

### CONSTITUTIONS OF ALL COUNTRIES

THE CONSTITUTIONS of all countries. Vol. I. The British Empire. London, 1938. vii, 678 p. 25 cm. (Foreign Office.) 10s. 6d.

### COURTS, INTERNATIONAL

JUDGMENT of February 28th, 1939. The Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway case. Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff's, 1939. 59 p. (French and English). 24 cm. (Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A./B., Fascicule No. 76.)

PHOSPHATES in Morocco. Judgment of June 14th, 1938. (Series A./B., Fascicule No. 74.) Minutes. — Pleadings. — Documents filed. Correspondence. — Contents and index. Leyden, 1938. Pp. 867–1,404. 24 cm. (Permanent Court of International Justice, Series C. No. 85.)

RAPPORT du conseil administratif de la Cour Permanente d'arbitrage sur les travaux de la Cour, sur les travaux de la Cour, sur le fonctionnement des services administratifs et sur les dépenses de l'exercice 1938. Trente huitième année. La Haye, Bureau International de la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage, 1939. 36 p. 33 cm.

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## CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

AGREEMENTS between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic regarding financial assistance to Czecho-Slovakia. London, January 27, 1939. London, 1939. 15 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 9 (1939) 5933.) 3d.

PAPERS relating to the extinction of Czecho-Slovakia by the German Reich have been published in newspapers and in various periodical publications issued under German auspices.

## DEFENSE PROGRAMS

AN ADEQUATE NATIONAL defense as outlined by the message of the President of the United States. Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 76th Cong. 1st sess. Washington, 1939. iii, 139 p. 23 cm.

NATIONAL DEFENSE. Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, 76th Cong., 1st sess. on H.R. 3791, an act to provide more effectively for the national defense by carrying out the recommendations of the President in his message of January 12, 1939, to the Congress. January 17 to February 22, 1939. Washington, 1939. iii, 324 p. 23 cm.

ARMY ESTIMATES 1939. Presented by Command of His Majesty. London, 1939. 532 p. 24½ cm. (House of Commons 1938–39, No. 59.) 5s.

MEMORANDUM of the Secretary of State for War relating to the army estimates 1939. London, 1939. 9 p. 24½ cm. (War Office, Cmd. 5948.) 2d.

THE GENERAL ANNUAL report on the British army 1938 with which is incorporated the annual report on recruiting (for the year ending 31st December, 1938). Prepared by command of the Army Council. London, 1939. 27 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 5950.) 6d.

ARMY APPROPRIATION account 1937. With the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General thereon, and upon other army accounts (in continuation of House of Commons Paper No. 29 of 1937–38). London, 1939. ix, 118 p. 24½ cm. (House of Commons 1938–39, No. 34.) 2s.

AIR ESTIMATES 1939. Presented by Command of His Majesty. London, 1939. 303 p. 24½ cm. (House of Commons 1938–39, No. 61.) 4s. 6d.

MEMORANDUM by the Secretary of State for Air to accompany air estimates 1939. London, 1939. 15 p. 24½ cm. (Air Ministry, Cmd. 5953.) 3d.

STATEMENT relating to defence. London, 1939. 19 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 5944.) 3d.

## GUATEMALA

WHITE BOOK. Controversy between Guatemala and Great Britain relative to the convention of 1859 on territorial matters. Belize question (translated from the Spanish copy). Guatemala, Tipografia Nacional, 1938. 503 p. 26 cm. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Guatemala.)

## INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

PROTECTION of industrial property. Convention between the United States of America and other powers revising the Paris Convention of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels on December 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, and at The Hague on November 6, 1925. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Washington, 1939. 43 p. 23 cm. (Treaty Series No. 941.) 10c.

## INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR Conference. Twenty-fifth session, Geneva, 1939. Technical and vocational education and apprenticeship. First item on the agenda. Geneva, 1939. iv, 251 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office, Report I.)

—— —— REGULATION of contracts of employment of indigenous workers. Second item on the agenda. Geneva, 1939. iv, 121 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office, Report II.)

—— —— RECRUITING, placing and conditions of labour (equality of treatment) of migrant workers. Third item on the agenda. Geneva, 1939. iv, 167 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office, Report III.)

—— —— REGULATION of hours of work and rest periods of professional drivers (and their assistants) of vehicles engaged in road transport. Fourth item on the agenda. Geneva, 1939. iii, 171 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office, Report IV.)

—— —— GENERALISATION of the reduction of hours of work in industry, commerce and offices. Fifth item on the agenda. Geneva, 1939. iv, 211 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office, Report V.)

—— —— REDUCTION of hours of work in coal mines. Sixth item on the agenda. Geneva, 1939. 125 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office, Report VI.)

## LABOR

INDUSTRIAL LABOUR in India. Geneva, 1938. viii, 335 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office, Studies and Reports Series A (Industrial Relations) No. 41.) $2.00.

LABOR CONDITIONS in Indo-China. Geneva, 1938. vii, 331 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office, Studies and Reports, Series B (Economic Conditions) No. 26.) $2.

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THE MINIMUM WAGE. An international survey. Geneva, 1939, viii, 257 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office, Studies and Reports, Series D (Wages and Hours of Work) No. 22.) $1.25.

## LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE LEAGUE from year to year (1938). Geneva, 1939. 214 p. 21½ cm. (League of Nations, Information Section.)

MINUTES of the Hundred-and-Fourth Session of the Council. Held at Geneva from Monday, January 16th, to Friday, January 20th, 1939. Geneva, 1939. 192 x p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, *Official Journal*, 20th year, No. 2.) $15 per year.

RECORDS of the 19th Ordinary Session of the Assembly. Meetings of the committees. Minutes of the First Committee (Legal questions). Geneva, 1938. 30 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Spec. Sup. No. 184.) 40c.

—— ——. Minutes of the Second Committee (Economic, Financial and Transit Questions). Geneva, 1938. 77 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Spec. Sup. No. 185.) 75c.

—— ——. Minutes of the Fourth Committee (Budgetary and Administrative Questions). Geneva, 1938. 128 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Spec. Sup. No. 187.) $1.25.

—— ——. Minutes of the Fifth Committee. (Social Questions.) Geneva, 1938. 59 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Spec. Sup. No. 188.) 60c.

—— ——. Minutes of the Seventh Committee (various technical questions; health, opium, intellectual coöperation, etc.) and minutes of meetings of the Seventh Committee held jointly with members of the Second Committee. Geneva, 1938. 108 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Spec. Sup. No. 190.) $1.00.

## MUNITIONS CONTROL

THIRD ANNUAL report of the National Munitions Control Board. Letter from the Chairman National Munitions Control Board transmitting the third annual report of the National Munitions Control Board covering the year ending November 30, 1938. Washington, 1939. v, 109 p. 23 cm. (H. Doc. No. 92, 76th Cong., 1st sess.)

## NAVAL QUESTIONS

FLEETS. The British Commonwealth of Nations and foreign countries. Particulars of the vessels of the fleets of the British Commonwealth of Nations, Japan, France, Italy and Germany, on the 1st day of February, 1939, and of the United States of America, on 15th December, 1938. London, 1939. 119 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 5936.) 2s.

REPORT on need of additional naval bases to defend the coasts of the United States, its territories, and possessions. Letter from the Secretary of the Navy transmitting report of the board appointed to report upon the need, for purposes of national defense, of additional submarine, destroyer, mine, and naval air bases on the coasts of the United States, its territories, and possessions. Washington, 1938. 39 p. 23 cm. (H. Doc. No. 65, 76th Cong., 1st sess.)

TO AUTHORIZE the Secretary of the Navy to proceed with the construction of certain public works, and for other purposes. Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, 76th Cong., 1st sess. on H.R. 2880. . . . Washington, 1939. ii, p. 49–551. 23 cm.

Action was taken on H.R. 4278, 76th Cong., 1st sess.

NAVY ESTIMATES 1939. Presented by Command of His Majesty. London, 1939. 532 p. 24½ cm. (House of Commons 1938–39, No. 60.) 7s. 6d.

STATEMENT of the First Lord of the Admiralty explanatory of the navy estimates 1939. London, 1939. 24 p. 24½ cm. (Admiralty, Cmd. 5952.) 4d.

## "NEUTRALITY"

NEUTRALITY, peace legislation and our foreign policy. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 76th Congress, 1st Session. The following bills and resolutions are pending before the Committee for consideration. S.J. Res. 21, S.J. Res. 67, S.J. Res. 97, S.J. Res. 106, S. Con. Res. 8, S. 203, S. 1745. Parts 1–7. April 5, 6, 13, 14 and 17, 1939. 180 p. 23 cm. (Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations.)

TEXT OF LEGISLATION relating to neutrality, peace, and our foreign policy. Pending in the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, March 31, 1939. Washington, 1939. 35 p. 28 cm. (Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations.)

TEXT OF PRESENT neutrality law (printed in bill form). Proposed amendments thereto, and related legislation affecting the foreign policy of the United States. Pending in the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U. S. House of Representatives. Washington, 1939. 113 p. 28 cm. (Printed for use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.)

## NUTRITION

HEALTH ORGANISATION. Technical commission on nutrition. Guiding principles for studies on the nutrition of populations. By Dr. E. J. Bigwood, Professor at the University of

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Brussels. Geneva, 1939. 281 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.H. 1401. [C.H./Com. Exp. Alim./50 (2).] 1939.III.1.) $1.40.

## PEACEFUL CHANGE

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Conference. Peaceful change. Procedures. Population, raw materials, colonies. Proceedings of the Tenth International Studies Conference, Paris, June 28th–July 3rd, 1937. Paris, International Institute of Intellectual Coöperation, 1938. 685 p. 24 cm.
The distribution of this volume was delayed until April 1939.

## PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

THE SECOND ANNUAL report of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands to the President and Congress of the United States covering the calendar year 1937 with a review of government finances for the years 1935, 1936, and 1937. Washington, 1939. iii, 184 p. 23 cm. (H. Doc. No. 93, 76th Cong., 1st sess.)
SECOND ANNUAL report of the President of Philippines to the President and the Congress of the United States covering the calendar year ended December 31, 1937. Washington, 1939. v, 27 p. 23 cm. (H. Doc. No. 94, 76th Cong., 1st sess.)

## PUBLIC FINANCE

(The monographs listed below complete the first official report on the public finance of all governments in the world upon a single standard of statistical measurement. The series, begun in 1936, was extended in the course of its production to cover two years beyond the original period of 1928–35.)

League of Nations, Economic Intelligence Service.

PUBLIC FINANCE 1928–1937. XXXV. Argentine. Geneva, 1938. 25 p. 27 cm.
—— XXXVIII. Chile. Geneva, 1939. 21 p. 27 cm.
—— XXXVI. Bolivia. Geneva, 1938. 8 p. 27 cm.
—— XXXIX. Colombia. Geneva, 1939. 11 p. 27 cm.
—— XL. Costa Rica. Geneva, 1938. 6 p. 27 cm.
—— XLIII. Ecuador. Geneva, 1938. 9 p. 27 cm.
—— XLIV. Guatemala. Geneva, 1938. 8 p. 27 cm.
—— XLVI. Honduras. Geneva, 1938. 6 p. 27 cm.
—— XLVIII. Nicaragua. Geneva, 1938. 6 p. 27 cm.
—— XLIX. Panama. Geneva, 1938. 7 p. 27 cm.
—— L. Paraguay. Geneva, 1938. 7 p. 27 cm.
—— LII. Salvador. Geneva, 1938. 7 p. 27 cm.
—— LIII. Uruguay. Geneva, 1938. 8 p. 27 cm.
—— LVII. Iran. Geneva, 1938. 7 p. 27 cm.

## STRATEGIC MATERIALS

STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL raw materials. Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 76th Congress, 1st Session on H.R. 2969, 3320, 2556, 2643, 1987, 987, and 4373 to provide for the common defense by acquiring stocks of strategic and critical raw materials in time of national emergency, and for other purposes. February 21, 28, March 1, 2, 3, and 7, 1939. Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs. Washington, 1939. iii, 232 p. 23 cm.
Congressional action on this subject was taken on S. Res. 572, 76th Cong. 1st sess., accompanied by S. Report 119 from the Committee on Military Affairs.

## TELECOMMUNICATIONS

INTERNATIONAL Telecommunications Conferences, Cairo, 1938. Report to the Secretary of State by the chairman of the American delegation. With appended documents. Washington, 1939. iii, 428 p. 23 cm. (Department of State, Publication 1286, Conference Series 39.) 45c.

## UNITED STATES

PAPERS relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1923. Vol. I. Washington, 1938 cxi, 973 p. 23½ cm. (Department of State Pub. 1260.) $1.25.
PAPERS relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1923. Vol. II. Washington, 1938. cxix, 1,283 p. 23½ cm. (Department of State Pub. 1262.) $2.00.
AMERICAN DELEGATIONS to international conferences, congresses and expositions and American representation on international institutions and commissions with relevant data. Fiscal year ended June 30, 1938. Washington, 1939. vii, 192 p. 23 cm. (Department of State Publication 1300, Conference Series 40.) 25c.

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